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Social policy plays an essential role in our efforts to build a more caring Europe,
more united and more successful in economic terms. It gives meaning to our
actions. It enables us to mobilise strengths and combine forces in working
towards shared aims.
This first Commission Report on Industrial Relations shows that European
social policy has far-reaching effects; it is steadily becoming a more integral
part of the decision-making and strategies of numerous players.
That goes without saying in fields where the European Union has clearly
defined and affirmed its principles: respect for fundamental social rights in a
frontier-free Europe; workers' rights to information and consultation on
company operations; social dialogue as a mainstay of good governance and a
means of involving citizens in the European venture.
However, far beyond such areas, it is interesting and encouraging to note that
the European dimension is on the table in national negotiations on wages or
the adaptation of working time, and that it was raised in the discussions
culminating in the conclusion of the national employment pacts.
For that reason, it was important to have a tool for information and analysis
at our disposal, available to a wide public, increasing our understanding of this
common heritage and throwing light on the initiatives taken by those who
play a part in shaping day by day the image of social Europe.
Anna Diamantopoulou
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Editoditor al
This report, the Commission's first on the subject
of industrial relations in Europe, fulfils a require-
ment for greater transparency in an area which
affects the everyday life of Europe's citizens. The
information it contains is intended for a wide
audience, with an eye to boosting industrial rela-
tions at all levels.
Key developments occurring over the last few years
are also noted in the report. The firmly rooted
national element of industrial relations has assu-
med a wider dimension as a result of growing
Europe-wide cooperation in the economic, mone-
tary and employment spheres, giving rise to inno-
vative, flexible forms of interaction. These changes
are happening quickly but are not yet completed.
Depending on the Member State or sector concer-
ned, industrial relations are driven mainly by indi-
vidual employment contracts, company or branch
agreements and national rules laid down on a sta-
tutory or collectively agreed basis. While a quarter
of the Member States' wealth on average is derived
from exports to the rest of the Union, meaning that
one worker in four is producing for the "internal"
market, the underlying social conditions continue
to be determined locally. The developments high-
lighted in this report show that the players invol-
ved must increasingly take the European dimen-
sion into account.
Highlights
The major influences on industrial rela-
tions in the European Union over the last
few years have been as follows:
– Economic and monetary union has helped
to create a more cooperative industrial rela-
tions climate based on shared macro-econo-
mic objectives. The sharp drop in the num-
ber of labour disputes illustrates this change.
The number of working days lost through
disputes in the European Union fell from
more than 85 million in 1979 to less than 7
million in 1996.
– In spite of the far-reaching structural
changes affecting industry and the European
economy more generally, and consequently
their members, the social partners have
adapted and they now have a greater say in
matters. At national level, new tripartite
approaches were taken in 11 Member States
during the 1990s, leading to the adoption of
a series of social pacts for employment. At
European level, the social partners have been
concerned mainly with getting the European
employment strategy off the ground, and
their contribution to this process is the cur-
rent focus of attention.
– Wage developments have been very modera-
te in the European Union over the past two
decades, with increases in real employee
compensation tending to remain below pro-
ductivity growth. As a result, real unit labour
costs fell by about 6% between 1991 and
1998, thereby paving the way for a readjust-
ment of economic policy and stabilisation of
inflation at a very low level. From an avera-
ge rate of around 10% between 1970 and
1985, inflation has fallen to less than 2%.
The introduction of macro-economic dia-
logue and increasing awareness of the
European dimension among national nego-
tiators is impacting markedly upon wage
negotiations.
– Enlargement will bring into the European
Union a number of countries with wage
levels in the region of 300 euro per month,
as opposed to more than 2 000 euro in many
of the current EU Member States. However,
these wage levels are roughly in line with
productivity. Far from being a competitive
threat to the 15 Member States, Central and
Eastern Europe represents a huge and gro-
wing market that absorbs more imports from
the current EU than it exports to it. The EU's
trade surplus amounted to some 27 billion
euro in 1998.
– The annual duration of working time in
1998 was 1 660 hours, ranging from 1 425 in
the Netherlands to 1 940 in Greece.
Innovative changes in hours of work and
working patterns are now widespread, geared
to achieving not only greater flexibility but
also a restructuring of working life, family
life and leisure time. Involvement in part-
time work continues to grow, covering 6% of
men and over 30% of women in 1998. The
question of reducing weekly working hours
is still very topical.
Wages
In the 1980s, the European social partners were for-
ced to experience wage restraint. Erratic rises in
nominal wages – reaching an average of 14% in the
1970s – were quickly eaten away by inflation. As a
result, the social partners, governments and mone-
tary authorities began to favour a concerted strate-
gy. The policy of nominal wage restraint has helped
to get inflation under control (falling below 2%)
and offers the best prospect of an increase in real
wages.
This policy, pursued over a 15-year period, paved
the way for the convergence needed to establish
economic and monetary union. The credibility of
the process is reflected in the long-term lowering of
interest rates, now in the region of 4%. This policy
remains vital to the ongoing process of regenera-
ting the European economy.
A radical change in the outlook of trade unions and
employers is a necessary corollary to such develop-
ments. The social partners have been obliged to
include the question of macro-economic stability in
their discussions; their key role in macro-economic
development has been recognised at the highest
level of the European Union. The Cologne European
Council set up a permanent mechanism for
exchanges at technical and policy levels between the
social partners, the Council, the Commission and
representatives of the European Central bank.
These "macro-economic dialogue" meetings show
how the fundamental approach to wage negotia-
tion is changing and how European developments
are influencing decentralised industrial relations.
One point to note is that, given these changes, cer-
tain trade-union bodies are coming together to
rethink at multinational level the terms of wage
negotiation. These efforts are aimed at strengthening
the trade-union negotiating stance over a broader
range of issues, including the objective of macro-eco-
nomic stability, and encompassing access to training,
equal opportunities and mobility.
The goal of stability has also led the social partners
to look for other ways of sharing in productivity
gains. The development of schemes to provide par-
ticipation in profits and enterprise results is a step
in the right direction, giving rise to new forms of
in-house organisation. 80% of the 500 largest
European companies have already introduced
financial participation schemes. Innovative
methods are springing up in a number of Member
States and the Commission is keeping a keen eye
on the situation.
The social partners continue to have the final say
on wages, although there is a limiting factor in that
the public authorities determine the level of social
security contributions – generally between 30 and
close to 60% of the total labour cost. They may give
guidelines, e.g. by setting minimum wage levels, as
is the case in eight Member States. It is, however,
the social partners' input which, in the final analy-
sis, determines general wage trends.
In this context, the persistence of gender-related
wage inequalities is all the more unacceptable. In
spite of a Directive adopted in 1975 (75/117/EC),
the wage gap between men and women remains at
around 28%, due partly to objective factors such as
couples' sharing of responsibilities (women having
more frequent career breaks), and reflecting also
the difficulty of reconciling work and family life.
The social partners can help to lessen such inequa-
lity by incorporating the gender dimension into
their agreements and by giving women more pro-
minence in collective bargaining.
The next enlargement will bring in countries with
low wage levels compared to the current EU States.
Far from being a homogeneous group, the candida-
te countries themselves display significant wage-
cost differentials, varying from 105 euro per month
in Bulgaria to 854 euro in Slovenia. With labour
productivity taken into account, the wage competi-
tiveness of the candidate countries is close to that
of the European Union. The EU's experience of
integrating Portugal, Spain and Greece shows that
the raising of real wages is a slow process, in line
with internal productivity trends rather than an
abstract European "norm".
Furthermore, it is generally the high-wage coun-
tries that benefit most from trade. This is particu-
larly striking in relations between the EU and
Central and Eastern Europe : Western Europe had a
large trade surplus of 27 billion euro with Central
and Eastern Europe in 1998. 
Working time
Besides wages, the second structural element of col-
lective bargaining lies in determining working time
and patterns of work. While recent developments
in wage negotiation have centred around the objec-
tive of economic stability, discussions on the orga-
nisation and duration of work have diversified and
expanded, being currently the focus for numerous
innovations.
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– The social dialogue at European level is
expanding considerably. More than 100
texts adopted jointly over a 10-year period
and six recent agreements provide evidence
of this dynamism. Under the Treaty, the
European social partners now have a greater
say in shaping social policy. Three cross-
industry agreements have been incorporated
into directives, thereby becoming compulso-
rily applicable.
The standard model of daily, weekly, monthly and
annual working time is the subject of much debate.
Working-time flexibility is emerging in the shape of
variable hours, the development of part-time or
weekend working, the annualisation of working
time and the introduction of opportunities for
taking career breaks and adjusting the age of retire-
ment. Between 1985 and 1998, part-time work
increased from 4 to 6% for men and from 28 to
32% for women.
These developments reflect the need to adapt pro-
duction rhythms and service availability more close-
ly to demand, with the aim of giving companies the
necessary flexibility and finding the most efficient
and productive forms of organisation. The changes
also meet workers' expectations in terms of having
more leisure time and being able to reconcile family
and work responsibilities more effectively.
One issue raised by these developments, however,
is the new balance to be struck between working
time flexibility and employee protection. Insecurity
may stem both from employment periods and from
the employment contract itself. Discussions are
focusing more and more on the need to consider
fragmented periods of working time from a general
vocational point of view, including periods spent
acquiring new knowledge and skills.
The working population in Europe (i.e. 61% of
people of working age) works an average of 1 600
hours a year, corresponding to a full working lifeti-
me of around 70 000 hours. This quantity of work
may be managed in various ways, having regard to
two questions to which all the EU Member States
have tried to find answers.
The first question has to do with the flexibility of
working patterns and hours. The burgeoning areas
of part-time work (17.4% of employment in 1998)
and weekend working indicate a trend towards
individualisation of working time and patterns.
The many possibilities for taking a career break
(training leave, sabbaticals, parental leave, etc.)
provide further scope for arranging one's working
life.
The second question has to do with the reduction
of working time, either in the form of maximum
weekly and annual hours or in the form of early
retirement. There is clearly an ongoing long-term
trend towards shorter working hours. The current
technological revolution, bringing with it signifi-
cant productivity gains and heightened aspirations
for a better quality of life, has given fresh impetus
to the debate. 
The Community approach in this field has been
geared to protecting employees against risks to
their health or safety. More recently, the social part-
ners' framework agreement on part-time employ-
ment contracts endorsed the principle of equal
treatment. The social partners in the agricultural
sector have, moreover, negotiated a reduction in
annual working time as part of a process to impro-
ve the organisation of work and promote employ-
ment. Such developments show how this issue is
being addressed at Community level and give some
idea of the far-reaching economic and social impli-
cations of discussions or measures dealing with the
duration and organisation of working time.
Social dialogue at European level
The European social dialogue has been instrumen-
tal in smoothing out cultural differences with
regard to industrial relations. Bipartite bodies set up
from 1985 onwards at cross-industry level, exten-
ding gradually to a number of sectors, have provi-
ded a forum for experimenting with 15-strong
negotiating teams and for clarifying the ground
rules.
In this context, it is essential to get the social
players at European level structured properly.
Aspects of representativeness and delegation of
authority have been central to the debates conduc-
ted in the wake of the entry into force of the Treaty
on European Union ("Maastricht Treaty"). With dis-
cussions continuing on these issues, the response
from the social players themselves has been extre-
mely encouraging.
The social dialogue has now reached the point
where it must focus on the partners’ ability to seize
the opportunities afforded by the Maastricht and
Amsterdam Treaties. On matters which are vitally
important to companies and workers, such as infor-
mation and consultation, skills acquisition, lifelong
training and mobility, it is necessary to modernise
the existing provisions, taking into account the
rapid introduction of new technologies, the gro-
wing need for business flexibility, and the desire on
the part of workers for further qualifications, mobi-
lity and a better balance between working and
family life.
It can be seen from the slowly emerging forms of
cooperation at European level that the social players
are increasingly taking account of the European
dimension and, in a number of cases, are using or
creating the new tools needed for action at this level.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of transna-
tional companies where, under the impetus given
by Directive 94/45/EC, more than 600 agreements
setting up mechanisms for informing and consul-
ting employees have been signed. Lending a new
form to European social dialogue, group works
councils help to foster exchanges of views and dis-
cussions which are essential for the development of
a multinational understanding of industrial rela-
tions. In years to come, these group works councils
could provide the proper forum for addressing
issues such as mobility, transferability of rights and
equal opportunities.
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The sectoral social dialogue is gradually taking
shape, with a voluntary bipartite dialogue process
currently being developed in 24 sectors at European
level. In traditional areas, where common
Community policies have been applied for a num-
ber of years, or in the emerging sectors, the social
players are seeking forms of cooperation at
European level. In most cases, the initial dialogue is
geared to identifying relevant problem areas for the
social dialogue and trying out a common "vocabu-
lary". This explains why, at the present stage, com-
mitments resulting from the sectoral social dia-
logue are still thin on the ground.
The sectoral element is no less crucial. It is, in many
Member States, the bridgebuilder of collective bar-
gaining, allowing the specific features of each area
of activity to be taken into account while determi-
ning the general conditions in which industrial
relations can flourish. At European level, agree-
ments on the reduction of working time (agricultu-
re – July 1997) and on the organisation of working
time (maritime transport – September 1998, rail-
ways – September 1998) have been signed.
In a number of sectors affected by a rapid process of
restructuring, the social partners are becoming
increasingly aware that Europe is the most suitable
arena for dealing with the changes and for taking
the necessary action. With new areas for discussion
now opening up, such as the social impact of the
emerging information society and teleworking, the
social partners in many sectors are discussing ways
of providing more support for developments at
national level.
The cross-industry social dialogue comprises two
elements: tripartite concertation and autonomous
bipartite dialogue. Born of a strong political will to
have the social partners more centrally involved in
the ongoing process of European integration, the
desired effect has been achieved.
Established initially in an advisory capacity (cross-
industry advisory committees), tripartite concerta-
tion was strengthened in the 1970s (setting up of
the Standing Committee on Employment and orga-
nisation of tripartite conferences), with the focus
on matters relating to employment. Tripartite dis-
cussions have taken place on such issues as the
acquisition of vocational training, improvement of
young people’s access to the labour market, equal
opportunities for women and men, and integration
of the long-term unemployed, leading to conclu-
sions which indicate that there are broad areas of
consensus.
The tripartite concertation process was recently
regenerated with the introduction of the European
employment strategy and discussion of the
employment guidelines, resulting in consolidation
of the forums for concertation and creation of new
structures.
Technical aspects of the employment guidelines are
regularly discussed by the "Employment and
Labour Market" Committee and the social partners.
Economic policy coordination and closer interac-
tion between wage trends and economic, budgeta-
ry and financial policy are discussed from the tech-
nical and policy-oriented points of view within the
framework of a "macro-economic dialogue" establi-
shed by the Cologne European Council. Half-year-
ly meetings within the Standing Committee on
Employment and with the Troika of heads of state
and government give Europe’s social partners the
opportunity to discuss economic guidelines and
employment policies and their interaction.
The institutional avenues open to the social part-
ners from the outset enable them to take a proacti-
ve stance on two key aspects of Community action:
coordination of economic polices and implementa-
tion of the European employment strategy.
The bipartite cross-industry social dialogue or "Val
Duchesse" social dialogue has played a key role at
European level, providing a springboard for enga-
ging in dialogue leading to agreement-based out-
comes. This approach, adopted in 1985 by UNICE,
CEEP and the ETUC, has proved fruitful, resulting
in the role of the social partners being recognised
in the Treaty (Articles 138 and 139). The organisa-
tions involved in this dialogue are able to explore
and discuss together the key issues to be addressed
in the building of Europe: the setting up of a coope-
ration strategy for economic policies; the comple-
tion of the Internal Market; the implementation of
the Social Charter of the Fundamental Rights of
Workers; and the progress towards economic and
monetary union. On these matters, thanks to their
dialogue, the social partners in Europe have been
able, at Summit meetings or through the adoption
of opinions and recommendations, to influence
recent developments and play a part in establishing
policies.
The most striking manifestation of this influence
occurred at the 1991 Intergovernmental Con-
ference, in the course of which a contribution by
the social partners (agreement of 31 October 1991)
served as a basis for drawing up the new Treaty
articles stipulating the role of the social partners at
European level.
The entry into force of the new provisions in 1993
launched the cross-industry social dialogue into a
new era. The social partners’ right to be consulted
on proposals in the social field and to opt for agree-
ment-based rather than legislative measures now
makes them central players in the European social
arena. The "joint opinions" period has thus gra-
dually given way to the negotiation of European
framework agreements.
Three framework agreements have been signed
since 1995: parental leave (December 1995); part-
time employment contracts (June 1997) and fixed-
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term employment contracts (March 1999). The
significance of this development is that it consti-
tutes a first step in the use of the innovative provi-
sions of Articles 138 and 139 of the Treaty, placing
the social partners in a position to determine, on
their own initiative, subjects of common interest
which they wish to address in future negotiations.
Community social law
The scope of European social policy has widened
and diversified over the lifetime of the Community.
The initial efforts to establish an area of occupatio-
nal mobility have been supplemented by provi-
sions aimed at combating distortions of competi-
tion, promoting equal opportunities for women
and men, and improving health and safety protec-
tion at the workplace. The progress made most
recently on the institutional front means that the
European social sphere now encompasses employ-
ment-related aspects, especially efforts to combat
discrimination.
Community social law nowadays focuses on four
main areas: freedom of movement for workers;
labour law; equal opportunities for women and
men; and protection of health and safety at the
workplace. Community proposals in these areas are
designed to establish new rights on transnational
matters (freedom of movement; European works
councils; posting of workers) and to determine
minimum entitlements without prejudice to more
favourable provisions at national level.
The task of incorporating the guidelines laid down
by Community Directives into national legislation
or collective agreements is an important facet of
European social law. Besides monitoring and eva-
luating the situation, the competent national
authorities need to interact with one another.
An increasingly important challenge lies in ensu-
ring that Community social law is properly unders-
tood and applied.
The practice of informing and consulting
employees is widespread in Europe. Companies
anxious to capitalise on the motivation and com-
mitment of their staff, and aware that this form of
dialogue is a source of innovation and improve-
ment in the organisation of work, have generally
developed on a voluntary basis mechanisms for
informing and consulting their staff. Provisions
introduced at European level have sought to clarify
the conditions governing employee involvement
and the level at which it should occur. The first
"labour law" directives in the early 1970s made it
compulsory to inform and consult employees
about major economic upheavals: "collective dis-
missals" and "transfers of businesses". Council
Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 made it
obligatory to inform and consult employees within
European groups employing more than 1 000
people. A more recent proposal is aimed at exten-
ding this obligation to all European companies
with more than 50 employees.
The approach adopted at Community level is desi-
gned to place greater emphasis on national prac-
tices in the face of internationalisation (informa-
tion on the European group’s strategy enhances the
information supplied locally) and to promote equal
treatment for workers and companies. In a period
of radical and rapid structural transformation, with
European companies having constantly to adapt
and reorganise, it is essential that the social impact
of change be taken into account.
Steps are currently being taken at national level to
redefine the internal ground rules applying to the
different levels and areas. Occurrences on two
fronts will have an effect on collective bargaining:
a trend towards greater freedom at decentralised
levels vis-à-vis the standards and guidelines nego-
tiated centrally, and broadening the scope of nego-
tiations.
Some clarification is still required as to where the
European dimension fits into the scheme of things.
The multi-layering of negotiation on the same
topics – the European framework being interpreted
nationally, then consolidated at branch or compa-
ny level – would lead to very general guidelines
being laid down at the highest level. A central task
in this context is to find ways of achieving comple-
mentarity between the levels.
A trend towards the coordination of collective bar-
gaining at European level is emerging in the light
of certain recent developments, whether in the
form of decentralised initiatives or initiatives taken
by European social partner organisations. This
applies particularly to trade-union action in
connection with wages in cross-border regions.
More generally, there is now an increasing spread
of issues and practices, and ever-growing awareness
of being part of the Union in national or decentra-
lised discussions between the social partners.
Practices governing the framework of dialogue, the
outcome of collective bargaining, the conditions
for collective action and the arrangements for resol-
ving conflicts are, however, still determined at
national level. European law is not applicable to
such matters, which are underpinned by strong
national traditions.
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Social pacts for employment
In the 1990s, tripartite pacts or agreements for
employment were signed in many Member States.
The growing influence of the tripartite approach
with regard to matters concerning employment
promotion, control of inflation and modernisation
of social protection systems marks a new stage in
industrial relations in Europe.
Through the social pacts, the partners are required
to turn their attention to areas traditionally reser-
ved for public action: employment-oriented poli-
cies and economic policy guidelines. On the other
hand, they undertake to negotiate, beyond their
contractual autonomy, framework guidelines for
wage trends or changes in the operation of the
labour market.
The efforts invested by the Member States in
conjunction with the advent of economic and
monetary union would undoubtedly not have been
possible without partnership and without input
from the social partners in their own spheres of
competence.
Over the last few years, this partnership-based
approach has been pursued by a number of
Member States engaged in the negotiation of
"second-generation pacts", with the objective of
preparing for and mastering current developments:
globalisation of markets, increasing competition
and demands of competitiveness; growing influen-
ce of the information society and lasting transfor-
mation of production methods, consumer habits
and lifestyles; demographic ageing and new inter-
generational compromises resulting therefrom;
development of working-time flexibility and the
question of continuity of rights in the event of
career breaks and job changes.
Against this backdrop, the social dialogue is taking
on fresh significance. As a key instrument for invol-
ving representatives of the working population in
decisions which affect them, it has become the
forum for airing a wider range of views and expec-
tations held by society generally.
The trend towards adopting social pacts at national
level has given rise to a parallel approach at
Community level. The European employment pact,
the draft of which was launched at the Cologne
European Council, seeks to reproduce on a Europe-
wide basis the highly positive dynamism set in
train in many Member States.
If it is to succeed, the partnership-based approach
at European level needs a strong commitment from
everyone and from the social partners first and
foremost. It demonstrates, alongside the other
aspects emphasised in this report, what is really
needed to boost industrial relations at European
level.
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Industrial relations at European level
The various players
and institutions at
European level
With the process of Europeanintegration gathering pace, the
social partners have become increa-
singly involved at European level.
To begin with, this took the form of
coordinating the views of national
organisations and giving expression
at European level to the concerns of
workers and business.
As the number of forums and oppor-
tunities for dialogue increased, the
social partners gradually strengthe-
ned their European representation to
enable them to play a full part in the
social dialogue.
The social partners’ involvement in
the design and drafting of European
social provisions is based on a firmly
rooted tradition in most of the
Member States. All aspects of the
social dialogue (from consultation to
negotiation) help to make the deci-
sion-making procedure more effecti-
ve and to enhance good governance.
The social partners are ideally placed
to give real substance to industrial
relations, and this has enabled them
to secure an area of responsibility
and room for autonomous action. By
means of their negotiation role in
particular, they have to make choices
which structure the way industrial
relations are organised and to
express general views which go
beyond the specific concerns of this
or that group.
This role is an important aspect of
the European social model, bringing
together a number of values — res-
ponsibility, solidarity and participa-
tion. It is only natural, then, that the
social partners should have become
stakeholders in the construction of
the European Community.
At cross-industry level, the major
European social partners’ organisa-
tions have been active since the out-
set.
UNICE, CEEP and ETUC have taken
the lead in organising and develo-
ping the social dialogue at
Community level. They were the
first to become truly aware of the
creation of a European area for
industrial relations, and it was they
which, in 1985, agreed to take part in
the ‘Val Duchesse’-type dialogue,
going well beyond pure and simple
consultation.
More recently, a number of
European organisations which were
not present at the outset have staked
a claim for their place in the social
dialogue, the upshot being endea-
vours to reach cooperation agree-
ments with UNICE, on the one
hand, and with ETUC, on the other.
There are currently two major
European cross-industry organisa-
tions which are well ahead of the
others in terms of representativeness:
UNICE on the employers’ side, and
ETUC on the workers’ side1.
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Industri l relations at Europe n level
• Social dialogue: Process of continuous interaction between the
social partners with the aim of reaching agreements on the control of
certain economic and social variables, at both macro and micro levels.
• Consultation: A process of discussion and debate, usually distingui-
shed from collective bargaining and negotiation in that it does not
imply a process of bargaining, compromise and joint agreement.
• Social concertation: Method of managing labour, social and eco-
nomic issues by means of consultation and social concertation bet-
ween the public authorities and bodies representing employees and
employers.
• Collective bargaining: Collective bargaining is the process of
negotiation by which collective agreements are reached. Such agree-
ments are compromises which reflect the relative bargaining power of
the parties.
• Collective agreement: An agreement reached through collective
bargaining between an employer and one or more trade unions, or
between employers’ associations and trade union confederations.
This agreement regulates the relationships between the parties and
the treatment of individual workers, and covers the wages and condi-
tions of the workers affected.
Source:  Industrial relations glossaries, Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 1993.
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The origins of the European cross-industry organisations
UNICE - Union of Industrial and
Employers’ Confederations of Europe
SSE - European trade union secretariat1958
1961
1969
1973
1979
1989
CESL - European confederation of free 
trade unions
ETUC - European Trade Union 
Confederation
CEC - European confederation of
Executives and Managerial staff
CEEP - European Centre of Enterprises
with Public Participation 
UEAPME - European association of craft,
small and medium-sized enterprises
Cross-industry 
union representation 2
In assessing ETUC’s representative-
ness, account has to be taken of the
agreement reached last June between
Eurocadres and the CEC, under
which the two organisations under-
took to work closely together within
all of the social dialogue entities.
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In interpreting these data, it has to be
borne in mind that half of all firms in
Europe have no paid employees. In
other words, the clearest picture
emerges from looking at the relative
weight of organisations in terms of
total employment.
In assessing UNICE’s representative-
ness, account has to be taken of CEEP
(for public service jobs) and the
UEAPME (for small and medium-
sized undertakings and for the craft
trades). It has further to be borne in
mind that, in Austria, the 100 %
business membership rate is because
of compulsory membership3.
Employers’ organisations, 
cross-industry level
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Coverage 
of existing agreements
Agreements signed by the European
organisations cover directly 70 mil-
lion workers, and close on 6 million
businesses in Europe. Because the
agreements are automatically incor-
porated into industry or business-
level agreements, and because a
number of countries use extension
procedures, the rate of coverage of
agreements signed by the European
cross-industry organisations is, in
fact, around 80 %, within a range
extending from just less than 30 %
in the United Kingdom to approxi-
mately 95 % in Austria and Finland.
Links between cross-
industry and sectoral
organisations
The links between the cross-industry
organisations and the sectoral orga-
nisations tend to vary. On the trade
union side, the federations represen-
ting the main sectors are all members
of ETUC. On the employers’ side, the
European employers’ network
enables the various organisations to
exchange information, but does not
have any real coordination function.
A number of sectoral employers’
organisations do not actually regard
themselves as social partners. This
imbalanced situation is reflected in
the list of organisations consulted
under Article 138 of the Treaty, from
which it is clear that a
number of trade union
federations have no
counterpart on the
employers’ side. The gro-
wing importance of the
sectoral social dialogue,
reflected in the number
of sectoral committees
now being set up (see
below), should, howe-
ver, eventually bring this
list back into balance.
The question of linkage
between general-covera-
ge organisations and
specifically sectoral orga-
nisations will be one of
the major challenges
over the years to come.
The social partners at
European level will have
to cope with the chal-
lenge of a growing level
of autonomous representation cove-
ring all aspects of industrial relations.
As a result, the need for linkage bet-
ween the various levels — cross-
industry, sectoral and company —
will become ever more pressing.
Consultation 
of the social partners
Since the Treaty of Rome, a number
of mechanisms have been set in
place to facilitate the work of the
social partners.
The initial need was to enable repre-
sentatives of the social partners to
give their opinions on Community
policies. This level of consultation
has been fleshed out and become
more structured over the course of
time.
In its communication of 20 May
1998 entitled ‘Adapting and promo-
ting the social dialogue’, the
Commission suggested rationalising
these consultation forums. It under-
took to merge the two advisory com-
mittees dealing with social security
for migrant workers and with free-
dom of movement for workers. It
also decided to replace the joint
committees by sectoral social dia-
logue committees with extended
powers, more especially in terms of
dialogue and negotiation. Finally, it
decided to set up a liaison forum ups-
tream of the trade union and
employers’ organisations involved in
the European social dialogue.
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Joint Committee on Sea Transport
Joint Committee on Civil Aviation
Joint Committee on Telecommunications
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on Postal Services
Article 3 of the agreement on social policy
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Specific consultations
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New sectoral
social dialogue
committees
New sectoral
social dialogue
committees
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
European
work
councils
Reconciling family and
working life
Reversal of the burden
of proof in case of discrimination based on the sex
Flexible working time
and job security
Sexual harassment
Information and Consultation
of workers
Negotiation on part-time working
Negotiation on
fixed-term
contracts
Negotiation on parental leave
Consultation
Consultation
Consultation
Consultation
Consultation
Consultation
The entry into force of the
Maastricht Treaty and its social chap-
ter brought with it an obligation on
the Commission to consult the social
partners in advance of adopting
legislative proposals in the following
fields (Article 137):
• improvement, in particular, of the
working environment to protect
workers’ health and safety;
• working conditions;
• information and consultation of
workers;
• equality between men and women
with regard to labour market
opportunities and treatment at
work;
• integration of persons excluded
from the labour market;
• social security and social protec-
tion of workers;
• protection of workers where their
employment contract is termina-
ted;
• representation and collective
defence of the interests of workers
and employers;
• conditions of employment for
third-country nationals legally resi-
ding in Community territory;
• financial contributions for the pro-
motion of employment and job-
creation, without prejudice to the
provisions relating to the European
Social Fund.
Article 138 of the Treaty entitles the
social partners to be consulted in two
stages: (a) on the need for and the
possible direction of Community
action; and (b) on its content. At the
end of this consultation process, the
organisations can present an opinion
or a recommendation to the
Commission or inform the Commis-
sion of their intention to open nego-
tiations on the subject covered by
the consultation. In this case, the
social partners have an initial period
of nine months to reach an agree-
ment. Where the social partners do
not take the initiative, the
Commission resumes its active role.
These provisions have been used six
times since 1993.
In the wake of these consultations,
the social partners gave the Com-
mission the following replies:
• European works councils: failure to
define the terms of reference for
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Tripartite concertation
The social partners are also involved
in preparing the work of the
Council. Since 1970, the Standing
Committee on Employment (SCE)
has met twice a year in the presence
of representatives of the Council, the
Commission and the social partners
to discuss issues linked to industrial
change and the employment situa-
tion.
The tripartite concertation system
has been greatly strengthened over
recent years, with the social partners
now being invited to informal and
periodic meetings with the ‘troika’ of
Heads of State or Government, in
conjunction with successive
European Councils, with the
Employment and Social Affairs
Council, and with representatives of
the European Central Bank.
Following the Cologne European
Council (1999), a ‘macroeconomic’
dialogue was set up, bringing in the
social partners to coordinate eco-
nomic policy and improve the inter-
action between wage trends and
monetary, budget and tax policy.
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negotiation. Elements arising from
the discussions between the social
partners were incorporated into
the proposal which was adopted by
the Commission.
• Reconciling family and working
life: agreement of 14 December
1995 on parental leave.
• Reversal of the burden of proof in
case of discrimination based on the
sex: the social partners decided to
leave this issue in the legislator’s
hands.
• Flexible working time and job
security: agreements of 6 June
1997 on part-time working and of
18 March 1999 on fixed-term
contracts.
• Sexual harassment: the employers
were against adopting a binding
instrument on this matter.
• Information and consultation of
workers: the employers were oppo-
sed to adopting a European instru-
ment.
Settings for tripartite consultation
Tripartite consultation of the social partners: Current structure
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The bipartite Val
Duchesse social dialogue
Since 1985, acting on an initiative
from the then President of the
Commission, Jacques Delors, the
social partners have been engaged in
autonomous dialogue, presaging the
development of a European contrac-
tual area.
The Val Duchesse dialogue is pushed
along periodically by plenary meet-
ings (the social dialogue ‘summits’),
and currently comes under the aus-
pices of the Social Dialogue
Committee (the permanent dialogue
level) and the subservient technical
working groups (on macroeconom-
ics, the labour market and education
and training).
With effect from 1 January 1999, a
similar approach has been adopted
for the sectoral dialogue, with the
creation, in sectors requesting it, of
sectoral social dialogue committees.
These new committees are set up on
a voluntary basis and replace the old
joint committees and informal, advi-
sory working parties. They depend
on the willingness of the two sides to
develop a social dialogue in all the
various aspects in the sectors con-
cerned.
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Social Dialogue
Summits or
Mini-Summits
Social
Dialogue
Committee
Labour Market
working
group
Macroeconomic
working
group
Education and
training
working group
Sector Workers Employers Old Old informal New 
committee group   SSDC
Agriculture EFA GEOPA/COPA ✔ ✔
Insurance UNI-Europa CEA; BIPAR; AECI ✔ ✔
Banking UNI-Europa BFEU; ESBG; EACB ✔ ✔
Footwear ETUF-TCL CEC ✔ ✔
Wood EFBWW CEI-Bois ✔ ✔
Railways ETF CER ✔ ✔
Commerce UNI-Europa Eurocommerce ✔ ✔
Construction EFBWW FIEC ✔ ✔
Culture EEA Pearle ✔
Horeca SETA-UITA Hotrec ✔ ✔
Inland navigation ETF IUIN; ESO ✔ ✔
Cleaning UNI-Europa EFCI ✔ ✔
Sea fishing ETF Europeche/Cogeca ✔ ✔
Postal services UNI-Europa Posteurop ✔ ✔
Private security UNI-Europa COESS ✔ ✔
Personal services (hairdressing) UNI-Europa CIC Europe ✔
Sugar ECF-IUF CEFS ✔ ✔
Tanning ETUF-TCL Cotance ✔
Textiles ETUF-TCL Euratex ✔ ✔
Sea transport ETF ECSA ✔ ✔
Road transport ETF IRU ✔ ✔
Temporary work UNI-Europa CIETT ✔
Telecommunications UNI-Europa ETNO ✔ ✔
Air transport ETF; ECA AEA; ERA; ACI Europe; IACA ✔ ✔
Electricity EPSU; EMCEF Eurelectric ✔ ✔
Media EFJ UER; ENPA ✔
Local public services EPSU CEMR ✔
Graphics UNI-Europa Intergraf ✔
Total 9 15 25
Sectoral social dialogue committees (SSDCs)
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Negotiations
Since 1991, either on their own ini-
tiative or in the wake of consulta-
tions based on Article 3 of the agree-
ment on social policy (now Article
138 of the Treaty), the social partners
have negotiated a number of agree-
ments within specially constituted
negotiating groups.
Since 1994, i.e. since the adoption of
Council Directive 94/45/EC on the
establishment of a European works
council or a procedure in Com-
munity-scale undertakings and
Community-scale groups of under-
takings for the purposes of informing
and consulting employees, more
than 600 agreements have been
negotiated setting up such proce-
dures and anticipating the entry into
force of the directive, as provided for
in Article 13.
Representativeness
As the social partners became more
and more involved in Community
activities, the question arose as to
their representativeness at European
level.
In response to this question, the
Commission adopted the following
approach4:
• achieving the widest possible disse-
mination of available information
among interested economic and
social parties, making use of elec-
tronic networks and widely circula-
ted publications;
• identifying the social partners
within the meaning of Article 3 of
the agreement on social policy.
In order to be eligible for consulta-
tion and to have the legitimacy to
interrupt the legislative process and
to opt for an agreement-based
approach, the social partner organi-
sations must:
• be cross-industry, or relate to speci-
fic sectors or categories and be
organised at European level;
• consist of organisations which are
themselves an integral and reco-
gnised part of Member States’
social partner structures and with
the capacity to negotiate agree-
ments, and which are representati-
ve of all Member States, as far as
possible;
• have adequate structures to ensure
their effective participation in the
consultation process.
To date, some 30 European organisa-
tions have met these three criteria.
They are systematically consulted on
any proposal in the social policy
field. The list of such organisations is
reviewed regularly in the light of
experience and of the results of an
ongoing study on representativeness
(see next page).
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Employees Employers
1. General-purpose cross-industry organisations
ETUC UNICE
CEEP
2. Cross-industry organisations representing certain categories of workers or businesses
CEC UEAPME
Eurocadres (ETUC)
3. Specific organisations
Eurochambres
4 and 5. Sectoral organisations and European sectoral federations affiliated to ETUC
Commerce UNI-Europa Eurocommerce
Insurance AECI
BIPAR
CEA
Banking BFEU
EACB
ESBG
Cleaning EFCI
Postal and telecommunications services
Graphics
Catering etc. ECF-IUF Hotrec
Construction EFBWW FIEC
Wood CEI-Bois
Agriculture EFA COPA/Cogeca
Fishing ETF Europeche
Civil aviation ERA
ACI Europe
AEA
Inland navigation ESO
IUIN
Sea transport ECSA
Railways CER
Road transport IRU
Metal EMF
Culture and media EEA
Public services EPSU
Teaching ETUCE
Textiles, footwear, leather ETUF-TCL
Chemicals and energy EMCEF
Journalists EFJ-IFJ
Diamonds and precious stones EFDPS
Consultation under Article 138
The European 
social dialogue: 
main developments
Growth in the number 
of sectoral organisations
Some 20 sectors have traditionally
been involved in dialogue at
Community level. This kind of secto-
ral dialogue enables the social part-
ners to play a dual role: firstly, they
fulfil a watchdog function by
making their concerns known to the
Commission and the Council;
secondly, they provide a forum for
the exchange of ideas and dialogue
between the social partners.
Currently, there are sectoral social
dialogue committees in fields of acti-
vity representing a little more than
40 % of total employment. The total
number of sectoral social dialogue
bodies (25 sectoral social dialogue
committees have been created since
1 January 1999) has increased three-
fold in the space of 10 years.
The newcomers are mainly from the
services sector, more often than not
industries which are actively seeking
recognition and a higher profile.
Industrial sectors are comparatively
rare in the European social sectoral
dialogue system (representing 5 % of
the total: wood, construction, tex-
tiles, etc.), despite repeated requests
from the trade union side. One
explanation might be that the
employers are involved in sectoral
advisory committees which bring
together Member States and repre-
sentatives of industry, and that
industry wields a substantial weight
in a large number of UNICE’s natio-
nal member organisations. This
effectively gives industrialists a
convenient way into the social dia-
logue.
The results of the 
sectoral social dialogue
The sectoral social dialogue has gene-
rated a large number of joint texts
(more than 150), representing the
culmination of a cooperation process
and, to a limited extent, a process of
negotiation between the social part-
ners. They take the form of joint opi-
nions, declarations, resolutions,
recommendations, proposals, guide-
lines, codes of conduct, agreement
protocols and agreements proper.
Under the social dialogue system,
the social partners can take a wide
variety of initiatives. The most cur-
rent are training schemes (more
especially under the FORCE — later
the Leonardo da Vinci — program-
me), joint conferences and studies.
The growth in the number of texts
adopted by the social partners can be
explained by the number of sectors
involved in the social dialogue and
the more intense level of dialogue
within the committees. The number
of sectors has greatly increased, but
‘dialogue productivity’ has itself dou-
bled over the past 10 years (from 0.7
agreements per year in 1986 to 1.4
agreements in 1996).
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Agriculture Framework agreement on employment and working time 1997
Insurance Comments on the Commission’s Green Paper on the organisation of work 1998
Banks Joint declaration on the Commission’s Green Paper on the organisation of work 1998
Wood Agreement on sustainable forestry 1997
Footwear Update of the Charter on Child Labour 1997
Railways Agreement on the organisation of working time 1998
Commerce Agreement on fundamental rights and principles at work 1999
Construction Joint agreement on the application of the directive on the posting of workers 1997
Catering etc. Recommendation on the promotion of employment 1999
Internal navigation Examination of freer access for operators from outside the EU 1997
Cleaning Memorandum on new sources of employment 1996
Sea fishing Opinion on the safety of fishing vessels of less than 15 m 1998
Postal services Agreement on the promotion of employment 1998
Private security Handbook on the award of public contracts 1999
Sugar Teaching instruments for safety in the sugar industry 1999
Telecommunications Framework agreement on employment 2000
Textiles Code of conduct on fundamental social rights 1997
Air transport Recommendation on working time for ground staff 1994
Sea transport Agreement on the organisation of working time 1998
Road transport Agreement on the proposal for a directive concerning the minimum health 1993
and safety requirements for transport activities and places of work on board 
means of transport
Media Undertaking on tolerance and racism 1997
Local public services Joint declaration on the modernisation of public services 1996
Examples of joint texts adopted under the sectoral social dialogue
Number of sectors involved in the European social dialogue, 1965 - 2000
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The fields covered
In all, 50 % of all agreements are con-
cerned with issues involving com-
mercial policy or industrial policy
and the economy (e.g. access to mar-
kets, privatisation, organisation of
markets, etc.). In most cases, the texts
result from a joint reaction on the
part of the social partners to a
European initiative or to a consulta-
tion process initiated by the
Commission.
However, the work of the social part-
ners at sectoral level is not limited to
the ‘reactive’ aspect. A great deal of
work has been put into developing
cooperation on questions which fall
within the direct competence of the
social partners, such as employment,
vocational training, working condi-
tions and working time.
Clearly, the more experience the var-
ious sectors have of the social dia-
logue, the more able they are to pro-
duce a substantial number of agree-
ments. Correlating the number of
agreements signed to the longevity
of the social dialogue, we can see that
three very different sectors have a
particularly high level of ‘production’
(i.e. more than one agreement per
year): telecommunications, postal
services and civil aviation.
In the other sectors, the average
number of agreements5 is around 0.5
per year. In other words, it takes two
years on average to conclude a joint
text at European level.
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The level of commitment
The results of the social dialogue are
not always uniform. The social part-
ners find it easier to agree on recom-
mendations targeted at the
Community public authorities or the
national authorities. The sectoral
social dialogue has tended to gene-
rate more joint submissions to third
parties than reciprocal undertakings.
However, in fields more directly
linked to the social partners’ spheres
of competence, the level of commit-
ment is increasing, even to the point
of becoming a priority issue over the
question of working time.
The ‘recommendation’ instrument
tends to be used particularly in fields
affecting sectoral policies. In more
general terms, we can see that sectors
which have produced a substantial
number of joint texts have tended to
use the recommendation formula,
for example in telecommunications
and postal services.
Although their current spread is
unequal within the Community
social dialogue, the sectors do at the
moment offer the greatest potential
for development. It is at sectoral level
that the real economic and social
issues manifest themselves, whether
they be industrial restructuring, the
introduction of new technologies,
changing occupational profiles,
changing Community policies or
liberalisation and freer competition.
By the same token, the social part-
ners’ answers at sectoral level have a
real operational dimension.
19I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  i n  E u r o p e
Cross-industry
Textiles
Telecommunications
Tobacco
Sugar
Public services
Security
Road
Rail
Postal services
Fishing
Cleaning
Sea
Media
Catering
Electricity
Construction
Commerce
Footwear
Wood
Inland navigation
Banks
Aviation
Insurance
Agriculture
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
Textiles
Telecommunication
Public services
Security
Railways
Postal services
Fishing
Cleaning
Sea transport
Catering
Electricity
Construction
Commerce
Footwear
Wood
Agriculture
Recommendation
Monitoring
Commitment
Source: European Commission. Source: European Commission.
0,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0 1,2 1,4 1,6 1,8 2,0
Analysis/Statistics
Working conditions
Social dialogue
Employment
Training
General policy
Health and Safety
Working time
Recommendation
Monitoring
Commitment
Source: European Commission.
This analysis of the joint texts looks at three characteristics:
• the level of commitment of the social partners;
• the level of recommendation to a third party;
• the level of monitoring.
For each of these three characteristics, there were three possible results:
• no undertaking, recommendation or monitoring;
• undertaking at European level, defensive recommendation, or simple monitoring;
• undertaking the national transposition, constructive recommendation, or more 
rigorous monitoring.
To make the results more readily visible, each of these results was awarded a grading
on a scale of points from 0 to 2.
Average grading of joint text at sectoral level, by sectors Average grading of joint text at sectoral level, by areas
Number of joint texts per sector
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6 November 1986 Joint opinion on the cooperative growth strategy for more employment
6 March 1987 Joint opinion concerning training and motivation, and information and consultation
26 November 1987 Joint opinion on the Annual Economic Report 1987/88
13 February 1990 Joint opinion on the creation of a European occupational and geographical mobility area and 
improving the operation of the labour market in Europe
19 June 1990 Joint opinion on education and training
10 January 1991 Joint opinion on new technologies, work organisation and adaptability of the labour market
5 April 1991 Joint opinion on the transition from school to adult and working life
31 October 1991 Agreement on the role of the social partners in developing the Community social dimension
20 December 1991 Joint opinion on ways of facilitating the broadest possible effective access to training 
opportunities
3 July 1992 Joint opinion on a renewed cooperative growth strategy for more employment
3 July 1992 Joint statement on the future of the social dialogue
13 October 1992 Joint opinion on vocational qualifications and certification
June 1993 Joint recommendation on the functioning of interprofessional advisory committees
28 July 1993 Joint opinion on the future role and action of the Community in the field of education and 
training, including the role of the social partners
29 October 1993 Proposals by the social partners for implementation of the agreement annexed to the protocol 
on social policy of the Treaty on European Union
3 December 1993 Joint opinion on women and training
5 December 1993 Joint opinion on the framework for the broad economic policy guidelines
8 November 1994 Joint publication: ‘Broad lines of the White Paper on growth, competitiveness and employment 
in the fields of education and training, and responses to the joint opinions’
4 April 1995 Joint opinion on the contribution of vocational training to combating unemployment and 
reabsorbing the unemployed into the labour market in the light of the new situation created by 
the White Paper
16 May 1995 Joint opinion on the social partners’ guidelines for turning recovery into a sustained and 
job-creation growth process
21 October 1995 Joint declaration on the prevention of racial discrimination and xenophobia and promotion of 
equal treatment at the workplace
21 October 1995 Joint declaration of the European social partners to the Madrid European Council on the 
employment policy arising from the Essen European Council
14 December 1995 Framework agreement on parental leave
29 November 1996 Joint declaration ‘Action for employment: a confidence pact’
6 June 1997 Framework agreement on part-time work
13 November 1997 Joint contribution of the social partners to the Luxembourg Employment Summit
17 October 1998 Joint opinion on the draft decision establishing the second phase of the Leonardo da Vinci 
programme
9 December 1998 1999 employment guidelines — joint declaration of the social partners to the Vienna European 
Council
9 December 1998 Joint opinion on the reform of the Standing Committee on Employment
9 December 1998 Compendium of good practice on the employment of disabled persons
18 March 1999 Framework agreement on fixed-duration employment contracts
18 March 1999 Joint declaration for the Warsaw Conference on enlargement
19 May 1999 Declaration of the European social partners on the employment of disabled people
2 June 1999 Declaration of the social partners to the Cologne European Council
Date Cross-industry social dialogue texts
The results of 
the cross-industry 
social dialogue
The Val Duchesse social dialogue has
given the social partners at European
level the chance to intervene in areas
such as employment, vocational
training, freedom of movement,
health and safety, equal opportuni-
ties and Structural Fund operations.
The social partners have been able to
issue opinions on Commission ini-
tiatives on the coordination of eco-
nomic policies, on the implementa-
tion of the internal market and on
monetary union. But the social dia-
logue would not occupy such a cen-
tral position in our societies if all it
did was to issue opinions. The
important thing is that the dialogue
is also concerned with influencing
the social dimension directly and
helping it to develop.
This dimension of the social dia-
logue is now also beginning to make
its presence felt at Community level.
The Val Duchesse social dialogue was
an initial tentative attempt to com-
mit the European social partners’
organisations to autonomous dia-
logue. All the ensuing meetings since
1985 have helped forge a European
culture of industrial relations, and
have enabled the social partners to
test at European level their capacity
to negotiate on economic coopera-
tion strategy, vocational training,
racism, labour market adaptability,
the European employment strategy,
and the integration of disabled peo-
ple into the world of work.
The various joint opinions, recom-
mendations, declarations, and the
agreement of 31 October 1991 on
the role of the social partners in
developing the Community social
dimension formed the basis for an
approach which was consolidated
over the period 1986–93; the natural
outcome will be the development of
a European contractual area and the
first framework agreements.
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Examples of agreements
negotiated at European
level and how they have
been put into practice
Article 139 of the Treaty makes pro-
vision for two possible ways of
implementing an agreement reached
by the social partners at European
level.
Either the two sides undertake to
incorporate the terms of their agree-
ment into national agreements and
texts (this is the voluntary approach
chosen by the social partners in the
agricultural sector to implement
their agreement of July 1997 on
working time) or they ask for their
agreement to be extended to all the
industry or the whole of the econo-
my.
In the latter case, the Commission
can decide, having assessed the
scope and legality of the agreement,
to submit the social partners’ agree-
ment to the Council. The Council
can decide to give legal force to this
agreement by adopting it as a direc-
tive, a regulation or a decision. This
was the route chosen by the social
partners for the framework agree-
ments on parental leave, part-time
work contracts, limited-duration
employment contracts, and working
time in sea transport.
The agriculture 
agreement of 24 July 1997
Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23
November 1993 lays down a number
of provisions concerning the organi-
sation of working time. It makes pro-
vision for a wide range of exceptions,
more especially for the agricultural
sector, subject to certain conditions
concerning daily rest time, breaks,
weekly rest periods and night work-
ing. On these points, the directive
says that ‘derogations may be adopt-
ed by means of laws, regulations or
administrative provisions or by
means of collective agreements or
agreements between the two sides of
industry’.
The framework agreement on a rec-
ommendation for improving paid
employment in agriculture in the
Member States of the European
Union was signed on 24 July 1997 by
the employers (GEOPA/COPA) and
the European trade unions
(EFA/ETUC), and fleshed out the
areas left blank by the directive. It
also extends the scope of the direc-
tive in laying down the maximum
annual working time. It thus reflects
a very strongly held commitment on
the part of the social partners to help
boost employment.
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Commission CouncilSocial Partners
Agreement
Implementation under
the social partners’ and
the Member States
own procedures
and practices
Commission asked
to submit the
agreement for
implementation
by Council decision
(field covered
by Article 137)
The Council discusses
the proposal for
implementing
the social partner’s
agreement
The Council
adopts a
Directive,
a Regulation
or a Decision
Proposal for
the agreement
to be extended
The Council
rejects the
proposal
The Commission
does not adopt the
proposal
The Commission assesses
the representativity of
the contracting parties, their
mandate, the legality of each
clause of the collective
agreement in respect
of Community law and
compliance with
the provisions
concerning
SMEs
The content of the agricultural
agreement of 24 July 1997
1. Maximum limit of annual working
time of 1 827 hours (average: 39
hours/week) and fixing of a frame-
work for flexible working time with
regard to climatic conditions and
nature of production.
2. Recommendation on the adapta-
tion of working time on an indivi-
dual basis, with a view to training
leave, part-time work, parental
leave and career breaks.
3. Guarantee of a secure income with
respect to the hours worked.
4. Entitlement to a pay supplement
and/or time off for overtime and
intent of the signatory parties to
reduce the use of overtime as much
as possible in order to promote
employment.
5. Daily rest: generally 12 hours du-
ring each 24-hour period, including
a period of at least 11 consecutive
hours; weekly rest: if possible 48
hours, with a compulsory period of
at least  35 consecutive hours.
6. Definition of night work as any
work carried out between 21.00 and
6.00 (i.e. a period of 9 hours).
7. Definition of periods to be consid-
ered as working time, such as inter-
ruptions of work due to atmosphe-
ric conditions or for technical rea-
sons, or such as time spent on
preparation of work.
8. Entitlement to four weeks’ paid
annual leave after a full year of
employment (in case of shorter
period of employment, calculation
on a pro rata basis) and to the paid
public holidays as determined by
national legislation and/or collec-
tive agreements.
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Implementation 
of the agreement
The agreement signed by the social
partners at European level will be
implemented by way of a voluntary
approach. It is a ‘framework agree-
ment on a recommendation’, and
will have to be incorporated into
national collective agreements in the
agricultural sector. It will be moni-
tored by the Agriculture Social
Dialogue Committee.
This is the first voluntary agreement
at European level which has not
emerged from prior consultation of
the Commission in accordance with
Article 138 of the Treaty. It shows
that, at European level, the social
partners can create and exploit a real
autonomous contractual area pro-
vided the political will is there. It
illustrates the dynamism of the
social dialogue in the agricultural
sector, based on a long tradition at
European level (the first agreements
date from 1978).
The agreement 
on parental leave
Directive 96/34/EC on the frame-
work agreement on parental leave
was adopted under the agreement on
social policy on 3 June 1996. This
directive constitutes a landmark for
European labour law and industrial
relations as it is based on the first
European-level collective agreement
to be concluded under the proce-
dures set out in the agreement on
social policy and the first ever agree-
ment to be implemented through
Community law. The directive had
to be implemented in Member States
by 3 June 1998. However, the direc-
tive allowed Member States an addi-
tional period of up to one year if this
was necessary to take account of spe-
cial difficulties or implementation by
collective agreement. Ireland and
Austria both took advantage of this
possibility to delay implementation
by 6 months and 12 months respec-
tively. Following the UK’s decision to
be bound by the directives adopted
under the protocol on social policy,
the provisions of the directive were
extended to the UK by Directive
97/75/EC of 15 December 1997 and
the UK had until 15 December 1999
to implement these provisions.
The directive aims to help working
parents to reconcile work and family
commitments as well as to encou-
rage fathers to play a more active role
in the care and upbringing of their
children. The directive applies to all
workers, men and women, who have
an employment contract or employ-
ment relationship as defined by
Member States and Member States
have ensured that the public and pri-
vate sectors are covered. It provides
that workers shall have the right to
take at least three months’ parental
leave on the grounds of the birth or
adoption of a child until a given age
of up to eight years.
The directive provides that, to pro-
mote equal opportunities and equal
treatment between men and women,
the right to parental leave should, in
principle, be granted on a non-trans-
ferable basis. Although the directive
allows employers to postpone
parental leave for justifiable reasons
and allows special arrangements to
meet the operational and organisa-
tional requirements of small firms,
few Member States have taken
advantage of these provisions.
The directive protects workers
against dismissal on the grounds of
an application for, or the taking of,
parental leave in accordance with
national arrangements.
The directive provides for the preser-
vation of rights acquired or in the
process of being acquired on the date
on which parental leave begins and
states that such rights shall apply at
the end of parental leave. It is, how-
ever, for Member States to define the
status of the employment contract or
employment relationship for the
period of parental leave and to deter-
mine all matters relating to social
security.
The directive also requires that a
worker be allowed to take time off for
reasons of force majeure, for urgent
family reasons in cases of sickness or
accident requiring the immediate
presence of the worker. It is left up to
Member States to specify the amount
of time off and conditions of access.
The provisions of the directive are
minimum standards, and some
Member States have provided for a
system of parental leave which goes
well beyond the minimum require-
ments. This, combined with the dis-
cretion left to Member States to
determine matters such as condi-
tions of access, payment during
parental leave, whether leave should
be taken full-time or part-time,
notice periods, etc., has led to con-
siderable variation between Member
States’ parental leave systems.
Practical arrangements for 
implementing texts adopted 
at European level
The way in which texts adopted at
Community level are implemented
(by legislation or by agreement)
varies according to the field in ques-
tion and the choice made by the
social partners as to the monitoring
arrangements for their European
agreements.
22I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  i n  E u r o p e
Implementation
by agreement
Implementation
by legislation
Agreement
field
Legislation
field
Working time in agriculture
(7/1997)
Parental leave  (12/1995)
Part-time work  (6/1997)
Working time in sea transport
                 (9/1998)
Fixed-Term contracts  (1/1999)
European works councils
Posting of workers
Reversal of the burden of proof
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Collective bargaining
and democracy
This is an aspect which has caused a
good deal of discussion, particularly
in connection with the implementa-
tion of agreements negotiated by the
legislative route. In its judgment of
17 June 1998, the Court of Justice of
the European Communities
addressed this aspect.
European social dialogue 
and EU enlargement
Increasing initiatives from the European
social partners
The European social partners have a
key role to play in helping the social
partners from candidate countries to
prepare themselves for the enlarge-
ment process. Over the last year, the
European social partners have multi-
plied the initiatives in this regard.
Under their joint initiative and with
the support of the European
Commission, the first conference of
the social partners on enlargement
was organised in Warsaw in March
1999. For the first time, it generated
a wide-ranging debate on the role of
the social partners in the EU enlarge-
ment process between over 200
social partners’ representatives from
EU Member States and candidate
countries6. This led to a joint declara-
tion of the social partners, marking
the importance to be given by all
actors to promoting social dialogue
in the applicant countries.
Source: Abstract of the joint declaration of the social part-
ners, Warsaw, 19 March 1999; see Social dialogue
for success: the role of social partners in EU enlarge-
ment, European Commission, Brussels, 1999, p. 43.
The social partners have launched a
number of initiatives over the past
few months to help the social part-
ners from candidate countries to
improve progressively their organisa-
tional structures and prepare them to
play an effective role in the enlarge-
ment process.
Social dialogue in candidate countries
As regards the prospect of EU
enlargement to central and east
European countries (CEECs), it is
important to observe how industrial
relations are functioning in these
countries, and what the main gene-
ral trends are in this regard.
• Most countries in central and eas-
tern Europe have promoted social
dialogue through tripartite struc-
tures, for instance, by creating tri-
partite national councils where for-
mal discussions are held between
government representatives and
the social partners. In many cases,
the social partners have not been
able to get involved in a number of
policy matters. This situation calls
for the complementary develop-
ment of bilateral channels of social
dialogue.
• There are shortcomings in collecti-
ve bargaining in many of the can-
didate countries. Entire areas are
not covered by collective bargai-
ning such as civil servants and
employees in public enterprises.
There is also an absence of inter-
mediary levels of collective bargai-
ning, at the branches or regions.
Employers’ and trade union orga-
nisations are often not sufficiently
structured and prepared to carry
out collective bargaining at inter-
mediary levels.
• There are also rapid changes in
labour-management practices at
the enterprise level. Adverse deve-
lopments can be observed in new
small private companies that do
not always recognise trade unions
nor sign collective agreements and,
in some cases, even individual
labour contracts. At the same time,
interesting developments are
observed with regard to financial
participation. Employees have
been allowed to participate in the
privatisation programme so that
employee-ownership has become
one important property form in
many CEECs.
The above trends obviously may
have effects on the enlargement
process, since they may limit the
capacity of candidate countries to
adopt and implement the different
elements of the acquis communau-
taire. They could also reduce the abi-
lity of candidate countries to partici-
pate effectively in the European
social dialogue. For example, it is
clear that the lack of sectoral struc-
tures for social partners in candidate
countries may render difficult their
forthcoming participation in the sec-
toral dialogue committees at the EU
level.
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The UEAPME appealed against
Directive 96/34/EC on parental
leave. In its judgment of 17 June
1998, the Court ruled that the
appeal was inadmissible. It did,
however, take a detailed look at the
democratic aspect of the agreement
and hence of the representativeness
of the social partners that signed the
agreement which then turned into
the directive.
The Court gave detailed justification
of the need to make such an exami-
nation. First of all, it emphasised
that, where there was a call for
implementation at Community
level of an agreement concluded
between the social partners, the
intervention of the Commission
and of the Council effectively gave
the agreement a Community legisla-
tive basis, without having recourse
to the conventional procedures for
drawing up a legislative text as pro-
vided for in the Treaty, i.e. involving
the European Parliament. In the
Court’s view, the involvement of the
European Parliament is a reflection
at Community level of a fundamen-
tal democratic principle, under
which the Member States’ peoples
take part in the exercise of power
through a representative assembly.
The lack of European Parliament
participation in the procedure pro-
vided for by the agreement on social
policy therefore requires, according
to the Court, that participation on
the part of the people in the process
of adopting a legislative instrument
be assured in some alternative man-
ner, in this case through the social
partners.
Enlargement of the European Union
to the East and South is a process of
historic importance. (…) It con-
fronts the candidate countries and
the European Union with the dou-
ble challenge of profound economic
and social reform currently taking
place in almost all candidate coun-
tries, and of taking over the
Community acquis. The tasks to be
fulfilled require the active participa-
tion of the social partners that must
fully live up their responsibilities by
contributing to the enlargement
process, both at the national and
the European level. […] ETUC,
UNICE/UEAPME, and CEEP invite
the European Union and the
governments of candidate countries
to involve the social partners, in an
appropriate way, in the enlargement
process.
The major 
institutional 
developments - 
extension of the 
social field
The acquis communautaire interms of social legislation is now
considerable, affecting key areas of
industrial relations and social protec-
tion.
In some cases, the European Union
has passed legislation to regulate
situations directly linked to
European integration (freedom of
movement for workers and social
security for migrant workers). This
was the case recently with directives
relating to transnational situations
(European works councils and cross-
border posting of workers within the
framework of the provision of ser-
vices).
In other cases, the European legisla-
ture has intervened to influence the
development of national systems in
accordance with the aims of the
Treaty. This was the case in areas
such as labour law, equal opportuni-
ties for women and men, and health
and safety at work.
There are six main stages.
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Main developments in labour law
Main developme ts in labour law
1957 19851974 1989 19991993
Treaty
of
Rome
Single
European
Act
Social
Charter
Treaty of
Maastricht
Treaty of
Amsterdam
Val Duchesse
Social
dialogue
Agreement on
social policy
(APS)
Incorporation
of the ASP
into the Treaty
Employment
Chapter
1957 19851974 1989 19991993
European strategy
for employment
Role of the social partners
Social action programme
Health and safety
Social action programme
Freedom of movement for workers
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Stage 1: 
the 1960s and early 1970s
The instruments establishing and
reinforcing freedom of movement
for workers, and the coordination of
social security schemes for migrant
workers, occupied the attention of
the European social legislature until
the early 1970s. The Treaty of Rome
contained a chapter on freedom of
movement for workers, Articles 48 ff.
(new article 39 ff) for freedom of
movement, and Article 51 (new
article 42) for social security for
migrant workers). In 1972, the basic
legal framework for achieving these
aims was in place. It was subsequent-
ly to be considerably developed and
reinforced by the case-law of the
Court of Justice of the European
Communities. It also included a
social chapter (Articles 119 ff.) which
made no provision for legislative
interventions.
Stage 2: 
the second half of the 1970s
This period is characterised by the
adoption of the first directives on
labour law, equal opportunities for
women and men, and health and
safety at work. The institutional fra-
mework has remained unchanged,
but a number of events led the
European legislature to act: for
example, the oil crisis and the first
major industrial restructuring exer-
cises (the first labour law directive
deals with collective redundancies)
and the discovery, in the mid-1970s,
of the carcinogenic effects of vinyl
chloride monomer, a substance used
in the plastics industry. These provi-
sions were based on Article 100 of
the Treaty, which enabled the
Council to adopt unanimously direc-
tives for the approximation of such
national provisions as affect the esta-
blishment or functioning of the
common market, and on Article 235
for equal opportunities for women
and men.
Stage 3: 
the 1980s
This period enabled the progress
achieved in relation to equal oppor-
tunities for women and men and
health and safety at work to be
consolidated. A framework directive
adopted in 1980, defining a strategy
for dealing with all physical, chemi-
cal and biological agents at work,
was followed by a series of specific
directives. The Single European Act
strengthened the legal basis for heal-
th and safety provisions. The first
indent of Article 137(1) (ex Article
118a of the EC Treaty) enabled the
adoption by qualified majority of
directives laying down minimum
requirements for safety and health at
work. The other significant legal
innovation in the Single Act in the
social field was that the social dia-
logue was recognised at European
level (Article 118b – new Article 139).
Stage 4: 
1990 – 93
The signing in 1989 of the
Community Charter of the
Fundamental Social Rights of
Workers was a milestone in the deve-
lopment of social policy. A number
of initiatives followed, some of them
legislative. The action programme
based on the charter led to the adop-
tion of 15 health and safety direc-
tives, one equal opportunities direc-
tive and four labour law directives.
However, the experience of this
second action programme showed
the need for a stronger legal basis for
social policy. The entry into force of
the Maastricht Treaty and, in parti-
cular, its social protocol (currently
Articles 136 ff.) extended the use of
qualified majority voting beyond
health and safety and defined the
role of the social partners at
Community level.
Stage 5: 
1994 – 99
The social protocol attached to the
Maastricht Treaty provides an active
role for collective bargaining. It
enables the social partners to make a
direct contribution to the produc-
tion of Community social legisla-
tion. On three occasions, (parental
leave, part-time work and fixed-term
contracts), the directives have imple-
mented agreements between the
social partners at European level. The
protocol also establishes a more
favourable political, institutional
and legal context and enables propo-
sals pending for the action program-
me linked to the Social Charter to be
followed up.
Stage 6: 
since 1999
The Treaty of Amsterdam consoli-
dates and significantly reinforces the
institutional framework and instru-
ments of Community social policy. It
ends the UK opt-out and moves
Europe forward in four areas:
employment, combating discrimina-
tion, equal opportunities for men
and women, and the role of the
social partners (Articles 3, 13,
employment chapter, 137, 138 and
141). It enables the European
Parliament to increase its involve-
ment (co-decision).
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HEALTH
AND
SAFETY
Directive 78/610/EEC: vinyl 
chloride monomer
Directive 80/1107/EEC: chemical,
physical and biological agents
Directive 82/130/EEC: explosive
atmospheres (firedamp)
Directive 82/605/EEC: metallic
lead
Directive 83/477/EEC: asbestos
Directive 86/188/EEC: noise
Directive 88/35/EEC: explosive
atmospheres (firedamp) 2
Directive 88/364/EEC: banning
agents and other activities
Directive 88/642/EEC: chemical,
physical and biological agents 2
Directive 89/391/EEC: framework
Directive 89/654/EEC: workplaces
Directive 89/655/EEC: work 
equipment
Directive 89/656/EEC: personal
protective equipment
EQUAL
TREATMENT
Directive 75/117/EEC: equal pay
Directive 76/207/EEC: equal 
treatment as regards access to
employment
Directive 79/7/EEC: social 
security
Directive 86/378/EEC:
occupational social security
schemes
Directive 86/613/EEC:
self-employed women
LABOUR
LAW
Directive 75/129/EEC: collective
redundancies
Directive 77/187/EEC: transfers
of undertakings
Directive 80/987/EEC: insolvency
1960–74
Freedom of movement
for workers
THE MAIN
STAGES
1975–80
First directives on
labour law
and equal opportunities
1981–89
Health and safety
equal opportunities
(continued)
1958
Treaty of Rome (provisions 
on freedom of movement and 
social chapter - Article 100)
1974
First social action programme
INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK
1985
SEA: Articles 118a (safety/health)
and 118b (social dialogue)
1989
Charter and action programme
Articles 48 ff.
Article 51LEGAL BASES
1986
Article 118a - safety/health - 
qualified majority
FREE MOVEMENT
Regulation No 15 (1961): first
measures
Regulation No 38/64/EEC:
extension of free movement
Directive 64/221/EEC: special
measures
Directive 64/240/EEC: public
policy, public security and public
health
Directive 68/360/EEC: abolition
of restrictions on movement
Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68:
free movement of workers
Regulation (EEC) No 1251/70 of
the Commission: right to remain
in the territory of a Member State
SOCIAL SECURITY
Regulations Nos 3 and 4: social
security, workers and self-
employed
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71:
social security, workers and self-
employed
Regulation (EEC) No 574/72:
social security, workers and  self-
employed
FREE 
MOVEMENT
AND
SOCIAL 
SECURITY
FOR
MIGRANT 
WORKERS
Regulation (EEC) No 1390/81:
self-employed workers
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HEALTH
AND
SAFETY
Directive 95/30/EC: biological agents 3
Directive 95/63/EC: work equipment 2
Directive 96/94/EC: chemical, physical and 
biological agents 4
Directive 97/42/EC: carcinogens 2
Directive 97/59/EC: biological agents 4
Directive 97/65/EC: biological agents 5
Directive 98/24/EC: chemical agents 5
Directive 98/65/EC: explosive atmospheres 5 
(Commission directive)
Directive 90/269/EEC: manual handling of loads
Directive 90/270/EEC: display screen equipment
Directive 90/394/EEC: carcinogens
Directive 90/679/EEC: biological agents
Directive 91/269 /EEC: explosive atmospheres 
(firedamp) 3
Directive 91/322/EEC: chemical, physical and 
biological agents 3
Directive 91/382/EEC: asbestos 2
Directive 92/29/EEC: medical assistance on board
vessels
Directive 92/57/EEC: constructions
Directive 92/58/EEC: health and safety signs
Directive 92/91/EEC: drilling
Directive 92/104/EEC: mining
EQUAL
TREATMENT
Directive 96/34/EC: parental leave
Directive 96/97/EC: equal treatment in occupational
social security schemes
Directive 97/80/EC: burden of proof
Directive 92/85/EEC: pregnant workers
LABOUR
LAW
Directive 96/71/EC: posting of workers
Directive 97/74/EC: European works councils — UK
Directive 97/81/EC: part-time work
Directive 98/50/EC: transfers of undertakings 2
Directive 98/59/EC: collective redundancies 3
Directive 91/383/EEC: temporary employment 
(H and S)
Directive 91/533/EEC: written statement 
(employment contract)
Directive 92/56/EEC: collective redundancies 2
Directive 93/104/EC: working time
Directive 94/33/EC: young people
Directive 94/45/EC: European works councils
THE MAIN
STAGES
1994–99
The role of the social partners at European level
1990–93
Beginning implementation of 1989 SAP
INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK
1997
Luxembourg Summit: European employment strategy
1999 
Entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (incor-
poration in the Treaty of the social agreement;
employment chapter; Article 13)
1993
Entry into force of the 1992 social protocol of
Maastricht (new powers, qualified majority, 
social dialogue)
1993
Maastricht social agreement: Article 2(1) (qualified
majority) and 2(3) (unanimity)
LEGAL BASES Articles 136 ff.Article 13Article 2 of the social agreement
FREE 
MOVEMENT
AND
SOCIAL 
SECURITY
FOR
MIGRANT 
WORKERS
Directive 98/49/EC: supplementary pension rights
Regulation (EEC) No 1247/92: non-contributory
benefits
Regulation (EEC) No 1248/92: pensions
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Community law -
national law
The impact of Community law onnational law varies depending on
the nature of the instrument used
and the prior existence of laws at
national level in the area in question.
Some areas of Community law have
broken completely new ground. This
is the case with freedom of move-
ment for workers, social security for
migrant workers and directives
linked to Europeanisation (European
works councils and posting of work-
ers in the context of the cross-border
provision of services). These ques-
tions could not be dealt with in iso-
lation by each Member State. The
influence of Community law is
therefore strong. It is exercised either
directly and immediately through
legislation which is directly and
immediately applicable, or through
directives establishing new rights
and obligations to be transposed into
national law.
However, in the majority of cases,
the aim of Community social law is
to use the directives to approximate
national provisions in a given area or
to establish minimum requirements.
Community law therefore acts
through national provisions which
must comply with the minimum
requirements laid down at European
level. The requirements are mini-
mum in the sense that they lay down
a level of protection below which the
Member States may not fall, while
enabling them to retain or adopt
stricter or more protective provisions
and thus preserve national traditions
and practices.
Example: the directive on collective
redundancies
The directive on collective redun-
dancies is a good illustration of the
way in which Community directives
act upon national laws without cal-
ling into question any more
advanced provisions at national
level.
In some Member States, Community
law is integrated without difficulty
into the mould of a national indus-
trial relations culture which is direct-
ly compatible. European law is then
regarded as the natural extension of
a model applied at national level.
On the other hand, those Member
States with a very different industrial
relations system, or which joined the
Union more recently, must radically
change their systems under the
influence of Community law.
European law, seen as an external
influence and no longer as the pro-
jection of internal provisions, sub-
stantially changes practices and pro-
visions in these countries.
Community social law, for its part, is
subject to the influence of national
law. Thus, for example, the develop-
ment of agreement-based law at
European level is to a large extent
inspired by the experience and prac-
tice of the Nordic countries, Belgium
and Italy.
Collective redundancy within the meaning of the
directive must involve at least 10 or 20 redun-
dancies, depending on the size of the company
and the period during which the redundancies
are carried out.
In Germany and Portugal, for example, the num-
ber is lower than that laid down in the directive,
meaning that national provisions have a wider
scope than the directive. On the other hand, in
the United Kingdom, which previously had no
provisions of this kind, the directive played a role
in establishing a system of protection for British
workers in the event of collective redundancy.
Obligation to notify
the authorities
Justification 
for redundancy
Compensation/notice
In accordance with the provisions of the directi-
ve, all countries have established or maintained
obligations to inform and consult in advance in
the event of collective redundancy. Some
Member States have maintained stricter rules
when transposing the directive and subsequently
(e.g. Germany, France, the Netherlands).
In the Netherlands, the system of prior adminis-
trative authorisation (more restrictive than the
simple notification of the authorities) has been
maintained.
This is not covered by the directive. Some
Member States, however, have a system of admi-
nistrative or legal examination of the economic
justification for collective redundancies.
Idem.
Concept 
(quantitative element)
Obligation to 
inform and consult
Legal arrangements for 
collective redundancy - some aspects
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Review of 
legislation in 1999
Subject
Commission 
proposal
Legal basis/
procedure
EP
opinion
ESC 
opinion
Council
Working time
COM(1998) 662 final
European 
company 
statute 
The Commission presented proposals in 1970, 1975, 1989 and 1991. In the light of the conclusions of the
Davignon report, the Council began new discussions in July 1997. At the Employment and Social Affairs
Council on 25 May 1999, a broad consensus emerged on the basis of a text presented by the German
Presidency. However, this compromise did not receive unanimous support (Article 308 of the Treaty).
April 1999 March 1999
Information and
consultation of
workers
COM(1998) 612 final
Article 137
Co-decision
April 1999 June 1999
Freedom of
movement for
workers
COM(1998) 394 final
Articles 40,
42 and 308
May 1999 April 1999
Social security
for migrant
workers
(a) COM(97) 561 final
Extension of Regulation (EEC)
No 1408/71  to citizens of non-
member countries
Articles 42
and 308
Co-decision
September 1999 March 1998 Under way
Health and
safety at work
(a) COM(1998) 170 final
Amendment of Directive
90/394/EEC — carcinogens
Article 118a
cooperation
1 October 1998;
2 April 1999
July 1998
Adoption April
1999 (Directive
1999/38/EC)
(c) COM(1999) 432
Codification of Directive
90/679/EEC — biological agents
Article 137
(b) COM(1999) 152 final
Codification of Directive
90/394/EEC — carcinogens
Ex Article 118a
(cooperation);
current Article
137 (co-decision)
Procedure sus-
pended awaiting
amended version
October 1999
Procedure sus-
pended awaiting
amended version
(d) COM(1998) 678 final
Second amendment of Directive
89/655/EEC — work equipment
— temporary work at a height
Ex Article 118a
(cooperation);
current Article
137 (co-decision)
March 1999 Under way
(e) COM(92) 560 and COM(94) 284
Proposal for a directive on 
physical agents
Ex Article 118a
(cooperation);
current Article
137 (co-decision)
June 1999
April 1994;
September 1999
(confirmation of
first reading)
Under way
(f) COM(92) 234 and COM(93) 421
Proposal for a directive on
transport
Ex Article 118a
(cooperation);
current Article
137 (co-decision)
April 1993
July 1993;
September 1999
(confirmation of
first reading)
(g) COM(95) 310 and COM(97) 123
Proposal for a directive on
explosive atmospheres
Ex Article 118a
(cooperation);
current Article
137 (co-decision)
February 1996
June 1996; 
May 1999
(and Parliament)
agreement on
common draft
‘A’ item at
Conciliation
Committee on
21.10.1999
(b) COM(1998)779 final
Simplification of Regulation
(EEC) No 1408/71
Articles 18,
42 and 308
Co-decision
Under way Under way Under way
(a) Revision of Regulation (EEC) 
No 1612/68
(b) Revision of Directive 68/36/EEC
(a) Amendment of Directive
93/104/EC
(a) Article 137
Co-decision
(a) Common
position of
July 1999
(b) Agreement at Community level
on certain aspects of working
time for seafarers
(b) Article 139
(b) Adoption 21
June 1999
(c) Organisation of working time
for mobile workers in road
transport
(c) Articles 71
and 137
Co-decision
(c) Discussions
under way
(c) Creation of Advisory Committee
on Freedom of Movement and
Social Security
Co-decision
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Worker information,
consultation and 
participation in
Europe
This section reviews the nationalsystems and main Community
provisions with regard to the infor-
mation, consultation and participa-
tion of employees in Europe. It sets
out in turn:
• systems for informing and consul-
ting employees on economic mat-
ters;
• systems for employee participation
on the board of directors or super-
visory board of an undertaking;
• Community provisions and pros-
pects with regard to employee
information, consultation and par-
ticipation.
National systems for informing and
consulting employees on economic
matters
Two models for employee representation
in Europe
In the (contract-based) ‘single-chan-
nel’ system, the unions are the only
or priority channel of communica-
tion with the employer. Intervention
is mainly by negotiation. In Ireland,
Finland, Sweden and generally in the
United Kingdom (first group), repre-
sentation is solely through the trade
union delegates. There are also single
or joint representation bodies sup-
plementing the role of the trade
union delegates in Denmark, Italy
(second group) and, sometimes, in
the United Kingdom.
In the two-tier representation sys-
tem, based on statutory require-
ments, representation of all the staff
within a company is via an elected
body operating alongside the trade
unions. It essentially performs an
informative and consultative func-
tion.
This body is made up solely of
employees in Germany, Greece,
Spain, the Netherlands, Austria and
Portugal (third group). In Denmark
and Luxembourg it is a joint council
and, in Belgium and France, it is
chaired by the employer (fourth
group).
First group
Second group
Third group
Fourth group
Source: European Commission.
Forms of employee representation
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With the exception of Portugal and
Luxembourg, where representation
is at company level, the lowest level
of employee representation is the
establishment. Where there are seve-
ral establishments within the same
company, there is generally a specific
coordination structure for the vari-
ous forms of representation to be
informed and consulted on econo-
mic and financial matters, but it is
only generally applied in a minority
of countries.
At group level, employee informa-
tion within group committees is
advanced in France, Austria and
Finland. It is subject to negotiation
in Sweden, applicable to varying
degrees in Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands and very limited in
Greece and the United Kingdom.
Nature and extent of employee informa-
tion and consultation
Information and consultation are
carried out:
• on a voluntary basis, except for col-
lective redundancies and transfers
of undertakings, in Ireland and the
United Kingdom;
• on a compulsory and general basis
in the other countries.
In economic matters, all representa-
tives have more or less systematic
opportunities for information or
intervention with regard to:
• the undertaking’s economic and
financial situation;
• staff movements and work organi-
sation;
• decisions significantly affecting
staff.
With regard to collective redundan-
cies and transfers of undertakings,
national provisions governing infor-
mation and consultation of person-
nel representatives comply with the
minimum levels laid down in the
Community directives. The situa-
tions are very different with regard to
Belgium Works council Establishment 100
Information and consultation undertaking
provided by  the Committee for 
Prevention and Protection at Work Establishment 20–100
or by trade union delegation
Denmark Cooperation committees Undertaking 35
(Tillidsmanden) Undertaking 5–6 according to collective agreement
Germany Works council Establishment 5 permanent employees
(Betriebsrat) Undertaking 100 permanent employees
Greece Company trade union organisation Undertaking 20
Workers’ council Establishment 50
Spain Staff delegates Establishment 6-50
Works council Establishment 50
France Staff delegates Establishment 11
Works committee Undertaking 50
Ireland Recognised trade union Establishment 20 employees for information and 
consultation in the event of collective
redundancy
Italy RSA (establishment trade union Establishment 15
representation)
RSU (single trade union representation) Establishment 5
Luxembourg Staff delegation Establishment 15
Joint committee Undertaking 150
Netherlands Works council Establishment 50
Information, direct economic and 
social consultation Establishment 10–50
Austria Works council Establishment 5 permanent employees
(Betriebsrat)
Portugal Workers’ commission/trade union Undertaking No threshold
delegates
Finland Co-determination Act (trade union Undertaking 30
delegates)
Collective redundancy (trade union Establishment 20
delegates)
Sweden Trade union delegates Establishment No threshold
United Kingdom Recognised trade union or elected Establishment 20 employees for information and
representatives consultation in the event  of 
collective redundancy
Basic body Basic level Threshold 
(number of employees)
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the aspects of the undertaking’s strat-
egy and economic situation.
Belgium, Denmark and France (third
group) have a particularly advanced
and systematic system for informa-
tion on these questions, while the
Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon
countries apply it on a voluntary or
irregular basis (second group). There
are rights of inquiry to reinforce the
information and consultation proce-
dures in Belgium (réviseur), France
(expert comptable) and the
Netherlands (where maladministra-
tion is suspected).
This information/consultation is
supplemented by co-determination
systems in Germany, the
Netherlands, Austria, Finland and
Sweden (first group). The German
and Austrian formulas are based on
approval procedures, the right of
veto and joint decision-making. Co-
determination generally follows eco-
nomic decisions, for example in the
event of a major change or plans for
collective redundancies in the esta-
blishment. In such cases, there must
be an agreement between the mana-
gement and the works council, in
the absence of which a decision may
be taken externally by a conciliation
body. Other formulas under the
heading ‘co-determination’ used in
the event of important changes of
activity include the system of notice
with suspensory effect and the possi-
bility of appeal in the Netherlands,
and the suspensory obligation to
negotiate in Finland and Sweden.
First group
Second group
Third group
MODES D’INTERVENTION DES REPRESENTANTS
Source: European Commission.
Intervention by representatives 29
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Economic and 
financial situation
Development of activities
Employment
Situation, likely trend, 
anticipatory measures
Changes
Subjects and methods for information and consultation
Belgium
e 20
Prior to collective redundancies: 
written report, several meetings, 
arguments and alternative proposals
e 50
Basic dossier every four years
Information once a year on 
financial report
Information four times a year on 
likely trends (costs, cost price, budget 
management)
Information four times a year on 
progress towards production and 
productivity targets
Information annually or four times a
year depending on subject
Consultation on staff policy
Consultation on training and 
retraining measures
General information and 
consultation 
Denmark
u 20 Information and consultation in theevent of collective redundancies
u 35 Information six  times a year onsituation and forecasts
Information and consultation six
times a year
u 150 Information and consultation sixtimes a year
Germany
e 5 Information: once a year (assembly)
Information in good time. Prior
consultation on situation, employment
trends and anticipatory measures
Full information immediately.
Consultation 
e 20 Information: four times a year Co-determination on measures to beapplied Co-determination
u 100
Meeting on annual financial report
Meeting of Economic Committee
once a month
Greece 
e 50
u 20
Annual information on situation, 
economic policy, trends in activities,
production and sales
Prior information on investment 
projects
Prior information on employment
changes
Agreement on training measures
Consultation on working time and
improving working conditions; prior
information in the event of transfer,
closure, etc. 
u 20 Prior consultation in the event of collective redundancies
Spain e 6
Examination of accounts, regular 
information on economic situation 
in the sector
Information four times a year on
trends in activities 
Information four times a year on 
probable trends in employment
Information and consultation on 
evaluation of posts, restructuring and
training measures (opinion within 15
days)  
Information and consultation and
prior negotiation in the event of
changes which may affect employees.
Opinion within 15 days
France
u 20
Prior information and consultation in
the event of changes in economic or
legal organisation
Information and consultation on 
collective redundancies (over 10
employees)
u 50
Annual report (turnover, profits)
Annual accounting documents 
(analysis by expert comptable)
Document on trends in activities
every two years and consultation on
the company’s general progress
Annual consultation on trends in
employment and skills, annual or
multiannual forecasts and training
measures
Written report 15 days in advance.
Information and consultation on
accounts and training plan
Information four  times a year on
changes in production methods
Consultation on work organisation 
Ireland
Information and consultation 
voluntary
Information and consultation 
voluntary
e 20
Information and consultation 
in application of the directives on
transfers and collective redundancies
NB:  e : establishment   -  u : undertaking
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Economic and 
financial situation
Development of activities
Employment
situation, likely trend, 
anticipatory measures
Changes
Italy
Provisions in accordance with 
industry and company collective
agreements
Consultation on work organisation
and new technologies
e 15 Provisions in accordance with industry and undertaking agreements
e 20
In accordance with collective 
agreements
Information and consultation in the
event of collective redundancies
Luxembourg
e 15 Annual report Opinion and proposals on improvingworking and employment conditions
Information and consultation on
work organisation, new technologies
and collective redundancies
u 150
Information and consultation once a
year on accounts
Written consultation report twice a
year on trends
Monthly progress report for 
undertaking
Information and consultation once a
year on current and likely 
requirements for manpower, training,
further training, retraining, etc.
Information and consultation on
planned social measures
Information and prior consultation 
on training measures
When taking important decisions,
prior information and consultation
on repercussions for employment
Netherlands e 50
Annual report on accounts (expert
comptable)
Information on forecast documents
Information twice a year on underta-
king’s results, forecasts, activities and
investments (in establishments with
less than 10 workers, the information
is given to them directly)
Annual social report
Obligation to agree upon rules for
recruitment, redundancies, 
promotion
Consultation on recruitment with 
one-month suspensive opinion
Obligation to agree upon rules for
training
Information and consultation
Consultation with one-month
suspensive opinion on transfers, 
mergers, closures or relocations.
Information and consultation in the
event of redundancies and transfers 
(of more than 20 workers)
Austria e 5
Transmission of annual accounts
Information and consultation on 
economic and financial situation,
prospects for development and
investment projects
Consultation four times a year
(monthly on request) on current
affairs
Consultation four  times a year
(monthly on request) on current
affairs
Information on staff requirements
and planned measures; cooperation
procedure on training and retraining
Consultation on labour organisation
and new technologies
Prior consultation and cooperation
procedure in the event of changes
Portugal u-
Information on accounting situation
(budget, methods of funding, general
plan of activity, draft changes, sales) 
Information on personnel 
management, consultation on social
matters, prior opinion on changes to
classifications and promotions, 
recommendation on apprenticeships,
retraining and further training
Prior opinion on changes to classifi-
cations and hours; recommendations
for improving working conditions
Prior consultation on measures 
leading to staff cuts or to a change in
working conditions
Finland
e 20
Information on economic and 
financial changes
In the event of staff cuts, six-week
negotiation period, unless agreement
to the contrary
u 30
Information on accounts
Twice-yearly report on economic
situation and prospects
Obligation to negotiate prior to 
change of activities affecting staff or
major investments — suspensive for
six weeks if reduction of staff
Obligation to negotiate budget and
plans for employment and training in
the event of staff reductions or
changes to contracts
Obligation to negotiate on changes
in work organisation, use of subcon-
tracting, transfers and mergers
Sweden e-
Regular information
Opportunity to examine accounting
documents
Obligation to negotiate is suspensive 
in the event of important changes
Consultation prior to breaching
employment contracts
Obligation to negotiate on forward
management of employment
Information and right of participation
in the event of changes in 
organisation and working conditions
Obligation to negotiate prior to taking
decisions on changes to activity
United
Kingdom
Information and consultation 
voluntary
Information and consultation 
voluntary
e 20
Information/consultation in 
application of the directives on 
transfers and redundancy
NB:  e : establishment   -  u : undertaking
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National systems for
employee participation
on the board of 
directors or 
supervisory board 
of undertakings
Bodies in undertakings and employee
participation
There are two types of limitedcompany in Europe:
• those in which a management
body, the board, coexists with a
supervisory board (two-tier structu-
re); this is standard practice in
Germany, the Netherlands and
Austria;
• those with a single management
body in the form of a board of
directors (single-tier structure),
with member directors playing a
particular role; this is standard
practice in the other European
countries.
Provision is made in Germany,
Luxembourg, Austria and the Nordic
countries for staff representation
within the supervisory and adminis-
trative bodies (i.e. ‘participation’),
including those in the private sector.
These staff representatives usually
have the same rights and duties as
the shareholders’ representatives,
except in the matter of industrial dis-
putes. Representation is generally on
a minority basis, accounting for a
maximum of one third of the seats,
except in Germany.
There are also forms of participation
midway between information/
consultation (including negotiation
and co-determination) of workers’
representative bodies and participa-
tion in decision-making bodies, for
example:
• in the Netherlands: recommenda-
tion on the appointment of super-
visory board members and joint
works council/supervisory board
meetings;
• in France: works committee delega-
tion on the board of directors.
In the public sector (social sector),
there are more far-reaching provi-
sions, with joint or minority repre-
sentation of staff on the social
bodies. This applies particularly in
Greece, Spain, France, Luxembourg
and Ireland.
NB:    BD : board of directors    -    SB : supervisory board.
Country
Body
BD SB
Sector
Sector Sector
Procedures
Belgium X
Denmark X Ltd/plc + 50 employeesGroups
1/3 of seats (at least two members)
1/3 of seats for representatives of branches + two members for parent 
company if + 50 employees; total maximum of 1/2 of seats
Germany X + 500 employeesincluding groups
1/3 of seats if 500–2 000 employees
1/2 of seats if + 2 000 employees, chairman appointed by shareholders with
casting vote
1/2 of seats in mining/steel if + 2 000 employees; worker director with 
agreement of employees
Greece X Socialised sector 1/3 of seats on BD and 1/3 of seats on "representative assembly for socialcontrol"
Spain X + 1 000employees
Choice between joint committees and one BD member per union with 25 %
of trade union delegates and members of works council
Ireland X 11 bodies 1/3 of seats
Italy X
Luxembourg X Semi-public
Limited liability
company + 1 000
employees
1/3 of seats
Netherlands X Ltd/plc + 100 employeesK > NLG 22.5 million
Right of recommendation and veto on appointment of members of SB and
BD. Joint works council–SB meetings
Austria X Including groups 1/3 of seats
Portugal X
+ 200 employees Two members if 200–1 000 employees, 1/3 of seats if + 1 000 employees
Possible under
articles of 
association
Maximum four members (five if quoted company) or 1/4 of seats
France
X X Companies with BD or SB
Two works council members (or four if three colleges) attend meetings in
advisory capacity; possibility of making requests which must receive reply
giving reasons
Finland
X + 150 employeesin Finland Depending on agreement
Otherwise, one to four members representing 1/4 of seats
X Groups + 500 employees in Finland
Sweden X (X) + 25 employeesAt group level
Minority: two members (plus two alternates);
Three members (plus three alternates) if + 1 000 employees in Sweden
United
Kingdom
X
Employee involvement in informa-
tion and supervisory functions and
decision-making
Participation by employees’ repre-
sentatives on the board of directors
or supervisory board of a company
provides:
• monitoring and approval of major
decisions in Germany, which is the
only country to make provision in
certain cases for equal representa-
tion of employees and sharehol-
ders;
• information and involvement in
decision-making in Austria, the
Nordic countries, Denmark and
Luxembourg, where representation
is minority-based. Employees’
representatives in Sweden also par-
ticipate, within the executive com-
mittee, in decision-making or plan-
ning structures deriving from the
board of directors and, in Austria,
within the committees deriving
from the supervisory board.
Main Community 
provisions and 
perspectives with
regard to employee
information, consulta-
tion and participation
Directives making provision forinforming and consulting
employees in the event of collective
redundancies and transfers of under-
takings
Two directives adopted during the
1970s contain elements linked to the
information and consultation of
workers in undertakings.
• With regard to collective redun-
dancies7: a procedure for the prior
consultation of workers’ represen-
tatives is required ‘in good time
with a view to reaching an agree-
ment’. These consultations ‘shall,
at least, cover ways and means of
avoiding collective redundancies
or reducing the number of workers
affected, and of mitigating the
consequences’. ‘All relevant infor-
mation’ shall be provided ‘in good
time to enable workers’ representa-
tives to make constructive propo-
sals’. Provision is made for calling
on the services of experts.
• With regard to transfers of under-
takings8: representatives of the
employees must be informed ‘in
good time before the transfer is car-
ried out, and in any event before ...
employees are directly affected by
the transfer as regards their condi-
tions of work and employment’.
Where measures in relation to
employees are envisaged, consulta-
tions are required ‘with a view to
seeking agreement’. Information
must be provided and consulta-
tions take place in good time befo-
re the change in the business.
Directive on European works councils
The 1994 directive on European
works councils reflected the need to
inform and consult employees in a
transnational framework 9.
It lays down that specific procedures
for representing, informing and con-
sulting employees shall be established
by agreement in every Community-
scale undertaking and group of
undertakings (undertakings or groups
with at least 1 000 employees within
the Member States and at least 150
employees in each of at least two
Member States).
However, should negotiations break
down after three years, a European
works council shall be established
and shall operate in accordance with
the subsidiary provisions laid down
in the annex to the directive. Those
groups in which there existed on 22
September 1996 ‘an agreement, co-
vering the entire workforce, provi-
ding for the transnational informa-
tion and consultation of employees’
shall not be subject to the obliga-
tions under the directive until those
agreements expire or are renewed.
The vast majority of existing agree-
ments at the end of 1999 (450 out of
a total of 650) were in the latter
form.
The ‘Renault Vilvoorde’ affair high-
lighted the requirements for infor-
mation and consultation of emplo-
yees under the directive (Versailles
Court of Appeal, judgment No 308,
7 May 1997, Ste Renault v CGE
Renault, the Public Prosecutor, EMF).
Draft European company statute
and employee participation
The European company would add a
new type of limited liability compa-
ny to those existing in the Member
States: under Community law, estab-
lishment by merger, and constitu-
tion of a joint subsidiary or holding
between companies in different
countries or through transformation
of a national company. For 30 years,
the stumbling block for the project
has been the question of employee
participation in company bodies.
Brought back into the limelight by
the current European economic and
financial context and by the impetus
given by the European works coun-
cils, the project was the subject of
new discussions and proposals in
1997 on the question of employee
participation10.
A draft directive on information,
consultation and participation of
employees in the European compa-
ny is under discussion within the
Council. The draft is based on nego-
tiations between partners in consti-
tuent companies, the application of
reference provisions in the event of
the failure of negotiations and the
taking into account of the situation
in the constituent companies with
regard to participation.
Proposal for a directive on informa-
tion and consultation
In November 1998, the European
Commission adopted a proposal for
a directive on employee information
and consultation11. This aimed to:
• ‘ensure existence of the right to
permanent information and
consultation of employees on eco-
nomic and strategic developments
in the undertaking and on deci-
sions which affect them in all
Member States’;
• enable the implementation of pro-
visions by means of negotiated
agreements;
• ‘assist risk anticipation’, particular-
ly with regard to employment
trends;
• ‘ensure that workers are informed
and consulted prior to decisions’
where these are likely to result in
substantial changes in work orga-
nisation and employment
contracts;
• ‘ensure the effectiveness of these
procedures’.
The proposal for a directive estab-
lishes a general framework contain-
ing, in particular, a definition of
information and consultation and a
non-exhaustive list of the areas co-
vered. Major importance is given to
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adaptation at national level and to
negotiation of the framework
between the social partners at
various levels.
Implementation of
Community directives:
by means of 
legislation/by means
of agreement
In most cases, Community direc-tives are transposed into national
law by legislative measures. Howe-
ver, the social partners at national
level play a role in their implementa-
tion, either because they are associa-
ted with the legislative work (now
standard practice in the Member
States), or because they themselves
take on the task of introducing, by
collective agreement, the aims set
out in the Community directives.
This practice, validated over the
years by the Court of Justice of the
European Communities and enshri-
ned in Article 137(4) of the EC
Treaty, is more frequent in those
countries with a strong tradition of
agreement-based regulation such as
Belgium, Denmark or Italy (in bold
in the table). Nevertheless, it raises
the question of general coverage,
continuity and appropriate publicity
for agreement-based transposal mea-
sures. Moreover, action by the social
partners does not exempt the
Member State from the requirement
to ‘take any necessary measure
enabling it at any time to be in a
position to guarantee the results
imposed by that directive’ (Article
quoted, in fine). Such is the case
when the Member States, supple-
menting collective agreements on
transposal, pass legislative measures
for extension erga omnes or adopt
legislative measures supplementing
the agreement on those items not
dealt with by the social partners
(penalties, means of appeal, etc.).
Monitoring 
the application 
of Community law
Monitoring the application ofCommunity law is primarily
the responsibility of the European
Commission and, in the last
instance, of the national courts and
the Court of Justice of the European
Communities.
In exercising its powers, the
European Commission acts in differ-
ent ways.
• Directives are the subject of imple-
mentation reports aimed at evalua-
ting their transposal into national
law.
• The Commission investigates com-
plaints from citizens who feel that
their rights under Community
directives have been violated. The
right of petition also enables citi-
zens to alert the European
Parliament to incorrect transposal
or application of Community
directives. The Commission is the-
refore closely associated with the
examination of these petitions.
When the Commission finds that a
rule of Community law has been
incorrectly transposed or wrongly
applied in a Member State, it opens
infringements proceedings and,
where appropriate, brings an action
before the Court of Justice. 
As Community law takes precedence
over national law, citizens can ensure
that the rules of Community law
apply in certain cases where national
law does not comply with
Community law.
Doubts as to the interpretation of
Community law are ruled upon by
the Court of Justice of the European
Communities within the framework
of requests for preliminary rulings by
the national courts.
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DIRECTIVES B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A P FIN S UK
I. LABOUR LAW
77/187 transfers of undertakings C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
80/987 insolvency (87/164) C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
91/533 written statement C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
93/104 working time C C C C C IC C N IC C C C C C C
94/33 young people C C C C C IC C C IC C C C C C C
94/45 european works councils (97/74 - UK) C C C C C C C C N C C C C C N
96/71 posting of workers (deadline: 16.12.99) N N C N C N N N N C C N C C IC
97/81 part-time work (dea.:20.01.2000) (98/23-UK:7.4.00) - - - IC C - - - - - - - - - -
98/50 transfers of undertakings 2 (deadline:17.07.2001) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
98/59 collective redundancies C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
99/70 fixed-term work (deadline: 10.07.2001) -
II. EQUAL TREATMENT
75/117 equal pay C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
76/207 access to employment C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
79/7 social security C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
86/378 occupational social security schemes N C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
86/613 self-employed women C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
92/85 pregnant workers C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
96/34 parental leave (97/75 - UK) C C C C C C C N C C C C C C N
96/97 occup. so. sec. schemes C C C N C N C C C C C C C C C
97/80 burden of proof(dea:1.1.2001)(UK:98/52;dea: 2001) - - C - C - - C - - - C C - -
III. FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS
64/221 special measures C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
68/360 abolition of restrictions on movement C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
72/194 right to remain in the territory of a MS C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
98/49 supplementary pensions rights (dea: 25.01.2002) - - - - C - - - - - - C - - -
IV. HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK
78/610 vinyl chloride monomer C NR C C C C NR C C C C C C C C
80/1107 chemical, physical and biological agents C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
82/130 explosive atmospheres (firedamp) C C C C C C NR C C C C NR NR C C
82/605 metallic lead C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
83/477 asbestos C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
86/188 noise C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
88/35 explosive atmospheres (firedamp 2) C C C C C C NR C C C C NR NR C C
88/364 banning of agents and other activities C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
88/642 chemical, physical and biological agents 2 C C C C NR C C C C C C NR C C C
89/391 framework C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
89/654 workplaces C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
89/655 work equipment C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
89/656 personal protective equipment C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
90/269 manual handling of loads C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
90/270 display screen equipment C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
90/394 carcinogens C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
90/679 biological agents C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
91/269 explosive atmospheres (firedamp) 3 C C C C C C C C C C C NR NR C C
91/322 chemical, physical and biological agents 3 C C C N NR NR C C C N C NR C C C
91/382 asbestos 2 C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
91/383 temporary employment C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
92/29 medical assistance on board of vessels C C C C C C C C N C C C C C C
92/57 construction C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
92/58 health and safety signs C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
92/91 drilling C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
92/104 mining C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
93/88 biological agents 2 C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
93/103 work on board fishing vessels C C C C C C C C NR C NR C C C C
94/44 explosive atmospheres 4 (COM directive) C C C C C C NR C C C C NR NR C C
95/30 biological agents 3 C C C C C C C N C C IC C C C C
95/63 work equipment 2 C C C C C C N C C C C C C C C
96/94 chemi., phys. & bio. agents 4 C C C N NR NR C N C NR IC NR C C C
97/42 carcinogens 2 (deadline: 27.06.00)  C - - - - - - - C - - - - - -
97/59 biological agents 4 C C C C C C C N C C IC C C C C
97/65 biological agents 5 C C C C C C C N C C IC C C C C
98/24 chemical agents 5 (deadline: 5.5.2001) - - - - - - - - - - IC - - - -
98/65 explo. atmo. 5 (COM direc.) (dead: 31.12.99) - - - - - C - - - - - - - - -
99/38 carcinogens 3 (deadline: 29.04.2003)
99/63 working time of seafarers (dead: 30.06.2002)
% of national legislation communicated 01.01.2000 96,2 98,1 98,1 92,4 100 92,4 96,2 86,7 90,5 96,2 90,5 98,1 98,1 100 94,3
Average% /15 Member States 95,22
C: Communication of national legislation                N: No communication of national legislation
NR: Directive not relevant to a particular country       IC:      Incomplete communication
Transposal of European directives
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Structures
Collective bargaining:
levels and organisation
In all Member States, the social dia-
logue helps to shape industrial rela-
tions. Collective bargaining is the
preferred tool in this process.
While there is undoubtedly the same
recognition throughout Europe of
the central role of collective bargain-
ing, methods and levels of use vary
significantly.
Sectoral negotiation, which is well
developed in Germany and
Denmark, is thus non-existent in the
United Kingdom. Cross-industry
agreements are preferred in Belgium,
Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal
and Finland.
Two trends are generally apparent in
the development of collective bar-
gaining.
The first trend is a trend towards
releasing the decentralised levels
from the standards and guidelines
negotiated at the centralised levels.
This is done by putting greater
emphasis on company-level bargain-
ing, limiting cross-industry agree-
ments to framework guidelines, and
introducing exemption clauses to
enable general provisions to be
waived.
Agreements drawn up at sectoral
level play an important part in the
transparency and dissemination of
minimum social standards, in parti-
cular in small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). Increasingly
often, however, companies negotiate
new agreements, striking a balance
between flexibility and job security
on a case-by-case basis.
Relations between sectoral collective
agreements and company-level
a g r e e m e n t s
vary from one
country to
another. The
principles used
to prevent or
resolve con-
flicts between
levels vary
(hierarchy of
c o l l e c t i v e
agreements or
legal prece-
dence of the
sectoral agree-
ment, to the
detriment of
the company
agreement in
Germany and
Italy; application of the principle of
the most favourable rule in France;
application of the earlier agreement
in Spain, etc.).
Sectoral agreements often define the
scope of company-level negotia-
tions. However, given the rapid
growth of company-level collective
bargaining, it is difficult to maintain
strong discipline in sectoral agree-
ments. If this discipline is interpreted
too strictly, it can prevent a diversifi-
cation of collective agreement law
that would be necessary in the in-
terests of companies. On the other
hand, recognition of the autonomy
of company-level bargaining should
not be used to encourage unfair or
anti-union competition.
While it is generally agreed that the
role of sectoral agreements in stan-
dardising competitive conditions
should be safeguarded, company
agreements are increasingly moving
away from standards issued at this
level. These centrifugal forces are
apparent in various forms:
• watering down sectoral agreement
provisions into mere recommenda-
tions;
• providing for exemptions (saving
clauses or withdrawal clauses) from
rules laid down by the sectoral
agreement.
The second trend is a trend towards
increasing collective bargaining.
From issues directly related to indus-
trial relations, principally working
time and wages, collective bargain-
ing issues have gradually broadened.
It has been necessary, of course, to
integrate both aspects of employ-
ment (safeguarding existing jobs and
creating new jobs), which means
that more general interests outside
the company have to be taken into
account. Moreover, issues related to
employability (vocational training),
equal treatment of women and men,
and the fight against discrimination
are of increasing importance.
The players
The social partners have therefore
incorporated into their negotiations
and agreements concerns which are
peripheral to industrial relations,
concerns which are sometimes com-
municated by specific pressure
groups (trade unions representing
the unemployed, associations repre-
senting the family, and social non-
governmental organisations (NGOs)).
This development raises the question
of the capacity of trade organisations
to represent wider interests.
The new forms of organisation of
work and the significant level of
unemployment and social exclusion
have helped to weaken the structures
of collective representation.
Industrial relations at national level
Industrial rel tion  at n tional level
Enterprises
Sectors
UK IRL
FIN
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P E
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Main level of negotiation
Source: European Commission.
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The main effect of this weakening of
representative structures, which is
happening in most European coun-
tries, is a fall in membership. This
concerns mainly trade unions but
also, to a lesser extent, employers’
organisations.
This raises the question of the ability
of trade unionism to play a part in a
wider social area and to forge new
alliances with the structures repre-
senting these emerging interests.
The role of the State
In most countries, the State plays a
fundamental role in the organisation
and operation of the social dialogue.
This includes establishing a basic set
of rights recognising an area for
negotiation, instruments of collec-
tive action and the role of the social
partners.
Since 1990, the State has reposi-
tioned itself and taken on an increa-
singly mediatory role, which favours
informal coordination methods
between the various players rather
than rigid interdependency.
Labour law
With the exception of Sweden and
the United Kingdom, systems of col-
lective labour representation general-
ly have not undergone fundamental
changes in recent years. The role of
trade unions in the organisation of
the labour market has not been chal-
lenged, and some of their rights have
even been extended by new laws.
Recognition of the social
partners
Mutual recognition is the basic
mechanism of collective bargaining
in most EU countries, but additional
conditions are sometimes required.
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• Government incentives for tripar-
tite consultation and for negotia-
tion on trade union representa-
tion at work.
• Government White Paper entitled
‘Fairness at work’.
• Legislative programme compri-
sing a legal procedure recognising
the social partners, reform of laws
on unfair dismissal, maternity
entitlement, parental leave and
the introduction of a statutory
minimum wage.
Belgium Organisations must be recognised by the government in order to conclude collective
agreements
Greece Organisations must have a minimum number of members required by law
Spain The ‘most representative’ organisations must meet minimum membership criteria
France Representativeness is established by a government decision on the basis of 
membership, independence, subscriptions and the experience and age of the 
organisation
Luxembourg Only trade unions which are representative at national level can be party to a 
collective agreement
Austria Statutory organisations with compulsory affiliation to the Federal Chamber of 
Business and the Federal Chamber of Labour
Changes in worker trade union membership between 1985 and 1995
Source: ILO
Country Additional conditions to mutual recognition
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Legal application and 
extension of collective
agreements
Extending collective agreements in
law allows the general application of
some or all of the provisions negoti-
ated by a number of social partner
organisations. An erga omnes exten-
sion of this kind may involve one
branch of economic activity or all
sectors. It is generally provided for in
Member States where unionisation is
relatively low, thus ensuring equal
treatment of workers and fair compe-
tition between companies.
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Country Legal application Extension mechanism
Belgium Collective agreements apply only to signatoryparties and their members
Collective agreements adopted in the National
Labour Council and joint committees are
extended to all workers and employers
Denmark Collective agreements apply only to signatoryparties and their members No extension
Germany Collective agreements apply only to signatoryparties and their members
Collective agreements are extended if 50 % of
the workers in the sector concerned are already 
covered and if extension is in the public interest
Greece Collective agreements apply only to signatoryparties and their members
Agreements are extended where the employers
subject to the agreement already employ at least
51 % of the employees in a trade or sector
Spain Collective agreements apply to all employersand workers in their field of application
Cross-industry agreements are extended if the
trade unions represent at least 10 % of the 
members of the works councils and the
employers represent 15 % of the companies
Sectoral agreements are extended if legal criteria
are met
France Collective agreements apply only to signatoryparties and their members
Agreements negotiated and adopted in joint
committees are extended; clauses which do not
comply with legislative and statutory provisions
are excluded
Ireland Collective agreements apply only to signatoryparties and their members
Possible extension by registering the agreement
with the Labour Court
Italy Collective agreements apply only to signatoryparties and their members No extension
Luxembourg
Collective agreements apply to signatory com-
panies and to all their employees independently
of their membership of a signatory trade union
Declaration of a generally binding nature of
collective agreements in accordance with the
law, for all employers and workers
Netherlands
Collective agreements apply to all employees,
whether they are trade union members or not,
whose employers are members of the signatory
organisation
Agreements are extended to employers who are
not affiliated to a signatory organisation, accor-
ding to general interest and the representative-
ness of the signatories (55–60 %) of workers
covered
Austria
The prescriptive part of collective agreements
has force of law; the binding part applies only
to signatory parties and their members
Extension declared by the Federal Conciliation
Office
Portugal Collective agreements apply only to signatoryparties and their members
Extension of agreements negotiated in joint
committees, following verification of the parties’
mandate and ensuring that procedures have
been followed
Finland
Collective agreements are considered to be
‘generally applicable’ to employers who are not
represented in bargaining, where half or less
than half of employees in the sector concerned
are in its field of application
No extension
Sweden Collective agreements apply only to signatoryparties and their members No extension
United Kingdom
Collective agreements are not legally binding
on signatory parties or their members, unless
otherwise stipulated
No extension
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Conciliation Mediation and arbitration
Belgium Conciliation procedures within joint committees Mediation and arbitration procedures 
Denmark Conciliation procedures Arbitration procedures
Germany
Voluntary mediation: the parties involved in a 
collective agreement are free to institute a 
mediation procedure and to determine its effects
Joint conciliation committees in companies
Greece Voluntary conciliation procedures by an officialfrom the Ministry of Labour
Mediation by the opposing parties themselves or,
in case of disagreement, by the Mediation and
Arbitration Service; optional arbitration by this
same body
Spain
Prior arbitration procedure compulsory before
taking industrial action or bringing the matter
before the courts
Interconfederal system of mediation and 
arbitration
France Legal conciliation procedures optional Legal mediation and arbitration proceduresoptional
Ireland Conciliation and mediation bodies: Labour Courtand Labour Relations Commission
Italy
Conflict prevention by means of codes of good
conduct, particularly in the public sector, and by
incentives to negotiate
Informal mediation by public authorities and
mediation by a guarantee committee for public
service disputes
Luxembourg
Conciliation in collective disputes by the
National Conciliation Office, whose rulings may
be declared to be of a generally binding nature
Arbitration Council: the arbitration award is
equivalent to the conclusion of a collective
agreement and may be declared to be of a 
generally binding nature
Netherlands
Collective agreements sometimes make provision
for the procedure to be followed in case of
dispute
A compulsory mediation procedure is provided 
for participation of workers in public enterprises
or in public service
Austria
Compulsory conciliation by a conciliation board
or optional conciliation by the Federal
Conciliation Office
Portugal Optional conciliation procedures
Optional mediation and arbitration procedures
Arbitration compulsory for disputes relating to
public enterprises
Finland
Strikes and lockouts can only be initiated if the
conciliator has been notified in writing at least
two weeks in advance
Sweden Mediation by the National Conciliators’ Office
United Kingdom Disputes are settled informally Settlement of disputes by ACAS (Advisory,Conciliation and Arbitration Service)
Belgium Right to strike recognised Lockout not recognised
Denmark Right to strike Right to lockout
Germany Right to strike declared by the Constitution Lockout permitted
Greece Right to strike declared by the Constitution Lockout prohibited
Spain Right to strike recognised by the Constitution The Constitution limits lockout to specific 
circumstances
France Right to strike declared by the Constitution No formal recognition of lockout
Ireland Right to strike legally protected by civil law Right to lockout
Italy Right to strike declared by the Constitution Right to lockout 
Luxembourg Right to strike not declared explicitly either Employer obliged to refrain from
by the Constitution or in law threatening or implementing a lockout
Netherlands No legal rules supporting the right to strike No rules
Austria Strike permitted by law Lockout permitted
Portugal Right to strike guaranteed by the Constitution Lockout prohibited
Finland Right to strike Right to lockout
Sweden Right to strike guaranteed by the Constitution Lockout guaranteed by the Constitution
United Kingdom Right to strike legally protected by civil law Lockout legally protected by civil law
Right to strike Lockout
Settling collective disputes
There are generally three stages
involved in settling disputes of an
economic nature: conciliation, medi-
ation and arbitration. The three
stages are brought into play succes-
sively if the parties to the dispute do
not find a solution. The third stage
provides for the highest degree of
outside intervention. This is general-
ly used only as a last resort, and with
great reluctance in countries with
strong traditions of dialogue.
Arbitration may even be totally
excluded where procedures provide
for compulsory conciliation and, at
most, mediation.
Strikes and lockouts
In most EU Member States, strikes
and lockouts are not given the same
degree of protection. The right to
strike is generally recognised and
protected constitutionally (except in
the United Kingdom, where legisla-
tion is ad hoc).
Trends in 
collective bargaining
Relations between 
the social partners
The results of the social dialogue are
varied. A major part of the social
partners’ task is to sign agreements at
company, sector and cross-industry
level. For example, the following
sectoral or national agreements were
signed during 199912.
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Belgium Commerce Construction Post
Construction National Transport
Telecommunications Financial services
Public
Denmark  Agriculture Financial services Education
Financial services Health
Health Health
Germany  Chemical Automobile
Information technology Public
Automobile Post and telecommunications
Public Metal
Post and telecommunications Public
Public Metal
Metal Publishing and media
Maintenance and cleaning Maintenance and cleaning
Insurance Insurance
Publishing and media Publishing and media
Rail transport
Construction
Greece  Telecommunications Public Construction
Public Telecommunications Pulp and paper
Telecommunications Financial services Transport, public
Financial services
Spain Chemical Intersectoral Telecommunications
Intersectoral Financial services Financial services
Chemical Publishing and media Extractive
Chemical Chemical Transport, air
Chemical Intersectoral
Agriculture
Extractive
Automobile
Agriculture
France  National Education
Automobile Transport, air
Electrical Education
Automobile National
Commerce Energy
Public transport Public
Public transport
Ireland Financial services Financial services
Commerce
Maintenance and cleaning
Italy Tourism Construction Financial services
Public Tourism Automobile
Metal Post and telecommunications
Metal Public
Food Metal
Public Automobile
Automobile
Metal
Food
Public
Luxembourg Public Public
Financial services Public
Telecommunications
Financial services
Netherlands Public Education
Public Consultancy and business
Public Publishing and media
Food Public
Transport, public
Austria National Financial services Transport
National Tourism
Portugal Health
Transport, rail
Intersectoral
Transport, air
Transport, sea
Finland  Financial services Transport, air Food
Transport, air
Sweden Transport, public Transport, public Transport, public
Pulp and paper Pulp and paper Automobile
Transport Automobile Health
Transport Transport, road
United Kingdom Automobile Public Education
Health
Transport, air
Country Agreements Working time Agreements Wages Disputes
Although incomplete, this list clearly
highlights national situations, the
importance in each country of the
conclusion of agreements, the sec-
tors concerned and the frequency
with which industrial action is taken
where agreement is not reached.
Bargaining on wages and working
time is the focus of the social part-
ners’ attention. These two factors are
absolutely crucial in giving substance
to industrial relations. They are
analysed in detail in the next Part of
the report.
However, the social dialogue is not
limited to negotiating agreements.
As a result of dialogue, the social
partners may promote joint initia-
tives. Depending on circumstances,
these could involve measures pur-
sued under partnership arrange-
ments, in the area of vocational
training for example, joint manage-
ment of funds (retirement or unem-
ployment), campaigns to prevent
accidents at work, racism, discrimi-
nation or even sexual harassment.
Employability
Within the European employment
strategy, the employment guidelines
and Member States’ national action
plans, vocational training has a very
central role. Collective bargaining
has become an important factor in
the development of training — and
especially continuing training — in
many countries. In the 1990s, the
word employability appears in col-
lective bargaining. It qualifies the
ability of an employee to be mobile
because of the skills acquired
through in-company training.
The position of employability at the
bargaining table is very much depen-
dent on the national approach to
(vocational) training. It depends on
the characteristics of national indus-
trial relations systems and national
education and training systems. In
some Member States, employability
is solely a case of unions and
employers’ organisations, with
sometimes a little push from the
authorities. In other Member States,
the authorities are much more
involved in designing and executing
education and training programmes.
Overall, it can be said that whatever
the national system is, it is intersec-
toral and sectoral bargaining that has
the greatest impact on continuing
training. Company-level bargaining
occurs in a number of countries, but
in most cases it is relatively limited
in extent. Within the context of
these national systems, an intensifi-
cation of bargaining (and social part-
ner involvement) on training in
many EU countries has been seen in
recent years, both specifically and as
part of general employment pacts
and similar initiatives.
Early retirement
Over the years, consensus has been
reached between employers and
trade unions that ‘hidden unem-
ployment’ through early retirement
is more acceptable than youth
unemployment. However, policy-
makers now widely recognise that
the policy of encouraging early
retirement fell foul of the ‘lump of
labour fallacy’. Reducing labour sup-
ply does not necessarily help to
reduce unemployment. Indeed,
where such a policy has been pur-
sued, it does not seem to have been
effective in tackling youth unem-
ployment.
Furthermore, the evidence of loss of
expertise as older workers take early
retirement has become increasingly
noticeable. Questions have also been
raised about the real effects of the
compensatory recruitment measures
which have accompanied some early
retirement schemes. In some coun-
tries, attention has now switched to
encouraging the recruitment and
retention of older workers in
employment, through either incen-
tive or disincentive measures.
Collective agreements seeking
explicitly to turn the tide of early
retirement are so far very rare. One
notable example is the 1999–2000
agreement for Belgium’s construc-
tion industry, where early retirement
at the age of 58 was introduced in
1997. The new agreement provides
for a lump-sum bonus for workers
who volunteer to continue to work
until the age of 60. The deal is moti-
vated primarily by the fact that the
construction industry has witnessed
increasing difficulties in finding
employees for the vacancies availa-
ble. However, at the end of the day,
early retirement is still persistently
reported across the EU as an accom-
panying measure to company clo-
sures and restructuring.
Initiatives to integrate minorities
Collective bargaining also tried to
improve equal opportunities in the
labour market. In Denmark, the
employers and unions seek active
ways to integrate minorities into the
labour market. The aim of the agree-
ment is to put ethnic equality on the
same footing as gender equality. In a
draft proposal, the unions said that
they would train and educate their
shop stewards to help them absorb
people from ethnic minorities into
the labour market. In the UK, a joint
action was taken at Ford by the
managers and unions to fight racism
within the company. After threats
from the union to hold a ballot to
take action against growing racism,
Ford’s management launched a plan
to tackle the problem. The joint
statement provides for a ‘diversity
and equality assessment review’
covering policy and planning, selec-
tion, development and retention of
employees, communication and cor-
porate image, corporate citizenship
and a race equality audit. This
should lead to an improved working
atmosphere and reduce racial dis-
crimination to a minimum.
Industrial disputes
A decrease 
in industrial disputes?
Strikes have become a declining
method of collective action in recent
years. Since 1979, the number of
strikes in the EU-15 countries has
fallen. This evolution in industrial
disputes can be seen as a sign of
improved labour relations. It can also
be the result of a loss of union influ-
ence or, as in the case of the UK, of
legislative measures minimising
union power. High unemployment
and difficulties in finding a job dis-
suade employees from choosing this
type of action. Employers, for their
part, are under pressure from fiercer
competition, which makes it more
important to secure workers’ com-
mitments and production continua-
tion.
The industrial disputes identified by
the European Industrial Relations
Observatory (EIRO), as highlighted
in the previous table, show that most
of the strikes took place in the public
or protected sectors. These sectors
were placed under strong pressure
because of their restructuring and
liberalisation of markets.
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National differences
The following charts show huge dif-
ferences between the Member States
in the number of days lost due to
strikes. These differences can, for
instance, be attributed to the differ-
ent systems of industrial relations.
The systems characterised by well-
established negotiation or consulta-
tion processes between the social
partners might decrease the need to
express grievances through strikes.
Cycle in conflicts?
Conflicts between employers and
employees or their unions are quite
regular with differences in industry
among Member States. Based on data
collected by Eurostat, the following
chart shows the average number of
industrial disputes from 1997 until
mid-1999 in working days lost per
1 000 employees. It represents the
figures found in nine countries of
the European Union: Greece, Spain,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the
United Kingdom.
The chart below shows that, in the
third quarter of the year, disputes
seem to concentrate contrary to the
agreements cycle.
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Wage developments 
in the EU
Industrialised countries are wage
earner economies. This group repre-
sents around 84 % of the employed
population in the EU. This is about
the same level as in Japan, but less
than in the United States (see Chart
36). The share of wage earners in
total employment has risen over the
past decades as traditional forms of
self-employment in agriculture, the
crafts sector and commerce have
disappeared. This trend now seems
to have stopped, and in some cases a
reversal can be observed. The strong
political commitment to supporting
entrepreneurship might also con-
tribute to an increasing share of self-
employment.
Thus, wages are the main source of
income for the vast majority of the
working population. However, wages
also determine the living standards
of most people who are not working.
In many social security systems, the
incomes of pensioners, the unem-
ployed and the incapacitated are
linked to their own past wages, and
the ability of these systems to pay
depends on the amount of social
insurance contributions that can be
levied on the wages of the current
active population.
There are different ways in which the
reward for a wage earner’s labour can
be determined. They range from
legislation to individual contracts.
However, collective bargaining con-
tinues to play a key role in setting
wage levels and the structure of
wages. It therefore also has a major
impact on the macroeconomic per-
formance of the European economy.
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Wages
Wa es
This part of the report takes a closer look at selected topics in the area of industrial relations. In this first edition, the focus
is on the traditional key issues of collective bargaining, namely wages and working time. The intention is to gather some
key facts and, on this basis, to discuss the strategies and behaviour of the two sides of industry in relation to the major
policy objectives of the European Union.
The first section in this part presents information on wage developments in the European Union and then looks at some
key issues for the wage bargaining process. The first of these issues is monetary union which changes the environment
for economic policy-making and gives greater responsibility to the social partners. The role of wage bargaining in over-
coming Europe’s employment problem is the topic of another section. This is followed by a discussion of the pay gap
between men and women and the contribution of collective bargaining to equal opportunities. Finally, the challenge of
the environment is considered. The report examines wage disparities between the current Member States and the appli-
cant countries and tries to highlight some issues that are likely to arise in the enlargement process.
The second section looks at working time. Although working time is not on the collective bargaining agenda with the
same regularity as pay, it has become increasingly important over recent years. The main focus of attention tends to be
on the link between working time and employment, but it is important to note that the reduction in working time —
and the concomitant increase in leisure time — has been one important way in which workers have been able to enjoy
the fruits of the productivity growth resulting from technological progress.
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Determining the reward for
labour
Four methods of pay determina-
tion can be distinguished:
1. The most constraining for the
employer is a wage laid down by
legislation, i.e. a statutory mini-
mum wage. Such a minimum
wage currently exists in eight
Member States (Belgium, Greece,
Share of employees in total employment, 1975, 1990 and 1998
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One indicator that is often used for
international comparisons is hourly
labour costs in industry. Data for
1996 show that the average for the
EU is almost EUR 3 above the level in
the United States, but very close to
labour costs in Japan. There are
much greater differences within the
EU: labour costs in western Germany
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Spain, France, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal and the
UK — see below). In other
Member States, legislation can
be used to extend a negotiated
minimum wage to all workers in
a given sector.
2. Somewhat less constraining for
employers is wage determina-
tion through collective bargain-
ing. In Europe, the rate of cover-
age by collective agreements
tends to be high — much higher
than unionisation rates. This
high coverage rate of collective
agreements can be explained by
the fact that a large proportion
of employers are affiliated to an
employers’ organisation and
that employers do not normally
discriminate between trade
union members and non-mem-
bers.
3. It is difficult to assess the impor-
tance of individual employment
contracts in determining
incomes from work. Some work-
ers are likely to be covered only
by an individual contract, but in
many cases individual contracts
would build on a collective
agreement and secure some
additional benefits.
4. The reward for the work of
employees does not necessarily
have to take the form of wages
and salaries only. Workers may
also be offered various forms of
direct participation in profits
and results. These remuneration
schemes still only cover a limi-
ted proportion of households,
but they have multiplied over
recent years in most EU Member
States.
What an employer has to pay for a
worker is not only determined by
these four mechanisms. Social
insurance contributions and taxes
on labour need to be added — the
so-called ‘tax wedge’ which is set
by public authorities. There are also
payments for days not worked and
possibly various benefits in cash
and in kind (e.g. a company car).
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are more than four times higher
than in Portugal. It is, however,
important to be aware of the limita-
tions of such comparisons. Con-
clusions about the competitiveness
of a particular country can only be
drawn once other factors, and in par-
ticular productivity, have been taken
into account.
According to the European survey
on the structure of earnings, annual
gross earnings in 1995 ranged from
well below EUR 10 000 in some sec-
tors in Portugal to just over EUR
50 000 in the financial intermedia-
tion sector in Luxembourg. The dif-
ferences among the sectors within a
single country can be as striking as
the differences between countries.
The ranking of sectors may change
somewhat from country to country,
but two sectors always stand out:
financial intermediation with the
highest wages and hotels and restau-
rants with the lowest. It is interesting
to note, however, that the relative
gap between these two extremes
tends to be much smaller in the
Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland
and Sweden) than in the rest of the
EU.
Source:   Eurostat, structure of earnings survey (SES)
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As far as occupations are concerned,
there is a large spread between mana-
gerial and professional occupations,
on the one hand, and elementary
occupations, on the other. This
reflects the pay rewards for high skill
levels (see also Charts 40 and 41).
As regards the evolution of wages
over time, the steepest rises in real
compensation per employee took
place in most countries during the
1960s and 1970s. Since then, the rate
of increase has slowed down marked-
ly for the EU as a whole.
Source: Eurostat, SES
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The growth of nominal wages has
also slowed down considerably since
the 1970s. In most Member States,
the rate of increase in nominal com-
pensation per employee has been
brought well below the 5 % mark. It
is worth noting that, during the
1990s, there was no clear correlation
between the growth rates of nominal
and of real compensation. Higher
real wages are not automatically
achieved by faster nominal wage
growth. Conversely, moderate nomi-
nal pay settlements do not imply
that wage earners are losing out.
In order to facilitate graphical presentation, the earnings distribution is divided into five broad earnings brack-
ets, which are narrow enough to highlight the salient features of the distribution.
In most of the 11 Member States for which data are available, 6 % of employees or less have earnings below 50 %
of the national average; the exceptions are the UK, where the proportion is almost 19 %, and Spain and Ireland
(around 13 % in both). The share of employees earning 50–80 % of average wages exceeds that on 80–120 % in
France (by over 20 percentage points), Greece, Spain, Ireland and the UK. In contrast, in Sweden (where the diffe-
rence exceeds 30 percentage points), Denmark and Belgium, employees are more concentrated in the higher
earnings bracket. In the remaining three Member States, the proportion is similar. As is often the case, Sweden’s
relatively even distribution of income stands out, with almost 60 % of employees earning 80–120 % of the ave-
rage hourly wage.
Thus the share of employees on 80–120 % of average wages ranges from 26 % in Spain, France, Ireland and the
UK, to 58 % in Sweden, and 40 % or more in Belgium and Denmark.
Among the higher earnings brackets, differences are smaller; the 120–200 % bracket accounts for between 16
and 19 % of employees in most, reaching 20 % in Greece, while it is only 14 % in Sweden and France, and those
on more than twice the average earnings account for 4 to 6 % in all except Sweden, where the share is 2 %.
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The lower real wage increases are first
of all a reflection of reduced produc-
tivity growth (see Chart 44).
However, a comparison of the rates
of increase in real compensation and
in labour productivity reveals that in
most Member States real wages
lagged behind productivity growth
during the 1980s and 1990s. As a
result, the labour cost of producing
one unit of output has been falling
in real terms. Already in the 1980s,
the adjusted wage share fell below
the level of the 1960s, reversing the
sharp increase of the early 1970s (see
Chart 43). The fall in the wage share
— which of course implies a sym-
metrical rise in the profit share — has
continued in the EU, whereas in the
United States and Japan the split
between aggregate wages and profits
seems to have stabilised.
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Why has the wage share in Europe fallen so low?
Low wage settlements do not automatically lead to a falling wage share. Firms may be forced by market conditions
to pass on lower labour costs to their customers — and these include workers whose purchasing power (and hence
real wages) would benefit as a result.
Thus the question about the falling wage share can be asked in two ways:
• Why are workers unable to capture the full percentage increase in labour productivity (this would be required for
a constant wage share)?
• Or why are firms able to charge prices that result in a
high profit share?
The first question is usually answered by referring to the
weakened bargaining position of trade unions. Highly
unionised sectors are declining, and mass unemployment
makes industrial action more risky. However, the almost
constant wage share in the United States remains unex-
plained.
The second question cannot easily be answered either.
Competition on markets for goods and services could be
limited, but this is unlikely in view of the completion of
the internal market, liberalisation in various markets (e.g.
telecommunications, energy, transport) and globalisa-
tion. It could also be that capital costs are higher than
they used to be and that this is reflected in prices. Real
long-term interest rates are indeed much higher today
than they were in the 1970s, and, in the EU, they tended
to be slightly above the level in the United States during
the 1990s.
While the wage share is adjusted for shifts between salary
earners and the self-employed, there may be other struc-
tural factors that can have an impact on the wage and
profit shares. Changes in the composition of the econo-
my, notably in terms of sectors and types of employment,
can affect the wage share. If production requires a higher
capital input, then the wage share would fall. Since the
1960s, the investment rate (the share of gross fixed capi-
tal formation in gross domestic product (GDP)) was con-
sistently higher in Europe than in the United States.
Another structural factor might be Europe’s lack of jobs in
the services sector (see Chart 46). Some types of services
with a significant growth potential (e.g. personal services,
maintenance and repair services for households) are
unlikely to require a high level of capital investments.
These considerations are highly speculative, but illustrate the difficulty in using the wage and profit shares as a
yardstick for collective bargaining. Wage and profit shares are highly aggregate indicators. Thus, it is almost impos-
sible to determine, at the macroeconomic level, whether wage earners are getting a fair share of national output.
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The high degree of wage moderation
that has characterised industrial rela-
tions in Europe since the 1980s made
it possible to reduce inflation and to
stabilise it at a low level (see Chart
47). Large differences in inflation
rates had emerged among European
countries following the breakdown
of the fixed exchange rate system of
Bretton Woods and the oil price
shock in the early 1970s. Inflation
rates were not only different from
one European country to another,
they were also unstable and hence
difficult to predict.
The reduction in inflation rates did
not happen smoothly, though, and
there was strong public policy inter-
vention at certain moments. In a
number of countries, governments
introduced wage and price controls
in the 1970s. Monetary policy,
which since then in all Member
States has become the main policy
tool for keeping inflation under con-
trol, became very tight following the
first and second oil price shocks and
during the German unification
boom. The ensuing recessions each
time caused unemployment to rise
sharply to a new plateau and weak-
ened trade unions. Only during the
second half of the 1980s, a period
characterised by a relaxation of mon-
etary policy, did Europe as a whole
once again see a rapid rise in employ-
ment and a rapid decline in unem-
ployment.
Real long-term interest rates in Europe, 
United States and Japan, 1971 - 97
Working-age population in the EU 
and the United States, 1998 46
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Wage bargaining in
the monetary union
The introduction of the single cur-
rency on 1 January 1999 has
changed the macroeconomic policy
environment and has also forced the
social partners to adapt. Monetary
policy is now conducted for the
entire euro zone by the European
Institutions, in particular the Central
Bank. Fiscal policy remains national,
but has to be implemented in accor-
dance with the Stability Pact. By con-
trast, there is hardly any European
coordination of wage policy, the
third element of the macroeconomic
policy mix. Depending on the Mem-
ber State, wages are negotiated by the
social partners at the level of compa-
nies, sectors, regions or national.
Within the monetary union, wage
bargaining has to meet two chal-
lenges. First, at the aggregate level, it
is necessary to avoid ‘stability con-
flicts’ between the three components
of the macroeconomic policy mix. It
is crucial that the social partners
avoid wage settlements that could
jeopardise price stability in the euro
zone and hence force the European
Central Bank to tighten monetary
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Wage pressure and the inflation rate
Pressure for higher wages can be measured by the difference between the year-on-year change in labour compen-
sation and the annual productivity growth. If the increase in compensation exceeds productivity growth, then
workers are increasing their share of national income. Conversely, if productivity growth exceeds pay rises, then
we observe wage moderation.
There is a close link between wage pressure or moderation and changes in the inflation rate. Chart 48 shows both
the indicator for wage pressure/moderation and the change in the inflation rate (GDP deflator). It is interesting to
note that the rise in inflation usually preceded the increase in wage pressure.
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policy. In the event of a strong reac-
tion of monetary policy, there is a
risk of a stabilisation crisis that could
plunge the European economy into a
recession.
Second, at the national level, the
social partners have to adapt to the
fact that exchange rate movements
can no longer compensate for diver-
gent wage trends. Different wage
developments from those in the
other euro-zone members will have
an immediate impact on competi-
tiveness and employment. Thus
monetary union can have a strong
disciplining impact on wage bargain-
ing. This would be helpful in achie-
ving price stability, but it also raises
fears among trade unions about
‘competitive wage moderation’, i.e.
the danger that the social partners in
one country will try to gain more
employment at the expense of other
euro-zone members.
The macroeconomic policy
mix in the euro zone
The European social partners took a
constructive attitude towards the
single currency and accepted the
need for achieving the ambitious
convergence goals. In their joint
declaration ‘A renewed cooperative
strategy for more employment’ of 3
July 1992, they emphasised their
autonomy with regard to wage nego-
tiations but also accepted their
responsibilities in the macroeco-
nomic policy process.
‘The conduct of wage negotiations is
under the responsibility of the social
partners. The more credible and socially
acceptable economic policies are, the
easier the social partners can anticipate
low or decreasing inflation rates in the
results of their wage negotiations. This
would reduce the strain on monetary
policy and contribute to the reduction
also of short-term interest rates.
Furthermore, wage developments have
to take into account the requirements of
the profitability of employment-creating
investment, the competitiveness of enter-
prises on the world markets and the
implications of full economic and mon-
etary union. The non-inflationary and
sustainable growth process, thus gene-
rated, would provide the appropriate
scope for real wage increases which
underlines the interrelation between the
European integration process and rising
living standards.’
In their joint contribution to the
Luxembourg Employment Summit
of November 1997, the European
social partners stressed that the sin-
gle currency is an opportunity for
achieving a ‘sustainable job-creating
growth process’:
‘The realisation of EMU can facilitate
this task [of reaching progressively a
substantially higher employment level
within 10 years] by avoiding or alleviat-
ing major macroeconomic obstacles to
growth that were observed in the past.
Indeed, EMU will remove — by defini-
tion — the risk of intra-EMU monetary
turbulence, and it will also favour a
macroeconomic policy mix that, in the
coming years, will reduce the risk of a
stability conflict between the three
major components of the policy mix
(budgetary policy and wage develo-
pments on the one hand, and monetary
policy on the other).’
Thus, the European social partners
are aware of the strategic interaction
between wage bargaining behaviour
and monetary policy: if wage
developments jeopardise price stabi-
lity, the European Central Bank will
be forced to react by raising interest
rates. This restrains inflationary pres-
sures by reducing the demand for
investment and consumer goods and
can, in the worst case, lead the
economy into a recession (‘stabilisa-
tion crisis’, see box below). By giving
the right signals to the European
Central Bank, the social partners can
increase the scope for lowering in-
terest rates and hence contribute to
an economic environment that is
conducive to growth.
More recently, the recognition of the
social partners’ responsibility for a
balanced macroeconomic policy mix
has led to practical consequences.
The European Employment Pact
launched in June 1999 by the
Cologne European Council (3 and 4
June 1999) recognised the important
role of the social partners and esta-
blished the ‘macroeconomic dia-
logue’ where representatives of the
Council, the Commission, the
European Central Bank and the
social partners participate. The
Presidency conclusions stated that
‘… the key to sustainable non-inflation-
ary growth and increased employment
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Monetary policy 
and stabilisation crises
The tightness of monetary policy can be
measured by the difference between
short-term and long-term interest rates.
Usually long-term interest rates are higher
than short-term interest rates. However,
when monetary policy is tightened to
avert or to bring down inflation, short-
term interest rates (which are set by the
Central Bank) go up and may even exceed
long-term rates. There have been three
periods of very tight monetary policy
since the 1970s and each time a drop in
employment and a sharp rise in unem-
ployment followed (see Chart 49).
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lies in a properly coordinated mix of
macroeconomic policies geared towards
growth and stability and comprehensive
structural reforms at Community and
national levels. The European Council
takes the view that, to make a lasting
success of economic and monetary
union, there will need to be enhanced
and appropriate policy coordination as
well as dialogue with both sides of
industry and with the European Central
Bank. The European Employment Pact
will make a major contribution in this
regard.
In the euro area the enhanced dialogue
in the EUR-11 group will also contribute
to achieving a more balanced policy
mix. The European Council calls on
governments and both sides of industry
to support monetary policy in its priority
role of maintaining stability. It will also
be important to keep up efforts to
achieve budgetary positions which are
close to balance or in surplus over the
medium term, appropriate wage develo-
pment and comprehensive structural
reforms.’
According to a paper from the
Presidency of the Council, ‘the aim
of the dialogue is to preserve non-
inflationary growth dynamics
through coordination of economic
policy and improving the mutually
supportive interaction between wage
developments and monetary, budget
and fiscal policy.’ Discussions are
intended to be informal and open. A
commitment of participants to ex
ante coordination of economic poli-
cies is not expected. Consequently,
no common conclusions were issued
after the first macroeconomic dia-
logue meeting. Future meetings are
to be scheduled in such a way that
the macroeconomic dialogue can
influence the elaboration of the
European economic and employ-
ment policy guidelines.
This macroeconomic dialogue can-
not be regarded as a European
incomes policy, but it may further
strengthen the credibility of the euro
zone’s macroeconomic policy mix.
Already, the expectations about
macroeconomic stability in the euro
zone have been very positive. This is
illustrated by the remarkable conver-
gence of long-term interest rates not
at an intermediate level between
high and low inflation countries, but
at the low level of the former
German mark zone (see Chart 50).
This will be beneficial for growth,
employment and living standards
and would not have been possible
without the expectation of responsi-
ble wage bargaining behaviour of the
social partners.
Wage bargaining within
the euro-zone countries
The main changes resulting from the
single currency for national wage
bargaining systems were spelled out
in an opinion addressed in
September 1997 by the Economic
Policy Committee to the Council
and the Commission. The key mes-
sages of this opinion were taken up
in the broad economic policy guide-
lines adopted by the Council of the
European Union on 6 July 1998. The
Council stressed that ‘in EMU, with
the single monetary regime, the link
between wages and employment will
become more evident and stringent’.
It invited the social partners in the
Member States to conclude wage
agreements in accordance with four
general rules:
• ‘Aggregate nominal wage increases
must be consistent with price sta-
bility.’ Excessive wage increases in
the whole euro area would cause
monetary policy to become tighter
and this would be harmful to
growth and employment. If exces-
sive pay rises are limited to a
region, then competitiveness and
employment in this region would
suffer.
• Real wage increases should safe-
guard the profitability of capacity-
enhancing and employment-crea-
ting investment.
• ‘Wage agreements should better
take into account differentials in
productivity levels according to
qualifications, skills and geogra-
phical areas.’
• ‘Wage imitation effects need to be
avoided.’
Following these rules does not imply
uniform wage developments across
the euro area. The Council stressed
instead the increasing importance of
wages as a macroeconomic adjust-
ment tool: ‘In EMU, wage adjustment
will need to play a more important role
in the adjustment to changing economic
circumstances, especially in the case of
country-specific disturbances, thereby
requiring a higher degree of adaptability
in the wage formation process.’
Many social pacts concluded in the
Member States already reflect the
new requirements of monetary
union and some remarkable achieve-
ments can be found regarding the
adaptation of national institutions
and behaviour patterns.
Towards a European 
coordination of wage 
bargaining?
As the economies of the Member
States become more tightly inte-
grated, collective bargaining is also
likely to become increasingly
‘Europeanised13’. Such Europeani-
sation takes different forms
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depending on the objective that is
to be achieved.
National wage bargaining processes
in a number of countries had to take
account of the requirements of eco-
nomic and monetary union (EMU)
in terms of inflation and public
finance. A number of tripartite social
pacts were concluded in view of
becoming eligible for membership in
the euro zone. In some cases, guide-
lines for the evolution of wages were
formulated relative to other coun-
tries of the euro zone so as to main-
tain competitiveness. The social part-
ners at sector or company level (espe-
cially in multinational companies)
are also increasingly looking to other
countries in their quest for satisfacto-
ry collective agreements.
Another form of Europeanisation is
cross-border coordination of, or even
cooperation in, bargaining processes.
Some important pioneering initia-
tives were taken not on an EU-wide
scale but rather at a regional level.
The most prominent example is the
‘Doorn initiative’ by Belgian,
German, Luxembourg and Dutch
trade union confederations. In their
joint declaration adopted in
September 1998, they laid down an
‘orientation formula’ for national
bargaining according to which trade
unions should aim for wage increas-
es that are at least equivalent to ‘the
sum total of the evolution of prices
and the increases in labour produc-
tivity’. The trade unions also com-
mitted themselves to resist national
‘beggar-my-neighbour’ policies of
wage restraint, which would have to
be at the expense of employment in
neighbouring countries.
At its ninth conference (Helsinki, 29
June to 2 July 1999), the European
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)
adopted a resolution in which it pro-
posed to the employers’ organisa-
tions UNICE and CEEP ‘to open dis-
cussions with a view to reaching a
new agreement, defining the scope,
content and rules of this European
system of industrial relations, which
would complement the national sys-
tems’. The resolution also developed
the notion of coordinated collective
bargaining to counter the danger of
social dumping within the European
monetary union and growing
income inequality. The resolution
pointed out the need for compiling
and disseminating statistics on col-
lective bargaining and to develop ‘a
common understanding of central
collective bargaining concepts such
as compensation for inflation, labour
productivity and productivity gains’.
The development of strategies for
cross-border coordination of collec-
tive bargaining had already begun in
certain sectors before the ETUC con-
gress. In December 1998, the
European Metalworkers’ Federation
(EMF) responded to perceived down-
ward pressure on wages and working
conditions by adopting a ‘European
coordination rule’ according to
which trade unions should achieve
compensation for inflation and ‘a
balanced participation in productivi-
ty gains’ — a reasonable objective as
productivity growth above the
national average (as is generally the
case in manufacturing industries)
should not only be reflected in high-
er wages but also in lower prices.
However, this coordination devel-
oped by the EMF does not only cover
wages but also maximum working
times and other employment-related
questions such as continuous train-
ing, equal opportunities and
employment levels. This should
allow national wage negotiators to
obtain very different results (in terms
of the mix of improvements in areas
such as pay and benefits, training,
working conditions, etc.), while
ensuring that workers get a fair share
of productivity growth.
Coordination of wage bargaining is
also being developed in the services
sector by UNI which adopted an
action plan for a new euro bargain-
ing network in June 1999. In other
sectors, initial steps towards interna-
tional coordination of collective bar-
gaining are also being undertaken,
but with a focus on issues other than
pay.
The trans-border coordination of
wage bargaining might be facilitated
by the fact that most bargaining
takes place during the same period of
the year. The degree of synchronisa-
tion is not comparable to that found
in Japan with its well-known ‘spring
offensive’. In Europe, there is never-
theless a marked bargaining peak
around March (see Chart 51). It is
easier to cooperate and coordinate
demands and processes with neigh-
bouring countries if they are going
through similar stages of preparation
for negotiations. Another condition
for greater convergence of the differ-
ent bargaining processes will be that
the interests of the unions in one
country coincide with those of the
unions in another country.
Employers have so far not
announced any major initiatives
with regard to cross-border coordina-
tion of collective bargaining strate-
gies. However, a precursor of such
coordination could be the common
declaration signed by French and
Italian employers’ confederations
stating their disagreement with the
legislative proposals in the two coun-
tries to reduce the working week to
35 hours.
Some international coordination
also takes place within companies.
Many multinational firms hold regu-
lar international meetings of their
personnel and industrial relations
managers to discuss human
resources issues in the group. There
is, however, little evidence available
on the impact of such international
meetings on collective bargaining on
pay and working conditions.
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Wages 
and employment
Should and could the social partners
in Europe have done more to achieve
a reduction in unemployment?
Europe’s employment performance
is unsatisfactory. Only around 61 %
of the working age population is
actually employed in the EU, as
opposed to around 74 % in the
United States and Japan. To catch up
with the US employment rate, more
than 30 million jobs would be need-
ed in Europe. This would present an
increase in present employment of
20 % for Europe as a whole, but with
significant differences among the
Member States (see Chart 52). This
poor performance is often blamed
on a lack of labour market flexibility,
of which wage flexibility is one ele-
ment. Other elements include
employment protection legislation
and working time arrangements.
This section will only focus on wage
flexibility.
Wage flexibility
There has been much discussion on
the question as to whether wages in
the EU have been sufficiently
responsive to cyclical changes of eco-
nomic activity. Employment could
be stabilised, one argument goes, if
wages followed the business cycle
more strongly. They should notably
fall during cyclical downturns.
Clearly, there are situations in which
individual companies can be saved
by workers accepting a pay cut.
Whether stronger procyclical move-
ments of wages are desirable at the
macroeconomic level is another mat-
ter. There is a risk that this could
amplify the business cycle: pay cuts
during a recession would further
reduce demand and could cause
deflation; this could be worsened by
the expectation of falling prices
which leads to purchases being post-
poned.
At the aggregate level, real wages
appear to be no less flexible than in
the United States or Japan. As a result
of wages growing by less than pro-
ductivity over many years, Europe
has experienced a falling wage share
and falling unit labour costs. In
almost all Member States, real com-
pensation per employee fell in cer-
tain years during the 1980s and
1990s.
This section will not focus on macro-
economic wage flexibility, but on dif-
ferent types of flexibility at the
microeconomic level. At the level of
firms, the development of financial
participation schemes can be impor-
tant. Another form of flexibility con-
cerns the spread between low and
high wages. One form of flexibility
that is not considered in the present
report is regional labour cost varia-
tion.
The development of 
financial participation
In the context of the debates on
labour cost flexibility, particular
attention has been given to the dif-
ferent schemes for the financial par-
ticipation of workers in their compa-
ny’s profits. This part of income can
take many forms and is supplemen-
tary to the fixed, basic wage. There
are two essential forms of financial
participation: profit-sharing and
employee share ownership.
These schemes are seen as a way of
stimulating employees’ collective
efforts, gaining increased productivi-
ty and easing the adaptation to new
technologies. Financial participation
also appears to make it possible for
wages and employment to be more
flexible over the business cycle.
The expansion of financial participa-
tion has been clearly influenced by
different legal provisions in EU coun-
tries and also by the distinct nature
of industrial relations in each coun-
try. Encouraged by several legislative
steps, financial participation
schemes multiplied mainly in France
and the UK. In France, profit-sharing
schemes have been encouraged since
1959 and have been boosted by
recent changes. Voluntary cash-
based schemes cover nearly 15 000
companies, and compulsory partici-
pation in profits nearly 20 000 com-
panies and more than five million
workers.
There have been similar develop-
ments in the UK where a series of
new laws on shareholding, most of
them introduced during the privati-
sation of State-owned companies, led
to a spectacular increase in the num-
ber of workers holding shares with
nearly 5 000 such schemes.
In Belgium and Italy, financial par-
ticipation schemes developed with-
out much government intervention
and have expanded as a result of the
recent decentralisation of wage bar-
gaining. In Belgium, profit-sharing
and particularly share-ownership
schemes only expanded following
the return to free collective bargain-
ing in 1986. Such schemes are also
rapidly expanding in other EU coun-
tries, such as Greece, Spain, Ireland,
the Netherlands and Finland. On the
other hand, financial participation
schemes are rather marginal in a few
EU countries and notably in Ger-
many.
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In July 1991, the European Council
adopted a recommendation drafted
by the European Commission on the
basis of a comprehensive report
(Pepper) that highlighted the social
advantages and the economic poten-
tial of these forms of financial
participation. The recommendation
called on EU Member States to note
such potential benefits of making
increased use of financial participa-
tion schemes, to prepare suitable leg-
islation and to envisage the pos-
sibility of granting tax breaks to help
the spread of such schemes among
companies. This recommendation,
further supported by a second report
by the European Commission
(Pepper II, 1996), was not only
designed to encourage financial par-
ticipation but also to ensure a more
harmonised approach to financial
participation throughout the Euro-
pean Union.
Financial participation was also
referred to in the communication on
the modernisation of work organisa-
tion (1998), where financial partici-
pation is presented as an important
tool, and in a communication on
risk capital, where financial partici-
pation is presented as a tool for
allowing the mobilisation of neces-
sary funding of risk-capital ventures.
These developments reflect the
importance and the extension of
financial participation in the organi-
sation of work, management, em-
ployment and industrial relations.
If financial participation has known
such success in recent years, it is cer-
tainly because of the active role
played by the social partners. The
changing attitudes of trade unions
have been a key factor in this regard.
Over more recent years, financial
participation has been put on the
agenda of most EU trade union
organisations (especially in Germa-
ny, France, Ireland and the UK) and
also by ETUC14. Employers have usu-
ally supported enterprise-level
schemes introduced on a voluntary
basis, with the design of the scheme
being left to the discretion of the
enterprise. They have traditionally
argued for the introduction of tax
incentives and consider financial
participation as an important ele-
ment of human resources manage-
ment for the purposes of improving
employee motivation and commit-
ment.
Most studies on this question, either
in Europe or in the United States,
have shown the positive effects of
such schemes on workers’ motiva-
tion and productivity. According to a
survey carried out in 1999 among
500 top European companies, there
is a rising interest: 65 % of respon-
dents had an employee share-owner-
ship plan, while nearly 25 % had also
introduced a profit-sharing scheme.
In all, 26 % of these large companies
had adopted more than one plan.
The results presented in the table
below also show that these schemes
are generally open to all employees
and not only to selected manage-
ment employees. Only the relatively
less used stock option schemes are
aimed at a restricted group of mana-
gers, and have been under severe
criticism in some EU countries, for
instance in Spain, France, Finland
and the UK. Finally, it is important
that a majority of the largest EU
companies have a tendency to
extend their financial participation
schemes in their subsidiaries in other
EU countries confirming the interna-
tional dimension and widespread
development of this phenomenon.
Wage dispersion 
among individuals
In Europe, wage dispersion among
individuals is significantly smaller
than in the United States, and, in
most Member States, the gap
between the top and bottom of the
income distribution has not widened
as much as in the United States.
However, the demand for unskilled
workers may be falling relative to
that for skilled workers, owing to
skill-biased technological progress
and possibly competition from low-
wage economies. It is therefore fre-
quently argued that the costs of
hiring unskilled labour should fall in
Europe as they have in the United
States.
One would expect that the greater
inequality in the United States —
and, within the EU, the UK — com-
bined with a less generous social
safety net would lead to a higher
employment rate for less skilled
workers. International comparisons
suggest, however, that there is no
simple relation between wage
disparities and employment rates for
less skilled workers.
Economic theory suggests that,
where labour market rigidities pre-
vent wages from adjusting to market-
clearing levels, low-productivity
workers may, in effect, be priced out
of the market. Labour market
reforms leading to an increase in
wage dispersion might, therefore, be
expected to lead to a higher employ-
ment rate for low-skilled workers. Of
course, the relationship between
overall wage dispersion in an econo-
my and low-skilled employment is
complex and will depend on many
other factors and notably the distri-
bution of skills. The gap between the
highest and lowest skilled may be
smaller in some countries than in
others.  International comparisons
suggest that some countries manage
to combine a relatively high employ-
ment rate for the low-skilled with rel-
atively low wage dispersion. Thus,
flexibility in the form of a more
unequal wage distribution may not
be a panacea. It may require costly
tax and benefit measures to address
low in-work incomes, and it is
important to consider whether in
the long run it is not better to use
these resources for upgrading skills.
The cross-country differences in
employment rates of low-skilled
workers will reflect the use of a
whole range of active labour market
measures that may increase the
chances of less skilled workers of
finding a reasonably well-paid job.
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Percentage with a financial participation scheme 80
Types of scheme :
Share ownership scheme (%) 65
Profit-sharing scheme (%) 24
Other schemes (%) 11
Total (%) 100
Percentage having more than one scheme 26
Average percentage of employees participating 58
Percentage having extended financial participation to EU subsidiaries 40–50
Percentage planning to extend financial participation to EU subsidiaries 70
Financial participation practices in top European companies
Source: Obstacles for the development of European-wide financial participation in the European Union, under the
direction of F. Van den Bulcke, with financial support from the European Commission, 1999.
Minimum wages 
and guaranteed 
minimum incomes
Statutory minimum wages at nation-
al level exist in eight Member States,
including the UK which introduced
one in April 1999. The United States
and Japan also have statutory mini-
mum wages (see Chart 53). Two
groups of Member States can be dis-
tinguished: the northern Member
States, Belgium, France, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and the UK,
where the level of the minimum
wage is in the region of EUR 1 000,
and the three southern Member
States, Greece, Spain and Portugal,
where it remains below EUR 600 (in
purchasing power standards).
In the other Member States, there
may be statutory minimum wages
for specific sectors (e.g. Ireland,
Austria) or minimums that are laid
down in collective agreements. In
certain cases, these minimums may
be declared legally binding for an
entire industry (e.g. Germany, Italy).
Thus, wage floors exist in some form
in all Member States.
Empirical evidence on the employ-
ment impact of minimum wages in a
number of Member States suggests
that the general wage floor has not
been set to a level at which it could
have a negative effect on employ-
ment. The first signs of this would
appear among specific groups such
as the unskilled and the young.
Minimum wage systems are there-
fore often adapted in such a way that
the labour market integration of
these groups is not hampered. 
Another mechanism that indirectly
prevents wages from falling to
extremely low levels is a guaranteed
minimum income. Universal mini-
mum income systems now exist in
all Member States except Greece.
These systems are targeted at people
in genuine need and aim to facilitate
reintegration into the labour market.
A combination of guaranteed mini-
mum income and family and
housing benefits would generally
remain well below the minimum
wage in the case of single people. A
couple with two children, by con-
trast, could well receive benefits that
are higher than one minimum wage
(see table below). It should, however,
be kept in mind that a four-person
household with the minimum wage
as its only income would normally
be entitled to additional social bene-
fits (typically family and housing
benefits, but the UK also provides a
top-up of low wages). This would
restore, to some extent, the financial
incentive to work.
Taxes and social insurance
contributions: scope for
reducing labour costs
What matters to the employer is not
the same as what determines an indi-
vidual’s decision to take up a job.
Individuals are interested in take-
home pay and employers in the total
cost of employing a person with a
particular set of skills. Between the
two there, is a large gap, comprising
direct taxes on income and social
insurance contributions paid by
employers and employees.
The sum of employers’ and employ-
ees’ social insurance contributions
and of taxes on wages represents
between 30 and 50 % of total labour
costs. Whereas income taxes are pro-
gressive (i.e. the tax rate rises with
the income level), social insurance
contributions tend to be levied at
uniform rates up to an income cei-
ling. As a result, the burden of social
insurance contributions is often pro-
portionally higher at lower wage
levels than for top earners.
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B DK D E F IRL L NL A P FIN S UK
Single person 499 561 661 304 481 384 808 734 483 221 644 625 661
Couple, two children 926 1 431 1 230 565 858 852 1 519 1 090 1 082 654 1 266 1 207 1 094
Levels of support provided by minimum incomes and family and housing benefits, 1995, 
expressed in euro at purchasing power parities
E F NL L P UK
% employees
NB: UK: 1999 (estimate); E, P, L: 1998; NL:1997; F: 1996
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If high labour costs are indeed an
obstacle to higher employment le-
vels for less skilled workers, then
the most promising strategy for
reducing costs would be a reduction
of the tax wedge for low-wage ear-
ners. The European employment
guidelines stress this responsibility
of governments by calling on the
Member States to ‘set a target, if
necessary and taking account of its
present level, for gradually reducing
the overall tax burden and, where
appropriate, a target for gradually
reducing the fiscal pressure on
labour and non-wage labour costs,
in particular on relatively unskilled
and low-paid labour, without jeo-
pardising the recovery of public
finances or the financial equili-
brium of social security schemes’.
Collective 
bargaining and 
the gender pay gap
On average, women earn signifi-cantly less than men.
According to the 1995 structure of
earnings survey (see box below),
the pay gap amounts to 28 %. This
means that the average gross pay of
women in full-time employment is
only 72 % of that of men. The
countries with the largest pay gap
were the UK, Greece and the
Netherlands. The smallest gaps
were observed in the new German
Länder (former East Germany),
Sweden, Belgium and Luxembourg
(see Chart 57).
Structural differences 
versus discrimination
Eurostat calculated that even after
correcting for the main structural
differences in male and female
employment (composition of the
two groups in terms of age, occupa-
tion and sector) a pay gap of 15 %
would still remain for the EU as a
whole. Some of this can almost cer-
tainly be attributed to other, unob-
served structural differences, but it
is also likely to reflect genuine pay
discrimination, i.e. the fact that
women are not paid the same wage
as men for equivalent work.
Whether there is discrimination
can only be ascertained by a
detailed analysis of individual job
profiles and the corresponding pay
levels.
How do structural differences
between men and women on the
labour market affect the pay gap? If
the aim is to reduce the pay gap
and not just to eliminate discrimi-
nation, then it is important to
know what causes the structural
differences and to check whether
they can be reduced.
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The structural differences with a
significant impact on the pay gap
appear to be the following:
• Age: Women on the labour market
are on average younger than men,
and younger workers tend to earn
less. The age difference is notably
caused by the fact that it is mainly
women who reduce their labour
market participation when small
children or elderly or disabled rela-
tives need to be cared for.
• Length of service with current
employer: Due to career breaks,
women in the same age group as
men tend to have shorter lengths
of service and hence less seniority
pay increases. 
• Occupation: Women are less well
represented than men in profes-
sions where earnings are compara-
tively high. They are particularly
underrepresented in top manage-
ment positions.
• Education: Although younger
generations of women on the
labour market have caught up with
their male counterparts as far as
education is concerned, there is
still a significant gap between
women and men of all generations
that are still active. This reduces
women’s likelihood of comman-
ding high wages.
A determining factor for all these
structural differences is the way in
which family responsibilities are
shared between men and women. In
practice, the task of caring for chil-
dren and needy relatives is still main-
ly left to women. In the past, the
expectation that a woman’s life
would be devoted to this caring role
left many women excluded from
education opportunities. Today, this
caring role forces many women to
make difficult choices between their
working and family lives — and to
forgo career opportunities.
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Calculating the pay gap: the
structure of earnings survey
Data on earnings in 1995 were
gathered during 1996 in all
Member States by way of an
employers’ survey. Although the
sample size was very large (usually
between 50 000 and 100 000 per
Member State), there were some
very important gaps in its cover-
age. The survey did not include
workers in local units of less than
10 employees, nor employees in
agriculture and fisheries, the pub-
lic sector, services such as health-
care and education, or social and
personal services. Unfortunately,
some of these sectors are very
important job providers, especially
for women.
The structure of earnings survey
contains information on individ-
ual characteristics such as occupa-
tion, level of education and sector
of employment. This makes it pos-
sible to calculate what the pay gap
would be if the composition (in
terms of occupation, age, educa-
tion, etc.) of the male and female
sub-samples were the same.
However, even within a group of
employees with identical characte-
ristics, there can be significant dif-
ferences among individuals. Thus,
a group of male managers is likely
to contain more top-level man-
agers with high incomes than a
group of women with the same
broad structural characteristics. As
characteristics such as occupation
and education, in particular, are
defined in broad terms, many
unobserved structural differences
can be expected to remain
between male and female em-
ployees.
TREND IN THE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN EARNINGS OF MEN AND WOMEN
IN MANUAL OCCUPATIONS IN INDUSTRY, 1982-1998
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Reliable data for changes over time in the overall wage gap are not
available, but Eurostat’s harmonised earnings statistics allow compari-
son of hourly wages of manual workers in industry between 1982 and
1998 (or 1996) for several Member States. Among all of these, the
average wages of women increased relative to those of men over the
period, most notably in Greece and Luxembourg. In West Germany,
the UK and France, the increases were significantly smaller.
The overall wage gap between men and women is partly — but not
fully — explained by the concentration of women in occupations and
sectors with lower rates of pay. Since the figures presented here address
only manual workers in industry, this effectively excludes some of the
factors which determine the level and changes in the overall wage gap
from the picture.
Trend in the differential between the earnings of men and women
in manual occupations in industry, 1982 - 98
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What can the social 
partners do?
What can be done by the social part-
ners to redress the unfavourable
situation of women on the labour
market and to reduce the pay gap?
Legislation outlawing direct and
indirect discrimination between
men and women, particularly with
regard to pay, is already in force. This
would invalidate any directly dis-
criminatory wage agreement reached
by the social partners. Many forms of
discrimination are, however, not
immediately obvious. It would be
necessary to compare the tasks typi-
cally performed by women with pre-
dominantly male tasks and to check
whether pay differences are justified
by objective differences in job
requirements.
The European social partners issued a
joint opinion on women and trai-
ning on 3 December 1993, thereby
showing their commitment to the
goal of equal opportunities for
women and men on the labour mar-
ket. The opinion stressed the impor-
tance of women’s labour market
participation in order to meet the
skills and labour force requirements
of the economy. The opinion reiter-
ated a proposal from an earlier joint
opinion on education and training
(19 June 1990) according to which
‘the participation of women in all
training schemes, especially those
linked to the occupations of the
future, should be developed and spe-
cific measures should be devised as
regards training for occupations in
which women are underrepre-
sented’.
The Advisory Committee on Equal
Opportunities for Women and Men
set up a working group on equal pay,
chaired by ETUC, which is preparing
an opinion on the gender pay gap.
These themes have since been taken
up in the European employment
strategy in which strengthening
equal opportunities for women and
men has become one of the four pil-
lars. The 1999 employment guide-
lines call on Member States to ‘ini-
tiate positive steps to promote equal
pay for equal work or work of equal
value and to diminish differentials in
incomes between women and men’.
Both Member States and the social
partners are invited to ‘design,
implement and promote family-
friendly policies, including affor-
dable, accessible and high-quality
care services for children and other
dependants, as well as parental and
other leave schemes’.
There is no doubt that the social
partners can indeed play an impor-
tant role in helping women and men
reconcile their work and family lives.
The first European agreement
reached by the social partners under
the agreement on social policy was,
in fact, on parental leave. However, a
recent study by the European
Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions15
gathered a wide range of experiences
showing how collective agreements
can promote equal opportunities
and sometimes even address the pay
gap directly. The following sections
are based on this study.
Collective 
agreements against pay
discrimination and impro-
ving job access
The 1996 equal opportunities report
pointed out that gender pay gaps
tend to be greater in the absence of a
minimum wage and of centralised
wage setting. This problem was taken
up by the Danish social partners in
an agreement of 1995 covering com-
mercial and clerical employees. The
agreement sought to counter the
potentially discriminatory effects of
decentralised collective or individual
pay bargaining. To achieve this, it
required that employers carry out
systematic job evaluations as a basis
for pay determination. Swedish col-
lective agreements foresee a compar-
ison of women’s and men’s pay and
require adjustments when discrepan-
cies are found.
Detailed job descriptions based on
objective criteria such as skill require-
ments, responsibility, initiative,
mental and physical effort, and
working conditions can reveal unjus-
tified pay differentials between jobs
mainly performed by women and
those mainly performed by men.
Such an exercise was carried out in
the UK on the basis of a 1986 agree-
ment covering local authority manu-
al workers. In the Finnish chemical
industry, a 1995 agreement led to an
exercise of job evaluation and to a
new common pay structure for both
office and technical workers.
In the Belgium interprofessional
agreement (1999–2000), the social
partners committed themselves to
review systems of job classification if
they cause inequalities between both
sexes.
These examples illustrate how the
social partners can tackle the gender
pay gap directly. Such action should
be undertaken on a wider scale. It
would be of great help in achieving
the aim of Article 141 (ex Article 119)
of the EU Treaty which calls for equal
pay for work of equal value, instead
of ‘equal pay for equal work’, as was
stipulated in the Treaty before the
Amsterdam revision.
Collective agreements can also
improve women’s job access and
career chances. This would reduce
the pay gap by increasing the pro-
portion of women in better-paid
jobs. Examples of measures would be
job advertisements that are more
appealing to women, targets for the
gender balance of recruitments and
promotions, positive action, the
identification and elimination of
obstacles to the recruitment and pro-
motion of women, and better access
to training for women or special
training for women.
Facilitate 
the reconciliation 
of work and family life
Care facilities, leave arrangements
and part-time working are the three
main types of action that help
employees reconcile work and fami-
ly life. Leave arrangements will, how-
ever, mainly be used by women who
will often have to pay a price for pro-
longed absence from work.
Collective agreements can minimise
this price, for instance by ensuring
that an adequate job is offered after
the leave, that employees on leave
are not excluded from promotions,
training and pay rises, that the leave
period counts for seniority and that
contact between the employer and
the employee on leave is main-
tained. One, albeit costly, way of
encouraging more men to take
parental leave might be to offer full
pay during the leave.
The provision of care services
reduces the need for taking leave and
hence the associated career problems
for women. Collective agreements
can provide for the establishment of
care facilities for employees or even
for a proportion of the wage bill to be
set aside for financing care services.
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As far as part-time working is con-
cerned, the social partners at
European level have already reached
an agreement that seeks to guarantee
equal treatment to part-time and
full-time workers. At more decen-
tralised levels, the social partners can
seek to ensure that part-time work
becomes acceptable at all levels of an
organisation. An agreement for the
German banking sector stated that
part-time working should be possible
at all occupational levels. In the
Dutch building material trade, all
vacancies and new posts are checked
for their suitability for part-time
work.
Clearly, collective bargaining can
achieve a lot in terms of reducing the
pay gap between men and women.
In order to exploit fully the potential
of collective bargaining, it is neces-
sary that the issue of equal opportu-
nities be given higher priority by the
social partners. A number of mea-
sures can help in this respect: it may
be useful to involve more women in
the collective bargaining process;
framework agreements and guide-
lines on equal opportunities could be
adopted; and systems could be put in
place to ensure that equal opportuni-
ties agreements are properly imple-
mented and monitored. The social
partners have demonstrated what
they can achieve in the area of equal
opportunities. Now these initiatives
need to be deployed on a much
wider scale.
Wages, enlargement
and trade
The wage levels and collective bar-gaining systems in applicant
countries are obviously factors that
may have an influence on wage poli-
cies in EU countries. This is why it is
important to analyse some of the
major trends with regard to wages in
central and eastern Europe. Produc-
tivity differences are also presented
in order to complete the picture of
relative competitive strengths and
weaknesses16. This allows us to
analyse and explain to some extent
the current trends in trade flows
between EU members and applicant
countries.
The gap in wage levels
The differences between central and
eastern Europe and EU averages are
undoubtedly one distinctive feature
of the EU enlargement process to the
East. Average wages in all the central
and east European countries (CEECs)
continue to be much lower in euro
terms than average wages in current
EU Member States.
Average monthly wages 
(in euro), CEECs, end - 1998
(gross wages unless otherwise indicated)
Charts 59 and 60 compare gross
average earnings in industry in a few
EU countries and CEECs for two
main categories of workers: manual
and non-manual. They first of all
show how far wages for manual
workers in the CEECs fall short of
wages in the EU. Gross hourly ear-
nings in Hungary, for instance, reach
only one quarter of the average ear-
nings of the manual labour force in
Belgium, Germany or the UK. These
figures are probably underestimating
the differences in net earnings,
because workers in CEECs do not
receive as generous overtime pay as
in the EU, and because income taxes
are often much higher in CEECs
than in EU countries.
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Germany (old Länder) 2 701
Germany (new Länder) 1 969
Spain 1 225
Ireland 1 903
Austria 2 083
Portugal 606
United Kingdom 2 376
Bulgaria 105
Czech Republic (average 1998) 325
Estonia 266
Hungary (average 1998) 314
Latvia 213
Lithuania 232
Poland 349
Romania (1) 117
Slovakia 288
Slovenia 854
EUR
(1) Net monthly wage.
Sources: National statistics; EU countries: Eurostat,
‘Harmonised earnings 1998 of manual and
non-manual workers in industry’.
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Earnings differences were found to
be even larger for skilled employees.
In most EU countries, non-manual
workers are paid more than five
times what their colleagues from
central and eastern Europe can get.
Gross earnings for this category of
workers in the CEEC paying the best
(Slovenia) remains well below the
average earnings in the EU country
paying the least (Portugal). Chart 59
shows that manual workers are
already better paid in Slovenia (EUR
3.88 per hour) than in Portugal (EUR
2.98).
There are large differences among
CEECs themselves, average gross
monthly wages (see previous table)
varying from EUR 105 in Bulgaria
and 117 in Romania up to EUR 325
in the Czech Republic, EUR 349 in
Poland and even EUR 854 in
Slovenia, which has clearly taken the
lead in CEECs in terms of wages and
incomes.
These low wages in central and east-
ern Europe are related to a series of
factors. They are first the result of the
low-wage policy carried out in the
previous regimes where low basic
wages were complemented by a
series of additional social and welfare
benefits and facilities. They are also
the result of the first years of transi-
tion which were characterised by
rapid price liberalisation along with
wage controls and restrictive in-
comes policies. As a result, nominal
wages lagged behind consumer
prices and overall real wages fell
rapidly and substantially in all the
countries of the region17. In 1996, all
workers in central and eastern
Europe — with the possible and
recent exception of the Czech
Republic — were paid in real terms
below the wage levels which pre-
vailed before the beginning of the
transition: wages had fallen by
around 26 % in Hungary, by around
17 to 22 % in Poland, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia, and by 50 %
in Bulgaria. Since then, although the
situation improved slightly in
Hungary and the Czech Republic in
1997–99, it continued to deteriorate
in countries such as Romania and
Bulgaria. By mid-1998, wages in
Bulgaria had fallen in real terms by
more than 70 % since 1991. The
Baltic countries have also expe-
rienced a fall in real wages: 45 % in
Estonia, 46 % in Latvia, and 65 % in
Lithuania.
The period since the late 1980s has
also been marked by substantial
growth in wage differentiation
between regions, sectors, and occu-
pational and social groups. A few
people have benefited from the
changes, while the situation of the
majority has rapidly deteriorated. In
Hungary in 1993 the average income
in the highest taxation bracket was
almost 18 times the average income
in the lowest taxation bracket: in
1988, the same ratio was only three
to four times. Wage differentials in
Poland increased by more than one
quarter between 1991 and 1995.
Workers at the lowest grades have
been affected by irregular adjust-
ments of the minimum wage which,
in almost all central and east
European countries — with the pos-
sible exception of the Czech
Republic and Slovakia — has been
allowed to fall well below the pover-
ty line. Such increasing disparities
affect, in particular, the workers in
organisations financed out of the
government budget (especially in
the education and health sectors)
because their wages have been close-
ly linked to the minimum wage
which was not regularly increased.
Large disparities have also opened up
between regions. In Hungary, for
instance, three quarters of the rural
population belong to the three low-
est income quintiles, while 40 % of
the population of Budapest is in the
highest income quintile.
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The structure of labour costs
In order to complete the comparison of wage and labour costs between EU
countries and the CEECs, it is important to compare the relative weight of
direct wage and non-wage costs in both groups of countries. Direct wage
costs are relatively low in the CEECs. Most of them have, however, to bear
relatively high indirect costs that are generally above the EU average. High
employers’ charges in Hungary (37.8 % including 31 % for social contribu-
tions) are often quoted as a factor that reduces the competitiveness of
Hungarian enterprises and, at the same time, weakens the attractiveness of
the country for foreign investors.
Employers’ 
Direct costs Indirect costs social 
contributions
Belgium 67.4 32.6 30.7
Germany 74.3 25.7 23.7
Greece 76.0 24.0 22.9
Spain 73.6 26.4 25.0
France 66.9 33.1 29.2
Ireland 82.7 17.3 14.4
Portugal 75.3 24.7 20.8
UK 84.0 16.0 12.8
EU- 15 74.7 25.3 22.7
Hungary 62.2 37.8 31.4
Poland 62.2 37.8 26.9
Romania 73.8 26.2 21.7
Slovakia 71.0 29.0 26.2
Latvia — — —
Estonia 71.7 28.3 —
Lithuania 74.6 25.4 22.6
Bulgaria — — —
Czech Republic 70.8 29.2 25.5
Slovenia 76.4 23.6 11.1
Comparison of labour costs structure (in %), 
EU and CEECs, 1996
Sources: Eurostat.
Differences 
in unit labour costs
The large falls in production that
were experienced by the CEECs after
the collapse of the Comecon market
significantly widened the gap in per
capita GDP between these countries
and the EU Member States. Most
CEECs have a GDP per capita which
is about one fifth of the EU-15 avera-
ge. These low GDP levels reflect a
large productivity gap compared
with the EU. As a result of this, the
CEECs only derive a very small com-
parative advantage from their low
wage levels.
Chart 61 presents a comparison of
unit labour costs in the CEECs and in
the EU, where significant differences
prevail. Unit labour costs are calcu-
lated by dividing the compensation
paid by employers (including social
contributions) by the output per
employed person. This ratio takes
into account not only wages but also
non-wage labour costs and produc-
tivity. It therefore represents the
most comprehensive indicator of
comparative advantage. High wages,
for instance, can be more than com-
pensated for by high productivity
levels, while poor productivity per-
formance may limit or even cancel
the advantage of lower labour costs.
Chart 61 illustrates this for the three
southern Member States, Greece,
Spain and Portugal. Their unit labour
costs continue to lie above the avera-
ge of northern Member States of the
EU such as Denmark, Germany,
France, the Netherlands and Finland.
Central and east European countries,
by contrast, seem to be benefiting
from lower unit labour costs.
These differences, however, are mar-
ginal compared with the wage gap
described above since it is reduced to
a few percentage points. This is due
to the much lower levels of output
per employed person in central and
eastern Europe.
These differences warrant an analysis
of wage and unit labour costs coun-
try by country rather than a compari-
son of two large regions (EU and cen-
tral and eastern Europe), each of
which comprises countries at very
different economic levels.
The small comparative advantage in
unit labour costs of most central and
east European countries may be
rapidly eroded by increases in wages,
unless these countries simultaneous-
ly achieve rapid productivity growth.
Towards a rapid 
catching-up process?
It is instructive to analyse what type
of catching-up process operated after
the previous accession of less deve-
loped economies.
Chart 62 presents the catching-up
process of real earnings per employee
and confirms that this process has
been rather slow for Greece, Spain
and Portugal, although they are
much closer to the EU average.
This experience suggests that the
catching-up process of earnings may
also be rather slow in the CEECs.
However, the low starting level of
wages in the CEECs and their now
well-advanced market liberalisation,
combined with the massive foreign
investment in these countries, can be
expected to accelerate the catching-
up process. Nevertheless, even if
wages do rise much faster in the
CEECs than they did for instance in
Portugal, it will probably take
decades before they reach similar
levels to those in the most developed
Member States.
The CEECs, in any event, are likely to
remain attractive production loca-
tions for international companies,
thanks to their high levels of educa-
tion, an improving business environ-
ment (as national regulations are
adapted to EU rules) and their easy
access to markets in the EU.
64I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  i n  E u r o p e
Sources: Eurostat and AMECO
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Trade and 
foreign investment
The opening of markets from cen-
tral and east European countries in
accordance with the association
agreements has led to rapidly grow-
ing trade flows between those
countries and the EU Member
States. In spite of the apparent com-
petitive advantage of central and
eastern Europe in terms of unit
labour costs, the trade figures show
that EU countries are largely net
beneficiaries from trade with their
eastern neighbours. Exports from
the EU to CEECs largely exceed
imports from CEECs. EU exports
have increased four times between
1992 and 1998, while EU imports
have increased three times. This has
led to a significant and rising trade
deficit of central and eastern
Europe with regard to the EU. This
deficit has increased around five
times and reached more than EUR
20 billion.
The CEECs’ trade deficit demon-
strates the success of EU enterprises
in penetrating markets in central
and eastern Europe and boosts job-
creation and growth in the EU. It
also illustrates the importance of
not exclusively focusing on wage
levels but of considering producti-
vity in international comparisons
of competitiveness.
At the same time, foreign invest-
ment flows from the EU have also
massively increased since the
beginning of the transition. Such
flows are generally seen as an
important factor leading to higher
productivity, higher wages and bet-
ter working conditions. Foreign
direct investment could therefore
play a key role in the catching-up
process.
As the date of accession approa-
ches, many companies have already
located part of their industrial pro-
duction in central and east
European countries. The total stock
of foreign direct investment in the
10 applicant CEECs had reached
more than EUR 35 billion by the
end of 1996. Two thirds of that
originated from EU Member States.
The Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland have been the prime benefi-
ciaries. The fact that between 50
and 75 % of foreign investment in
central and eastern Europe had
been made by EU enterprises is
already a clear sign of EU enter-
prises’ eagerness to take the oppor-
tunities afforded by these new mar-
kets.
In the future, these foreign invest-
ment flows are likely to help the
CEECs rebalance their trade with
EU countries.
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A changing world
Time is at the heart of industrialrelations. Since the Industrial
Revolution and the development of
payment by wages, time has been
used to measure how workers earn
their pay. The working hours fixed
by individual or collective contracts
of employment allow free time to be
identified by default. Self-employ-
ment has avoided this dichotomy
between compartmentalised work-
ing time and family time.
Long-term trends
Over the last 150 years, the number
of hours worked on average has fal-
len in Europe from around 3 000
hours to below 1 700. Japan and the
United States bucked this trend from
1950 to 1990, and 10 years ago,
workers there still worked more than
2 000 hours on average. More recent-
ly, there have also been pressures
towards a reduction in working time
in Japan and the United States and
some stabilisation in Europe.
Long-term studies undertaken by
Maddison18 show that, in the UK, for
example, during the period 1870 –
1913, annual working hours had
reduced from around 2 950 to about
2 600.
Between then and 1950, the
economies developed in different
ways, with the figures showing a
range in Europe between 1 960 hours
in the UK and 2 310 hours in
Germany (with Japan at 2 270 — i.e.
below Germany — and the United
States at 1 870 hours — i.e. below the
whole of Europe). Over the next 30
years, working hours were substan-
tially reduced in most continental
west European countries to around
1 700 hours, but they stabilised or
even increased in the English-speak-
ing countries, notably the United
States, and in Japan.
Changing patterns 
of working time
Patterns of work have changed. At
one time, the organisation of work
and the organisation of working
time were determined by rigid pat-
terns of mass production or service
provision. Over the years, the pat-
terns of production and service have
become much more responsive to
the needs of consumers. Working
patterns have become much more
complex, varied and fragmented.
This has consequences for workers,
which may be beneficial, or may
cause problems in the reconciliation
of working life and family life. This
will depend partly on the extent to
which workers are able to choose
their own working patterns or at
least to negotiate them.
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Working time
Working time
Source: Maddison, A., Phases of capitalised development, Oxford University Press, 1982. 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
1929
EU Maximum
EU Minimum
JP
US
EU Average
1938 1950 1960 1970 1973 1978 1979
Hours
Source: Eurostat LFS
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Sometimes work shifts
Usually work shifts
% of employees
Left column 1992, right column 1998
NB : A, FIN, S: 1995 and 1998; D, IRL: 1992 and 1997
Men Women
B DK D I L NL A P FIN S UKEL E F IRL B DK D I L NL A P FIN S UKEL E F IRL
Annual working time, 1929 - 79 19
Shift working among men and women, 1992 and 1998
64
65
implications for the regulation of
working time in the Member States. 
Trends
Short-term trends
The snapshot figures for 1987, 1992
and 1998 (chart 67) show that,
throughout the EU over the period,
there was a small decrease in the
average hours worked per week,
including second jobs, from 39.9 to
38.6. This trend occurs in all the
Member States, for which compara-
ble figures are available (i.e. exclu-
ding Austria, Finland and Sweden).
Much of this reduction is, however,
due to changes in the composition of
the labour force (i.e. between men
and women, full-time and part-time)
and the sectoral distribution. Chart
68 shows that, whereas there was a
reduction of 0.36 in the average
usual hours per week between 1994
and 1998, when account is taken of
sectoral and compositional changes,
there was an increase of 0.15 in the
number of hours worked by indivi-
duals. This figure is most remarkable
for Belgium, where there is an
increase of 1.3 in the average usual
hours worked per week by individual
workers, after taking sectoral and
compositional changes into account.
The changing 
concept of working time
The concept of working time itself is
changing. When the majority of the
population worked regular patterns,
it was relatively easy to measure
working time. The obligation,
generally, was to be present rather
than to produce results (though
piecework systems were the excep-
tion to this). It was important to
measure it, as it formed the basis for
wage calculations. There are many
forces in modern European labour
markets, which tend, firstly, to make
it more difficult to measure working
time and, secondly, to relate remu-
neration to performance rather than
presence in the workplace. The cate-
gory of workers whose working time
is difficult to measure includes
managers at all levels, except those
directly related to the production
process. It also includes a long and
continuously lengthening list of
other workers: research workers,
design engineers, journalists, consul-
tants, etc. In future, the majority of
workers will no longer be obliged to
adhere to the specific constraints of
the production line or a sales point
which must be open at fixed times.
They will be subject to different con-
straints: having to be where they are
needed when they are needed, avai-
lable to provide a service when the
customer requires it; available to pro-
vide a product when orders increase;
able to adapt to suit requirements20.
Working
time/employment/
organisation of work
(national approaches)
Implications of changing
patterns and concepts of
working time
Over the years, working time has
been the subject of a number of
national laws, which were supple-
mented by Directive 93/104/EC con-
cerning certain aspects of the organi-
sation of working time. Weekly
working hours have thus been fixed
in most European countries.
Overtime has been the main form of
adapting working hours to company
needs.
Now, the changing patterns of work
organisation and working time
described above have important
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Analysis of current situation
Analysis of the figures in Chart 69
shows that European workers, inclu-
ding part-time and self-employed
workers, worked on average 1 660
hours in 1998. Workers in Greece,
Ireland, Portugal and Italy worked
the most hours, while those in the
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden
worked the fewest. The range is from
1 940 in Greece to 1 425 in the
Netherlands. The comparable figure
for the United States is 1 790 and for
Japan 1 905.
Source: Eurostat LFS
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• Usual hours worked are the week-
ly hours normally worked by
employed persons, excluding time
spent on training, meal breaks or travel
to and from work; time spent on
second jobs is included, as well as nor-
mal overtime hours. These are the fi-
gures used in the following charts for
weekly hours.
• Actual hours worked, in contrast,
are the hours worked during the refe-
rence week of the survey; these are a
less accurate reflection of the standard
working hours, because they may
include abnormal hours, due to illness
or overtime, beyond the usual.
• Annual hours worked are calcu-
lated by multiplying usual weekly
hours by an estimate of annual weeks
worked — a Eurostat estimate of an-
nual weeks worked, based upon stan-
dard entitlements and statutory holi-
days, is adjusted to take account of
data on days lost through illness.
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Employees work longer on average
in manufacturing (39.3 hours) than
in services (35.9), though most of
this difference may be explained by
the distribution between males and
females or full-time and part-time
work.
Averages do not tell the full story.
The statistics (see Charts 71 to 86) on
the distribution of working hours
show wide differences.
In fact, three broad models can be
distinguished, which are as follows:
• A highly regulated model, showing
hours concentrated around a
single peak or two, or at most three
peaks. The figures for Luxembourg
best illustrate this type of model.
There has also been a significant
shortening of the peak figures in a
number of countries.
• A contrast is the unregulated
model, for which the chart for the
UK is the best illustration. This
shows, in particular, a wide spread
of hours for women while a high
proportion of men work long
hours.
• A progressive model. This is best
illustrated in the chart for the
Netherlands where there is a wide
spread of hours worked up to 40
hours, especially by women, but
very few workers work longer than
that.
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Sources: Eurostat LFS
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Source: Eurostat LFS
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Empirical evidence also shows that,
while in most of Europe, the working
time of production workers is getting
shorter, that of senior staff and
unskilled workers is getting longer.
For example, Chart 87 shows that
managers work longer hours than
other full-time employees in most
Member States. In France, the diffe-
rence for men is more than 15 %.
Self-employed workers also tend to
work significantly longer than
employees, especially in Belgium,
where the self-employed work on
average 171/2 hours a week more than
employees.
Developments 
in Member States
Changes in the length 
of the working week
Information from the 1999 national
action plans for employment reveals
that collectively agreed frameworks
on working time, within which the
social partners at the local/enterprise
level negotiate specific implementa-
tion provisions, have been establi-
shed in a number of Member States.
In others, legislative initiatives have
been taken in respect of working
time.
In France, legislation requires weekly
working hours to be reduced to 35
hours a week. By spring 1999, more
than 4 000 companies had reached
agreements on the way to proceed
with reduction in working time
before enforcement of the law, in
addition to which 69 sectoral agree-
ments covering eight million
employees had been concluded.
Many agreements include other
aspects related to the organisation of
work: forms of contracts, family
responsibilities, company flexibility
and distribution of working time
throughout the year.
Workers on less 
than full-time contracts
In many Member States, the promo-
tion of part-time work has been the
subject of agreements by the social
partners or government legislation.
This is the case in Spain where the
agreement on promoting stable part-
time employment, signed by the
government and the main trade
unions (but not the employers),
came into force in 1999.
In recent years, the Netherlands have
been pioneers in the development of
part-time work, with a consequence
that in 1998 two thirds of women
and one in six men worked fewer
than 35 hours a week. The social
partners have been key players in
developments in this area. In parti-
cular, the Flexibility and Security Act,
which came into force on 1 January
1999, followed almost all the propo-
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sals contained in a unanimous report
by the employers’ federations and
trade unions. In addition, the
Working Hours Bill introduces a
right for individuals to change their
working hours, either upwards or
downwards, subject to certain condi-
tions. A recent survey showed that
19 % of over 100 agreements
analysed by the Labour Inspectorate
included provisions for part-time
work and changes in working hours.
Many such agreements contain pro-
visions to allow workers to negotiate
working time patterns which suit
their particular needs.
The pressure 
for working time flexibility
Improving work organisation
The issue of working time needs to
be considered in the wider context of
work organisation. The main mes-
sage of the Green Paper entitled
‘Partnership for a new organisation
of work’21 was that better organisa-
tion of work, based on skill, trust and
quality as well as a high level of
involvement of workers, can make a
valuable contribution to the compe-
titiveness of European firms, to the
improvement of the quality of wor-
king life and to the employability of
the workforce. Changes can take
place in the organisation of a firm,
for example in the production
process, without there necessarily
being a change in the working time
of employees. On the other hand, in
almost every case, the introduction
of new working time arrangements
implies a change in the way work is
organised.
Overtime
The traditional response to changes
in demand is to require workers to
work overtime during peak periods
and to work short time during slack
periods. It has the advantage of
being the easiest response in terms of
work organisation. But it has a num-
ber of disadvantages. From the work-
ers’ point of view, the high wages
associated with long hours can be
attractive, but disruptive in terms of
family life. When there is no over-
time, the consequent reduction in
‘take-home’ pay can be difficult to
cope with. From an organisational
point of view, it makes it less likely
that the company will introduce the
root-and-branch organisation of
work which may be necessary in
order to maintain its competitive
position in the global economy. This
can lead to overtime working becom-
ing endemic and masking low pay
and low productivity.
Overtime working is still prevalent
throughout the EU. Figures for 1995
(the latest available — see Chart 91)
show that 32 % of men who are full-
time employees and 18 % of full-
time women received overtime pay.
The figure for men is over 25 % in all
countries except Belgium, Spain, the
Netherlands and Portugal.
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Throughout the EU, men work on
average 1.6 hours a week overtime,
compared with 0.5 hours for
women. In Ireland and the UK, men
work an average of more than 3
hours’ overtime a week.
Traditionally, many Member States’
legislation provided for standard
daily or weekly hours. A limited
amount of overtime was permitted,
to be worked over and above these
standards. Increasingly, the distinc-
tion between standard working time
and overtime has become blurred.
This follows the working time direc-
tive22, which provides for a maxi-
mum working time, including over-
time, of 48 hours a week on average.
This average can be calculated over
reference periods of 4, 6 or 12
months. The following table sets out
the main statutory limits on working
time and overtime in the Member
States. It should be noted, however,
that further derogations are often
provided to allow for specific circum-
stances.
Another important influence on the
amount of overtime worked con-
cerns tax and social security rules.
Governments may encourage firms
to require workers to work longer
hours, for reasons which have noth-
ing to do with any policy on working
time, for example where the cost of
taking on additional workers is high,
or where the marginal cost of over-
time in terms of additional social
security contributions is low.
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Member State Statutory limits on working time and overtime
Belgium 40 hours on average over 3 months, absolute limit of 56 hours per week
Denmark No legislation; limits set by collective agreements
Germany 8 hours per ‘working day’; 2 hours overtime per day if, during a reference period of 6 months, 8hours on average are not exceeded
Greece 48 hours over a reference period of 4 months including overtime (reference period may beextended to 6 or 12 months)
Spain 40 hours per week over a reference period of one year; 80 hours of overtime per year
France Normal working week of 35 hours from 1 January 2000; there is a limit of 46 hours per week overa reference period of 12 weeks and an absolute limit of 48 hours per week
Ireland 48 hours over a reference period of 4 months including overtime (reference period may be extended to 6 or 12 months)
Italy 40 hours per week (normal working time); overtime limited to 8 hours per day, 12 hours per week,80 hours per quarter and 250 hours per year
Luxembourg 40 hours per week (normal working time); absolute limit of 48 hours per week
Netherlands
Standard hours: maximum of 45 hours per week and an average of 40 hours per week; these rules
can be derogated from by collective agreement within the following limits: 50 hours per week over
a 4-week period and a maximum average of 45 hours per week over a 13-week period
Austria 40 hours per week (normal working time); 48 hours on average over a period of 17 weeks (reference period may be extended to 6 or 12 months)
Portugal 48 hours on average over a reference period of 4 months
Finland 40 hours per week (normal working time); overtime limited to 138 hours per 4 months and 250hours per year
Sweden 40 hours per week (normal working time); overtime limited to 48 hours per 4 weeks and 200 hoursper year
United Kingdom 48 hours over a reference period of 4 months including overtime (reference period may be extended to 6 or 12 months); possibility to agree not to apply the limits
Estimated weekly hours of overtime, 1995
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Decoupling working time 
and operating time
A more innovative way of reorganis-
ing working time is to make a dis-
tinction between the operating time
of plant and equipment, or shop
opening time, and the time worked
by individual workers. In this way
firms can reduce their unit costs, by
making more extensive use of expen-
sive plant and equipment, while at
the same time offering employees
compensation for unsocial hours. If
such a trade-off takes place and
attractive new shift systems are
introduced, both sides may profit. In
this way, many workers are being
compensated not only financially
but also with reductions in working
time or extra time off in lieu of
bonus payments. All these new shift
systems follow a very simple logic:
the working time of shift, night or
weekend workers is shorter than
standard working time. This makes it
possible to introduce new shift sys-
tems with more shift crews and thus
create new jobs. If more shift crews
are employed, each individual has to
work fewer nights or weekends,
which means that the same volume
of unsocial hours can be distributed
among a greater number of workers.
A characteristic example of this logic
is the introduction of a fifth crew in
continuous production. Workers
have to work on average only three
Sundays in five instead of three in
four in the former system. And if just
two crews working two 12-hour
shifts do weekend work, then each
worker will have to work only two
Sundays in five. In some European
countries, the easing of restrictions
on shift and weekend work has been
linked in legislation or collective
agreements to reductions in working
time.
Flexible working time 
arrangements
An alternative solution is to vary the
number of hours worked. This might
be appropriate where the company’s
activity is irregular. This could be
because of seasonal variations (in the
construction, tourism and food-pro-
cessing industries, for example),
daily or weekly fluctuations (shops
and certain client services, for exam-
ple), or due to unpredictable varia-
tions in demand, especially with a
‘just-in-time’ mode of production.
Under such arrangements, the actual
number of hours worked (per week,
for example) fluctuates between a
minimum and a maximum around
an average set by collective agree-
ment. This average must be respect-
ed over a reference period, which
may vary from a few weeks to a year.
In short, this is a method of calcula-
tion which enables employers not to
pay overtime premiums for hours
worked above the average in any
day, week, month, etc., as long as the
average number of hours is respected
over the reference period. Similar
methods have allowed the payment
of overtime to be replaced by the
granting of time off in lieu, or by
crediting the extra hours to ‘individ-
ual working time accounts’ which
workers can use over a period of
years.
Zero-hour contracts
An extreme example of flexible
working time is to be found in ‘zero-
hour’ or ‘on-call’ contracts. Under
these arrangements, workers have no
fixed working hours, but they must,
in some cases, be available to
respond to requests for their pres-
ence when work is available for
them. The existence of such con-
tracts, in addition to the implica-
tions for policy on working time,
raises wider issues relating to
employment security.
Measures modifying the
duration of working life
The following table provides esti-
mates of the likely lifetime hours on
the basis of employment patterns for
men in 1985 and 199723. The 1997
figures show that ‘working life
expectancy’ ranges from under
70 000 hours in Belgium, Italy and
Luxembourg to over 90 000 hours in
the UK and Ireland. Measures which
are being taken in the Member States
to change the way in which time is
distributed throughout the working
life, between education and training,
work, family responsibilities, leisure
and retirement, are addressed in the
following subsections. The table
shows that there has been a reduc-
tion in working life expectancy
between 1985 and 1997 for all
Member States for which comparable
figures are available.
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Flexible leave arrangements 
throughout working life
A number of interesting experiments
are being undertaken in Member
States and in individual firms to
allow workers to take career breaks
for family, training or other reasons.
The framework agreement on
parental leave concluded by UNICE,
CEEP and ETUC24 is a good example
of the progress at Community level. 
Such working lifetime policies may
reduce unemployment and improve
the quality of life by humanising the
world of work and, above all, its
compatibility with private life.
The working time accounts (also
called ‘time banks’) mentioned
above can help to make flexible leave
arrangements possible. Workers save
up their accumulated hours of extra
work performed and take an exten-
ded holiday within one or two years.
Similarly, job rotation schemes are
being introduced, with support from
the European Social Fund, in many
Member States. Under such schemes,
an unemployed person is trained to
replace an employee in a company.
The employees in turn receive fur-
ther training during their leave from
their job. The aims are to combat
unemployment, increase flexibility
and help to reinsert unemployed
workers into the labour market.
Flexible/early/
progressive retirement
Working time over the working life
can also be reduced through early
retirement. This is a policy which in
the past appealed to employers and
governments alike, in order to con-
centrate redundancies on those in
the older age groups who have rela-
tively few years of their working lives
remaining, so effectively freeing up
jobs for younger workers and redu-
cing the unemployment figures. But
it has given rise to a number of pro-
blems.
One consequence, combined with
the fact that older workers have diffi-
culties in finding jobs, is that in 1998
almost a third of men aged 55 to 59
in the EU were economically inacti-
ve. For those aged 60 to 64, the figure
for the EU was over 70 % (see Chart
94).
As regards women, under 40 % of
those aged 55 to 59 were still in the
labour force in 1998 and only just
over 10 % of those aged 60 to 64 (see
Chart 95).
The issue of early retirement is close-
ly related to the demographic
changes that are taking place. As the
population ages, fewer workers sup-
port increasing numbers of inactive
people. A solution, which the
Community has supported for many
years, is the principle of flexible
retirement25, i.e. the freedom for
employees to choose when they will
take their retirement. Another solu-
tion which has been tried, and
which is advocated in the 1982
recommendation, is for employees
to have the opportunity to obtain a
gradual reduction in their working
hours during the period immediately
preceding their retirement.
Although such schemes are fairly
widespread, their effect so far in
reducing the outflow of older
workers from the labour force has
been imperceptible in most countries
and very few of those eligible have
opted for partial retirement.
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Working time 
and economic 
performance
Employment
In 1999, the Directorate-General for
Employment published a critical
review26 of 14 studies on working
time undertaken for the European
Commission and the European
Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions
between 1995 and 1997. The review
concentrates on the potential
employment effects of changes in
working time arrangements. In par-
ticular, it examines the conditions
which have to be fulfilled in order
for the reduction in working time
to have an impact on employment
and unemployment.
The studies show, however, that
while the effects on employment
may be positive in theory, these are
very restrictive conditions, which
are unlikely to be satisfied at sec-
toral or macroeconomic level.
The studies also confirm that, in
order to have a favourable effect on
employment, a reduction in work-
ing time must take place in a wider
context of, or lead to, changes in
production and work organisation.
Working time is only one factor in
this process.
Tax incentive schemes to encourage
companies to reduce working hours
and to increase the number of
employees are of two different
types. Under the first type of
scheme, subsidies are available for
companies taking steps to reduce
working time. The award of subsi-
dies is often conditional upon crea-
ting or maintaining jobs. Under the
second type of scheme, hourly
social security rates are modulated
as a function of working time. This
scheme has yet to be applied in
practice.
According to the review, the first
type of scheme is accompanied in
most cases by fairly major side
effects (windfall, substitution, dis-
placement effects, etc.) that sub-
stantially reduce the efficiency.
In theory, tax incentive measures to
reduce working time (the second
type of scheme) may, under certain
conditions, prove effective in the
fight against unemployment, in
particular of the less skilled. This
type of public measure to promote
job-sharing policies should never-
theless be approached with cau-
tion. For example, the additional
tax revenue provided by additional
recruitment may prove to be less
than the public expenditure cost of
reducing social security contribu-
tions.
The review concludes that a genera-
lised and uniform reduction in
working time would have a very
limited impact on employment and
unemployment. The reason for this
is that such a concept is not
attuned to modern production con-
straints and employees’ prefe-
rences. Furthermore, while most
opinion surveys show that people
are generally in favour of a reduc-
tion in working time, they also
show a considerable diversity in
people’s preferences concerning the
method of reducing or adapting
working time. In addition, while
most people are in favour of work-
ing shorter hours, they are general-
ly unwilling to reduce their wages.
While general and uniform reduc-
tions of working time were
undoubtedly necessary in the past,
diversified ways of adapting or
reducing working time throughout
working life would nowadays be
more in keeping with employees’
aspirations and companies’ needs
to be competitive.
Working time 
and productivity
Productivity is one of the key ele-
ments, which drives economic
well-being, bringing improvements
in real wages, welfare and jobs. New
forms of (high-performance) work
organisation can make an impor-
tant contribution to improvements
in productivity.
Within this context, the reduction
in and reorganisation of working
time can make important contribu-
tions to the improvement of work
organisation — and hence to pro-
ductivity — provided the changes
are negotiated. Rigid rules on work-
ing time, whether imposed from
outside or internal to the company,
can have an adverse effect on pro-
ductivity.
In the case of reductions in working
time, the evidence, particularly
from France, is that small reduc-
tions in working time (e.g. from 40
to 39 hours in 1982) have a signifi-
cant short-term effect on producti-
vity. Similar results can be dis-
cerned from early research into the
effects of more recent legislation
introduced in 199627.
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Conditions which may need to be satisfied for working time reductions
to have an impact on employment
Reductions in working hours should take place in the broader context of a
better balance between flexibility and security: reducing working hours
while maintaining the same pattern of work organisation will be counter-
productive.
The way work is distributed has to be planned and working time patterns
have to be adapted to the new situation.
The redistribution of working time should be accompanied by an active
training policy. Otherwise skill shortages are likely to arise. The speed with
which they arise depends on the nature of the work and the quality of the
available labour force.
Barriers to recruitment should be low. In this context, there is a need to look,
in particular, at the effects of taxation systems on working time and to make
the necessary adaptations to social security systems.
Cooperation between the public authorities, trade unions and the various
training bodies with interest at plant level is important.
Working time reductions should be incorporated into long-term bargaining
packages. Many working time reductions in recent decades, for example in
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, have been traded against long-term
wage moderation. Such long-term packages have the advantage of making
it possible to use productivity increases to reduce working time over a peri-
od of several years, while at the same time reducing the wage increases need-
ed to offset the reduction in working time.
The dynamic and longer-term
effects are much more complicated
and can differ, for example, accord-
ing to the phase of the economic
cycle in which changes, and in par-
ticular reductions, are introduced.
Whether or not employees are com-
pensated for loss of wages when
their working hours are reduced is
also an important element in the
equation. Where individual work-
ing time reductions are accompa-
nied by an increase in plant utilisa-
tion or shop opening hours, total
factor productivity can increase
alongside an increase in the num-
bers employed and the wages of the
workers concerned. Whether these
increases are sustainable depends,
inter alia, on the availability of
suitably qualified and trained
workers to take up the new jobs
created.
Thus, in the longer term, the cru-
cial test is whether or not the redu-
ction in and/or reorganisation of
working time makes a positive con-
tribution to the competitiveness of
the plant, the company or the
economy as a whole.
Community 
legislation
The working time 
directive
Prior to the 1990s, regulations on
working time developed historical-
ly in very different ways, or, in the
case of the UK, not at all. In
December 1989, the European
Council adopted the Community
Charter of the Fundamental Social
Rights of Workers. This recognised
that the completion of the internal
market must lead to an improve-
ment in the living and working
conditions of workers in the
European Community and declared
that every worker should have a
right to a weekly rest period and to
annual paid leave.
Following a proposal from the
Commission, the Council of
Ministers adopted the working time
directive28 in November 1993. The
directive establishes minimum
standards with regard to the health
and safety of workers in respect of
working time, in particular by pre-
scribing minimum rest periods and
limits on working time.
Excluded sectors
Certain sectors and activities were
excluded from the 1993 directive
because of the specific nature of the
work concerned. These were air,
rail, road, sea, inland waterway and
lake transport, sea fishing, other
work at sea and the activities of
doctors in training. In November
1998, the Commission made a
number of proposals to apply
appropriate rules to these sectors
and activities. On 21 June 1999, the
Council adopted a directive29
putting into effect the agreement
on the working time of seafarers
concluded by the social partners at
European level in the maritime
transport sector. In December, the
Parliament and Council adopted a
directive concerning the enforce-
ment of seafarers’ hours of work on
board ships using Community
ports30. The remaining two propo-
sals31 are still under discussion.
Part-time work
The Commission put forward its
first proposals in the early 1980s on
different forms of atypical work
relationships, including part-time
work. These proposals resulted in
one directive on safety and health
issues for temporary workers and
fixed-term workers, adopted by the
Council in 1991. In December
1994, the Council confirmed that
adoption of the other Commission
proposals could not be expected in
the near future. The essential rea-
son for this was that there was a
fundamental difference between
those who wanted regulation in
this area and those who wanted less
regulation.
At the end of 1995, the Commis-
sion decided to launch a first-stage
consultation of the social partners
at EU level on the issue of flexibili-
ty in working time and security for
workers. The consultation covered
a number of forms of atypical work,
including part-time work.
The social partners (UNICE, CEEP
and ETUC) began negotiations in
July 1996 on part-time work. They
signed a framework agreement on
this issue in June 1997. In
December 1997, the Council of
Ministers adopted a directive32
putting into effect the agreement.
The purpose of the framework
agreement is:
• to provide for the removal of dis-
crimination against part-time
workers and to improve the quali-
ty of part-time work;
• to facilitate the development of
part-time work on a voluntary
basis and to contribute to the
flexible organisation of working
time in a manner which takes
into account the needs of
employers and workers.
Conclusion
Issues relating to working timecontinue to arouse considerable
interest throughout the European
Union. The number of hours
worked has fallen considerably over
time. However, whereas in the past
they were central to the employ-
ment relationship, changes in
working patterns and concepts
have led to a much more complex
situation. In many cases, changes
in working time are subordinate to
wider issues relating to the moder-
nisation of work organisation.
Furthermore, while the debate in
the past was mainly about reduc-
tion in weekly hours of work,
increasingly the number of hours
worked annually has assumed a
greater significance. In the future,
the debate can be expected to shift
further towards lifetime working
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• A minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours a day.
• A rest break where the working day is longer than 6 hours.
• A minimum rest period of one day a week.
• A maximum working week of 48 hours on average including overtime.
• Four weeks’ annual paid holiday.
• Night workers must not work more than 8 hours in 24 on average.
The directive provides for considerable flexibility in the application of these
provisions to specific situations.
Main provisions of the working time directive
patterns, in particular in relation to
flexible leave arrangements and
flexible retirement. Issues relating
to retirement, in particular, will
assume greater significance in the
light of changing demographic
trends33. The social partners will
have an important role to play in
relation to all these changes.
It is so difficult to isolate a uniform
block of working hours in paid
employment that it is no longer
possible to consider working time
issues solely from the point of view
of the company or of the organisa-
tion of paid work. It is thus crucial
that the issue of the organisation of
working time is negotiated to the
mutual satisfaction of all sides. It
affects the operation of public and
private services, businesses and all
aspects of politics, trade unions and
associations34.
Management of time (leisure time,
training time, time spent as a con-
sumer, time spent in transit, etc.) is
no longer conditioned by working
time only. It is becoming the sub-
ject of collective interest beyond
the context of productive activity.
It is becoming necessary for repre-
sentatives of consumer associa-
tions, families, users, public autho-
rities and environmental pressure
groups to get involved in collective
bargaining on the issue of working
time. Increasing the number of
players presupposes the develop-
ment of new forums for dialogue —
probably on a territorial basis — fol-
lowing the example of experiments
undertaken in a number of
European countries.
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Introduction35
The concept of the ‘social pact’ isstill one which is difficult to
define precisely. The most widely
accepted view is that these pacts
broke new ground and, by institu-
tionalising collective bargaining,
allowed the social partners to be
involved in the decision-making
process.
Since the beginning of the 1990s,
increasing efforts have been made in
most Member States and at
Community level to conclude social
pacts. This is not true of all countries;
France and the United Kingdom, for
example, have not followed this
trend for very different political, eco-
nomic and social reasons. It is, none
the less, a widespread phenomenon,
reflecting far-reaching changes.
Although each country’s approach
has been shaped  by its own specific
situation and social history, there are
a  number of common denomina-
tors. The agreements concluded in
recent years differ in terms of the
way in which they were negotiated
and their content from those drawn
up in the 1960s. The economic and
social climate has changed dramati-
cally, now being dominated by glob-
alisation, European monetary unifi-
cation and an ageing population.
The new conditions have altered the
negotiating framework: full employ-
ment has now given way to high
unemployment, wage restraint
replaces the redistribution of produc-
tivity gains and instead of increasing
social protection we are now seeking
ways to adapt it to the new condi-
tions.
The new social agreements cover
new issues: competitiveness, com-
bating unemployment, the labour
market, vocational training and
social protection.
However, it is worth drawing atten-
tion to the following:
• The variety of formulas: A ‘social
pact’ does not necessarily involve
the formal signature of a docu-
ment. It is an altogether more com-
plex process.  It presupposes that
an adequate consultation mecha-
nism is in place and that there has
been a sufficient testing period. For
example, the Wassenaar
Agreement, signed in the
Netherlands in 1982, was not reco-
gnised as marking a new era by the
Dutch social players until several
years after it was signed. What
makes a pact is not what it is called
but, above all, its content and the
way it is implemented. Formal
social pacts can prove disappoin-
ting when put into practice. Nor
should the achievements of insti-
tutional tripartism be forgotten.
This is the form which the social
dialogue takes in Austria, for
example, without the conclusion
of formal agreements. Another
example is Belgium, where the
1998 intersectoral agreement was
preceded, in 1996, by a new law on
competitiveness which laid down
new formal consultation rules.
• Differences in timing: Most of the
agreements were worked out in the
1990s, but two fundamental agree-
ments date back to the 1980s: the
Wassenaar Agreement in the
Netherlands (1982) and the
‘National recovery programme’ in
Ireland (1986).
The table below shows the main
stages in the development of a new
tripartite approach involving the
State and the social partners in each
Member State. Most Member States
are moving towards tripartism, even
those with no particular tradition in
this field.
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Social pacts in the Member States: the key stages in the 1990s
Belgium
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Global
plan
Pact for
the future
New law on competitiveness
Intersectoral 
agreement
Alliance
for jobs
Reopening of discus-
sions on a pact for
employment
Towards
the year
2000
(dropped)
Social pact
Toledo
pact on
the future
of social
security
Agreement
on part-
time
contracts
A new
course:
agenda for
collective
bargaining
in 1994
Agenda
2002
No pact; institutional tripartism
Tripartite
agreement
based on
the NAP
Amendment
of 26 laws 
following
the 1998
agreement
Short-term
agreement
not signed
by the
CGTP
Agreement on strategic
consultation
Europact
(failed)
Social pact
Social contract
Renegotiations in progress
Agreement
on 
abolition
of the scala
mobile
Ciampi
Protocol
Agreement
on pension
reform
Pact for employment
Social pact for growth
and employment
Programme for economic and social progress
Programme for competitiveness 
and work
‘Partnership 2000’ for inclusion,
employment and competitiveness
Debate on renewal of the pact
No pact; no institutional consultation; importance of social partners in social security reform
No pact
Ongoing
debate on
social 
security
Denmark 
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland36
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands37
Austria
Portugal
Finland
Sweden38
United Kingdom
Attempt to
achieve
wage 
standard
(failed)
Pact for
growth
(failed)
No pact; abandonment of centralised collective bargaining
The causes
The new generation of agree-ments emerged at a time of far-
reaching changes whose influence
is in some cases expressly referred
to in the agreements. The most
recent, ‘Partnership 2000’ conclud-
ed in Ireland, raises the question
clearly in its introduction: ‘how to
promote competitiveness in the
face of the challenges ahead for
Ireland, including global competi-
tion, the information society, tech-
nology advances, world trade nego-
tiations, ongoing reform in the
agriculture area, EMU and enlarge-
ment of the European Union?’. The
globalisation of the markets and
the economic and monetary union
are also mentioned expressly in the
Italian, Portuguese and Belgian
agreements.
Economic globalisation, the devel-
opment of new forms of produc-
tion and the information technolo-
gy revolution are transforming the
labour market, the emphasis now
being on competitiveness, labour
force skills and changing the balan-
ce between flexibility and security.
Funding social protection is also a
key issue.
The economic and monetary
union, by forcing the Member
States to seek ways of achieving
non-inflationary growth, has
changed the wage-setting rules.
In the light of the ageing of the
population, the question of the
future of social protection systems
has to be examined.
In contrast to the agreements con-
cluded in the 1960s, in a stable eco-
nomic climate marked by sustained
growth and full employment, the
new pacts are designed to manage
the uncertainties. Employment is
the key issue in this new era and
this is reflected in the change in
priorities: wage discipline and
work-sharing as opposed to the
redistribution of productivity gains.
In Ireland, the four pacts concluded
between 1986 and 1997 are aimed
expressly at channelling and sup-
porting the opening-up of the
national economy and its moderni-
sation and development. Their
scope is vast, ranging from support
for macroeconomic policies to
regional development, including
social back-up or aid for margina-
lised or vulnerable groups. It was
this approach which inspired
Portugal’s efforts to conclude ‘glo-
bal’ pacts in 1996 and 1998.
The advantages of social consulta-
tion are thus self-evident:
• institutional stability;
• broader scope;
• pacta sunt servanda; the parties
are bound by the end result;
• mutual understanding of the
facts;
• change in the way of adopting
common decisions, the focus
being on problem-solving.
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The Dutch precedent
Concluded in 1982, the Wassenaar Agreement was the first of the major European social pacts of the 1980s and 1990s.
With this agreement, concluded after 10 years of discussions which failed to reach any conclusions, the Netherlands
returned to a coordinated bipartite wage negotiation system.
The agreement marks the beginning of the trade unions’ acceptance of a long-term strategy to revive growth and
combat unemployment through wage restraint and work-sharing. To match the unions acceptance of the principle
of business profitability, the employers gradually dropped their objections to reducing the working week.
The agreement also marks the end of restrictive central bargaining. The text signed by the social partners takes the
form of a recommendation to the branch organisations and launches a form of decentralised coordinated social dia-
logue, allowing for sectoral or local flexibility.
This approach has made extensions easier through numerous agreements, recommendations, opinions and reports
on issues such as vocational training, the rights of part-time workers, youth unemployment and sick leave.
The signature of a new agreement in 1993 ‘A new course: agenda for collective bargaining in 1994’ helped to increase
the decentralisation of collective bargaining.
Context
National regulated economy
Baby boom
Accommodating monetary
regime
Fordism
Globalisation
Population ageing
Economic and monetary
union
Information society
Labour market
Full employment
Labour market regulation
Unemployment
Security and flexibility
Wage policy Productivity redistribution Wage restraint
Social protection Welfare expenditure Welfare modernisation
Institutional and 
bargaining frame-
work
Centralisation
Social-partners-oriented
Coordinated decentralisation
State-oriented
Social agreements, 1960s Social agreements, 1990s
Main differences between the agreements signed in the 1960s
and those signed in the 1990s
The content
Generally speaking, the recentsocial pacts have been dominat-
ed by three issues.
Wage policy
The Amsterdam resolution on
growth and employment highlight-
ed the responsibility of the social
partners to curb wage growth and
the need to maintain a link between
wage structure and employment. In
most Member States, wages are no
longer based on productivity but on
competitiveness. The aim of sharing
productivity gains has been incorpo-
rated, to a greater or lesser extent, in
all the agreements concluded in the
1990s (in Belgium, Denmark,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Finland and
Sweden).
Organisation of the labour
market
All Member States have tried to
improve flexibility by launching
active employment and vocational
training policies. Modernising the
way in which the labour market
operates means finding a new bal-
ance between flexibility and security.
This is reflected at Community level
in the framework agreement on part-
time working, concluded by the
social partners. The overriding trend
is to transform and adapt the labour
market as new forms of work emerge
and  information technologies con-
tinue to develop.
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The Irish case
In Ireland, the conclusion of four
global social pacts, the first in 1987,
show what can be achieved by a
concerted strategy of modernisa-
tion, diversification and interna-
tionalisation.
The first of these pacts, the
‘National recovery programme’
(NRP), 1987–90, was negotiated at a
time of far-reaching economic and
social change resulting from the
opening-up of the economy to
Europe. The unemployment rate
had risen from 7.1 % in 1979 to
nearly 18 % in 1987. The recession
created a serious imbalance in the
public finances: by 1987, the central
government deficit had reached 9 %
and the debt/GDP ratio 117 %. This
brought all parties to the realisation
that domestic policies had to
change.
In order to maintain a high level of
competitiveness, the pact provided
for wage restraint in all sectors, tax
reforms, the curbing of social bene-
fits and healthcare expenditure,
structural reforms and an agreement
on monetary policy. The trade
unions’ support for the curbing of
spending was matched by a com-
mitment on the part of the public
authorities to maintain the level of
social benefits, reform labour law,
introduce a minimum wage and
implement a tax reform favourable
to wage earners.
The three subsequent pacts, the
‘Programme for economic and
social progress’ (PESP), 1990–93, the
‘Programme for competitiveness
and work’ (PCW), 1994–96, and
‘Partnership 2000’ (1997–2000) fol-
low the general lines of the 1987–90
pact. Each of the agreements also
introduced further innovations. The
PESP, for example, introduced a
decentralised approach to the prob-
lem of long-term unemployment.
The most recent programme,
‘Partnership 2000’, extended the
scope of the agreement to new part-
ners. In addition to the traditional
social partners, representatives of
the non-profit-making sector and
organisations representing the
unemployed, women or the socially
excluded were involved in the nego-
tiations and in drawing up the pact.
This was because new areas were
included in the agreement: mod-
ernisation of the public services,
encouraging the development of
partnership at enterprise level, edu-
cation, poverty, equal opportunities,
rehabilitation of the disabled,
nomadism, etc.
Belgium Comparison with the three main exporters (Germany, France,the Netherlands); law on competitiveness
Finland Wage restraint in return for the creation of ‘stabilisation funds’
Inflation plus increase in national productivityGreece
Inflation plus moderate wage increaseIreland
Inflation plus part of productivity gainsPortugal
Expected inflation plus negotiation of share of productivity
gains at enterprise levelItaly
Germany
Protection against redundancies has been relaxed in the services
sector (1991) and for SMEs (1996), but  increased in industry.
The question of fixed-term contracts is regulated by a series of
laws, with a fixed period of validity.
Spain
The considerable flexibility which the introduction of the 
fixed-term contract has allowed since 1984 has been gradually
reduced since 1992 to counter a relaxing of redundancy 
procedures. The 1997 agreement and law ratified this 
increased flexibility for young employees.
Ireland
The flexibility of the labour market in Ireland is the subject 
of broad consensus and has been endorsed by the tripartite
mechanisms.
Italy
Recruitment (apprenticeship contracts, 1984; temporary work,
1997) and dismissal (liberalisation of collective redundancies,
1991) have been made more flexible, but in a closely regulated
framework. The measures adopted target the more vulnerable
groups or regions (young people, Mezzogiorno).
Netherlands
There has been a sharp increase in flexibility particularly in the
area of part-time work and temporary work, with no time limit
for the latter.
Source:  M. Regini, 'Between deregulation and the social pacts, the responses of European economies to globalisation'.
Estudio working paper n° 1999/133
Examples of wage increase formulas
Examples of approaches to adapting the labour market
Social security
The emphasis here has been onkeeping costs down. Italy, for
example, is trying to define the
arrangements for a  reform of the
pension scheme. Initiatives to reduce
non-wage labour costs also have to
take this aspect into account.
The Finnish example shows that tri-
partite consultation can also result in
inventive solutions to specific new
problems. The ‘buffer funds’, set up
following the 1997 agreement in
return for wage restraint, provide an
answer to the problems of budgetary
instability and crisis in the social sys-
tems which can occur because of the
structural sensitivity of the national
economy to asymmetric economic
shocks.
The emphasis on the above three
issues does not mean that other asso-
ciated issues have to be excluded.
The introduction of specific mea-
sures for regions whose development
is lagging behind is an important
aspect of the Italian compromise;
these aspects are also covered in the
decentralised negotiation process in
the Netherlands and Ireland. In
Ireland, extension of the scope of the
agreement to issues such as comba-
ting social exclusion has been
accompanied by the extension of the
social dialogue to new partners from
the non-profit-making sector.
Most of those involved in processes
of this kind which are now well-
established, as in the Netherlands,
stress the importance of the two-
pronged approach: not only seeking
the solution to the problem but also
learning together through the
process of negotiating the social
pact. In most cases, the conclusion of
an agreement on wage policy has
preceded and contributed to the sub-
sequent adoption of a compromise
on more difficult aspects such as
social security. Italy’s achievements
are an example of this sequence of
events and the process of building a
climate favourable to global dia-
logue.
The players
Establishing a climate of confi-dence is all the more important
given the diverse, not to say diver-
gent, nature of the strategies and
motivations of the different parties
involved. Fundamental to the
process of drawing up a pact, and, to
a large extent, to its success, is that
those involved share a common
diagnosis of the issues.
The public authorities
The 1990s saw an increase in tripar-
tism which meant greater involve-
ment on the part of the State in a
consultation process which had pre-
viously been the preserve of the
social partners. It should be stressed
that technical bodies played an often
crucial role in determining the agen-
da and guiding the discussions:
• in the Netherlands, the Labour
Foundation, involving employers
and trade unions, has been the
main forum for the preliminary
discussions, the main inspiration
being the Council for the National
Economy which set itself up as an
indispensable think tank and tech-
nical consultancy;
• similar bodies have been involved
in Finland, such as the Incomes
Policy Commission which contri-
buted to the success of negotia-
tions whose conclusion led to a
voluntary approach to the reform
of the national economy;
• the Central Council for the
Economy and the National Labour
Council in Belgium played a vital
role in discussions on the law on
competitiveness;
• the discussions in Italy on the esti-
mated inflation rate allowed a joint
statement to be drawn up on the
main macroeconomic variables.
The government’s role was even
more evident in Portugal, where
efforts to conclude a global pact
stemmed from the desire to achieve a
general long-term agreement on
modernisation of the economy and
social relations.
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Italy, a series of agreements
The series of agreements concluded
in Italy from 1992 are set against a
backdrop of unprecedented change:
an inflation rate reduced from 4.5 %
in 1995 to 1.7 % in 1997 and a bud-
get deficit brought down from 7.7
to 2.7 % of GDP. The desire to par-
ticipate in the first wave of the euro
was a powerful stimulus for res-
tructuring public finances, reform-
ing the wage bargaining system and
revamping social security.
The waiving of the scala mobile, fol-
lowing the tripartite agreement of
July 1992, was ratified by the agree-
ment concluded 12 months later on
a new wage-setting method. This
agreement, signed on 23 July 1993,
provides for the adoption of a gene-
ralised cooperative approach.
A similar approach was adopted for
the second major wave of social
reform. The 1995 agreement on
Finland: a social compromise
to manage change
The development of the social dia-
logue in Finland has been closely
linked to the rapid adjustment of
the economy under the dual influ-
ence of its modernisation (decline
of the timber industry countered
by rapid growth in the communi-
cation technology sector) and its
Europeanisation, marked by join-
ing the EMU.
The social security system in
Finland was unusual in that it
linked contributions to the
Unemployment Benefit Fund to
the number of job-seekers, thereby
increasing labour costs in times of
crisis.
The wage agreement of November
1997 marks a  new stage in the
handling of the question of labour
costs in so far as, with the buffer
funds, it goes beyond mere wage
social security, concluded between
the trade unions and public author-
ities, resulted in a negotiated reform
of the pension system and a
considerable reduction in pension
costs to help rebalance public
spending.
The dual system of collective bar-
gaining enshrined in  the 1993
agreement was reinforced, in spite
of some reluctance on the part of
employers, by the so-called
‘Christmas agreement’ concluded in
December 1998. This social pact for
development and employment
whose objective was to boost invest-
ment and household consumption
provides for a 3 % reduction in
employers’ costs by 2003, State-
funding of some family benefits
(maternity leave and family
allowances) and a considerable
reduction in income tax.
There are many reasons for the
increase in the public authorities’
power in the social sphere. It was
important to ensure that wage trends
were compatible with competitive-
ness and monetary stability and to
guarantee support for the reforms
planned in the fields of social securi-
ty and the labour market. The deci-
sions taken at European level, such
as the process of setting up the EMU
or the guidelines for employment,
have sometimes accentuated this.
The Belgian case is a good example.
The EMU provided the framework
for implementing the law on com-
petitiveness. The adoption of the
guidelines for employment led to an
extension of the intersectoral agree-
ment in 1998 and the introduction
of an important chapter on voca-
tional training.
The social partners
The new agreements mark the end of
the demands of the past, the new
spirit being one of wage restraint,
increased labour market flexibility
and social security reform, presup-
posing a change in attitude on  the
part of the trade unions. In many
cases, prior consensus on what the
negotiations should aim to achieve
(as in the Netherlands and Finland)
has proved to be a determining fac-
tor in the rest of the process, on the
understanding that sharing a com-
mon diagnosis in no way prejudices
the solutions put forward by the dif-
ferent parties.  In fact, the absence of
a common diagnosis was one of the
reasons why the Greek and
Portuguese pacts failed.
The employers’ reasons for signing
the central social pacts was that a
framework was needed to foster
negotiation. The central agreements
guaranteed flexibility, leaving
increasing scope for interpreting the
text at sectoral or regional level. It is
thus not so much centralisation as
coordinated decentralisation.
Results and outlook
How have the countries whichsigned social pacts performed?
How can we distinguish between
countries where explicit agreements
were concluded and those, such as
Denmark or Austria, where social
consultation has remained a perma-
nent feature of industrial relations?
It is difficult to identify a link
between the signing of an agreement
and economic and social perfor-
mance. What is striking, though, is
how the macroeconomic climate has
changed in some cases (reduction of
public debt, favourable economic
outlook, inflation in check, falling
unemployment). The reform of
social security, and particularly the
way it is funded, seems to be an
increasingly crucial issue.
The Belgian intersectoral agreement
reflects these new trends. Wage
increases are based on those of its
neighbouring countries (Germany,
France and the Netherlands), but
there is scope for sectoral bargaining
provided that it is linked to job
growth. Social costs will be reduced
within six years to the level of the
partner countries. Vocational train-
ing is also being encouraged and its
share of GDP is to rise from 1.2 to
1.4 %. The net minimum wage has
been increased to create a positive
difference between it and the social
minimums.
New balances will have to be found
if the formula of the social pact is to
continue. Social security reform is a
major concern of most Member
States and a cooperative solution
with the social partners is generally
being sought.
The success of some pacts has also
brought to light new issues such as
mobility and accommodation costs,
which are considered by workers to
be important aspects of the improve-
ment of their working and living
conditions.
The European strategy for employ-
ment has also enhanced consulta-
tion between the social partners at
national level. Although not to the
same extent in all countries, it has
none the less helped to improve dia-
logue between the public authorities
and social partners.
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restraint  and can be regarded as
an implicit social pact. Although it
takes the form of a bipartite frame-
work agreement establishing rec-
ommendations for the sectoral
social partners for the conclusion
of specific agreements, it also com-
mits the government to reducing
income tax. The buffer funds are
intended to allow some room for
manoeuvre during economic
downturns. The funds are
financed by special contributions
which accumulate during periods
of growth. They are now being
built up. The maximum level of
EUR 2 000 million should be
reached in 2004. 
The tripartite negotiations for the
Luxembourg National Action
Plan led to an agreement on
labour market reform. Following
the signature of this document, 26
laws were amended on a variety of
subjects: collective agreements,
parental leave, labour administra-
tion, vocational training, appren-
ticeship contracts, early retirement
scheme, unemployment benefit.
MAIN SOCIAL 
PROVISIONS OF THE
TREATY (POST-
AMSTERDAM 
CONSOLIDATED 
VERSION)
• THE PRINCIPLES •
Article 2 (ex Article 2)
The Community shall have as its
task, by establishing a common mar-
ket and an economic and monetary
union and by implementing com-
mon policies or activities referred to
in Articles 3 and 4, to promote
throughout the Community a har-
monious, balanced and sustainable
development of economic activities,
a high level of employment and of
social protection, equality between
men and women, sustainable and
non-inflationary growth, a high
degree of competitiveness and con-
vergence of economic performance,
a high level of protection and
improvement of the quality of the
environment, the raising of the stan-
dard of living and quality of life, and
economic and social cohesion and
solidarity among Member States.
Article 3 (ex Article 3)
1. For the purposes set out in Article
2, the activities of the Community
shall include, as provided in this
Treaty and in accordance with the
timetable set out therein:
(a) the prohibition, as between 
Member States, of customs duties
and quantitative restrictions on
the import and export of goods,
and of all other measures having
equivalent effect;
(b) a common commercial policy;
(c) an internal market charac-
terised by the abolition, as
between Member States, of obsta-
cles to the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capi-
tal;
(d) measures concerning the entry
and movement of persons as pro-
vided for in Title IV;
(e) a common policy in the sphere
of agriculture and fisheries;
(f) a common policy in the sphere
of transport;
(g) a system ensuring that compe-
tition in the internal market is not
distorted;
(h) the approximation of the laws
of Member States to the extent
required for the functioning of the
common market;
(i) the promotion of coordination
between employment policies of
the Member States with a view to
enhancing their effectiveness by
developing a coordinated strategy
for employment;
(j) a policy in the social sphere
comprising a European Social
Fund;
(k) the strengthening of economic
and social cohesion;
(l) a policy in the sphere of the
environment;
(m) the strengthening of the com-
petitiveness of Community indus-
try;
(n) the promotion of research and
technological development;
(o) encouragement for the estab-
lishment and development of
trans-European networks;
(p) a contribution to the attain-
ment of a high level of health pro-
tection;
(q) a contribution to education
and training of quality and to the
flowering of the cultures of the
Member States;
(r) a policy in the sphere of
development cooperation;
(s) the association of the overseas
countries and territories in order to
increase trade and promote jointly
economic and social development;
(t) a contribution to the strength-
ening of consumer protection;
(u) measures in the spheres of
energy, civil protection and
tourism.
2. In all the activities referred to in
this Article, the Community shall
aim to eliminate inequalities, and
to promote equality, between men
and women.
• ANTI-DISCRIMINATION •
Article 13 (ex Article 6a)
Without prejudice to the other pro-
visions of this Treaty and within the
limits of the powers conferred by it
upon the Community, the Council,
acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission and after con-
sulting the European Parliament,
may take appropriate action to com-
bat discrimination based on sex,
racial or ethnic origin, religion or
belief, disability, age or sexual orien-
tation.
• FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS
AND SOCIAL SECURITY OF
MIGRANT WORKERS •
Article 39 (ex Article 48)
1. Freedom of movement for workers
shall be secured within the
Community.
2. Such freedom of movement shall
entail the abolition of any
discrimination based on nationali-
ty between workers of the Member
States as regards employment,
remuneration and other condi-
tions of work and employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to
limitations justified on grounds of
public policy, public security or
public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment
actually made;
(b) to move freely within the terri-
tory of Member States for this pur-
pose;
(c) to stay in a Member State for
the purpose of employment in
accordance with the provisions
governing the employment of
nationals of that State laid down
by law, regulation or administra-
tive action;
(d) to remain in the territory of a
Member State after having been
employed in that State, subject to
conditions which shall be embo-
died in implementing regulations
to be drawn up by the Com-
mission.
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Annex
Annex
4. The provisions of this Article shall
not apply to employment in the
public service.
Article 40 (ex Article 49)
The Council shall, acting in accor-
dance with the procedure referred to
in Article 251 and after consulting
the Economic and Social
Committee, issue directives or make
regulations setting out the measures
required to bring about freedom of
movement for workers, as defined in
Article 39, in particular:
(a) by ensuring close cooperation
between national employment
services;
(b) by abolishing those adminis-
trative procedures and practices
and those qualifying periods in
respect of eligibility for available
employment, whether resulting
from national legislation or from
agreements previously concluded
between Member States, the main-
tenance of which would form an
obstacle to liberalisation of the
movement of workers;
(c) by abolishing all such qualify-
ing periods and other restrictions
provided for either under national
legislation or under agreements
previously concluded between
Member States as imposed on
workers of other Member States
conditions regarding the free
choice of employment other than
those imposed on workers of the
State concerned;
(d) by setting up appropriate
machinery to bring offers of
employment into touch with
applications for employment and
to facilitate the achievement of a
balance between supply and
demand in the employment mar-
ket in such a way as to avoid seri-
ous threats to the standard of liv-
ing and level of employment in
the various regions and industries.
Article 41 (ex Article 50)
Member States shall, within the
framework of a joint programme,
encourage the exchange of young
workers.
Article 42 (ex Article 51)
The Council shall, acting in accor-
dance with the procedure referred to
in Article 251, adopt such measures
in the field of social security as are
necessary to provide freedom of
movement for workers; to this end, it
shall make arrangements to secure
for migrant workers and their depen-
dants:
(a) aggregation, for the purpose of
acquiring and retaining the right
to benefit and of calculating the
amount of benefit, of all periods
taken into account under the laws
of the several countries;
(b) payment of benefits to persons
resident in the territories of
Member States.
The Council shall act unanimously
throughout the procedure referred to
in Article 251.
• EMPLOYMENT •
Article 125 (ex Article 109n)
Member States and the Community
shall, in accordance with this Title,
work towards developing a coordi-
nated strategy for employment and
particularly for promoting a skilled,
trained and adaptable workforce and
labour markets responsive to eco-
nomic change with a view to achiev-
ing the objectives defined in Article 2
of the Treaty on European Union
and in Article 2 of this Treaty.
Article 126 (ex Article 109o)
1. Member States, through their
employment policies, shall con-
tribute to the achievement of the
objectives referred to in Article 125
in a way consistent with the broad
guidelines of the economic poli-
cies of the Member States and of
the Community adopted pursuant
to Article  99(2).
2. Member States, having regard to
national practices related to the
responsibilities of management
and labour, shall regard promoting
employment as a matter of com-
mon concern and shall coordinate
their action in this respect within
the Council, in accordance with
the provisions of Article 128.
Article 127 (ex Article 109p)
1. The Community shall contribute
to a high level of employment by
encouraging cooperation between
Member States and by supporting
and, if necessary, complementing
their action. In doing so, the com-
petences of the Member States
shall be respected.
2. The objective of a high level of
employment shall be taken into
consideration in the formulation
and implementation of Commu-
nity policies and activities.
Article 128 (ex Article 109q)
1. The European Council shall each
year consider the employment
situation in the Community and
adopt conclusions thereon, on the
basis of a joint annual report by
the Council and the Commission.
2. On the basis of the conclusions of
the European Council, the
Council, acting by a qualified
majority on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting
the European Parliament, the
Economic and Social Committee,
the Committee of the Regions and
the Employment Committee
referred to in Article 130, shall
each year draw up guidelines
which the Member States shall
take into account in their employ-
ment policies. These guidelines
shall be consistent with the broad
guidelines adopted pursuant to
Article 99(2).
3. Each Member State shall provide
the Council and the Commission
with an annual report on the prin-
cipal measures taken to implement
its employment policy in the light
of the guidelines for employment
as referred to in paragraph 2.
4. The Council, on the basis of the
reports referred to in paragraph 3
and having received the views of
the Employment Committee, shall
each year carry out an examina-
tion of the implementation of the
employment policies of the
Member States in the light of the
guidelines for employment. The
Council, acting by a qualified
majority on a recommendation
from the Commission, may, if it
considers it appropriate in the
light of that examination, make
recommendations to Member
States.
5. On the basis of the results of that
examination, the Council and the
Commission shall make a joint
annual report to the European
Council on the employment situa-
tion in the Community and on
the implementation of the guide-
lines for employment.
Article 129 (ex Article 109r)
The Council, acting in accordance
with the procedure referred to in
Article 251 and after consulting the
Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, may
adopt incentive measures designed
to encourage cooperation between
Member States and to support their
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action in the field of employment
through initiatives aimed at develop-
ing exchanges of information and
best practices, providing compara-
tive analysis and advice as well as
promoting innovative approaches
and evaluating experiences, in par-
ticular by recourse to pilot projects.
Those measures shall not include
harmonisation of the laws and regu-
lations of the Member States.
Article 130 (ex Article 109s)
The Council, after consulting the
European Parliament, shall establish
an Employment Committee with
advisory status to promote coordina-
tion between Member States on
employment and labour market poli-
cies. The tasks of the Committee
shall be:
• to monitor the employment situa-
tion and employment policies in
the Member States and the
Community;
• without prejudice to Article 207, to
formulate opinions at the request
of either the Council or the
Commission or on its own initia-
tive, and to contribute to the
preparation of the Council pro-
ceedings referred to in Article 128.
In fulfilling its mandate, the
Committee shall consult manage-
ment and labour.
Each Member State and the
Commission shall appoint two
members of the Committee.
• SOCIAL PROVISIONS •
Article 136 (ex Article 117)
The Community and the Member
States, having in mind fundamental
social rights such as those set out in
the European Social Charter signed
at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in
the 1989 Community Charter of the
Fundamental Social Rights of
Workers, shall have as their objec-
tives the promotion of employment,
improved living and working condi-
tions, so as to make possible their
harmonisation while the improve-
ment is being maintained, proper
social protection, dialogue between
management and labour, the
development of human resources
with a view to lasting high employ-
ment and the combating of exclu-
sion.
To this end the Community and the
Member States shall implement mea-
sures which take account of the
diverse forms of national practices,
in particular in the field of contrac-
tual relations, and the need to main-
tain the competitiveness of the
Community economy.
They believe that such a develop-
ment will ensue not only from the
functioning of the common market,
which will favour the harmonisation
of social systems but also from the
procedures provided for in this
Treaty and from the approximation
of provisions laid down by law, regu-
lation or administrative action.
Article 137 (ex Article 118)
1. With a view to achieving the
objectives of Article 136, the
Community shall support and
complement the activities of the
Member States in the following
fields:
• improvement in particular of the
working environment to protect
workers’ health and safety;
• working conditions;
• the information and consultation
of workers;
• the integration of persons excluded
from the labour market, without
prejudice to Article  150;
• equality between men and women
with regard to labour market
opportunities and treatment at
work.
2. To this end, the Council may
adopt, by means of directives,
minimum requirements for gra-
dual implementation, having
regard to the conditions and tech-
nical rules obtaining in each of the
Member States. Such directives
shall avoid imposing administra-
tive, financial and legal constraints
in a way which would hold back
the creation and development of
small and medium-sized under-
takings.
The Council shall act in accor-
dance with the procedure referred
to in Article 251 after consulting
the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of
the Regions.
The Council, acting in accordance
with the same procedure, may
adopt measures designed to
encourage cooperation between
Member States through initiatives
aimed at improving knowledge,
developing exchanges of informa-
tion and best practices, promoting
innovative approaches and evalua-
ting experiences in order to com-
bat social exclusion.
3. However, the Council shall act
unanimously on a proposal from
the Commission, after consulting
the European Parliament, the
Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions
in the following areas:
• social security and social protec-
tion of workers;
• protection of workers where their
employment contract is terminat-
ed;
• representation and collective
defence of the interests of workers
and employers, including co-deter-
mination, subject to paragraph 6;
• conditions of employment for
third-country nationals legally
residing in Community territory;
• financial contributions for promo-
tion of employment and job-cre-
ation, without prejudice to the
provisions relating to the Social
Fund.
4. A Member State may entrust man-
agement and labour, at their joint
request, with the implementation
of directives adopted pursuant to
paragraphs 2 and 3.
In this case, it shall ensure that, no
later than the date on which a
directive must be transposed in
accordance with Article 249, man-
agement and labour have intro-
duced the necessary measures by
agreement, the Member State con-
cerned being required to take any
necessary measure enabling it at
any time to be in a position to
guarantee the results imposed by
that directive.
5. The provisions adopted pursuant
to this Article shall not prevent
any Member State from maintain-
ing or introducing more stringent
protective measures compatible
with this Treaty.
6. The provisions of this Article shall
not apply to pay, the right of asso-
ciation, the right to strike or the
right to impose lockouts.
Article 138 (ex Article 118a)
1. The Commission shall have the
task of promoting the consultation
of management and labour at
Community level and shall take
any relevant measure to facilitate
their dialogue by ensuring bal-
anced support for the parties.
2. To this end, before submitting pro-
posals in the social policy field, the
Commission shall consult mana-
gement and labour on the possible
direction of Community action.
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3. If, after such consultation, the
Commission considers Commu-
nity action advisable, it shall con-
sult management and labour on
the content of the envisaged pro-
posal. Management and labour
shall forward to the Commission
an opinion or, where appropriate,
a recommendation.
4. On the occasion of such consulta-
tion, management and labour may
inform the Commission of their
wish to initiate the process provi-
ded for in Article 139. The dura-
tion of the procedure shall not
exceed nine months, unless the
management and labour con-
cerned and the Commission
decide jointly to extend it.
Article 139 (ex Article 118b)
1. Should management and labour
so desire, the dialogue between
them at Community level may
lead to contractual relations,
including agreements.
2. Agreements concluded at
Community level shall be imple-
mented either in accordance with
the procedures and practices spe-
cific to management and labour
and the Member States or, in mat-
ters covered by Article 137, at the
joint request of the signatory par-
ties, by a Council decision on a
proposal from the Commission.
The Council shall act by qualified
majority, except where the agree-
ment in question contains one or
more provisions relating to one of
the areas referred to in Article 137(3),
in which case it shall act unani-
mously.
Article 140 (ex Article 118c)
With a view to achieving the objec-
tives of Article 136 and without
prejudice to the other provisions of
this Treaty, the Commission shall
encourage cooperation between the
Member States and facilitate the
coordination of their action in all
social policy fields under this chap-
ter, particularly in matters relating
to:
• employment;
• labour law and working condi-
tions;
• basic and advanced vocational
training;
• social security;
• prevention of occupational acci-
dents and diseases;
• occupational hygiene;
• the right of association and collec-
tive bargaining between emplo-
yers and workers.
To this end, the Commission shall
act in close contact with Member
States by making studies, delivering
opinions and arranging consulta-
tions both on problems arising at
national level and on those of con-
cern to international organisations.
Before delivering the opinions pro-
vided for in this Article, the
Commission shall consult the
Economic and Social Committee.
Article 141 (ex Article 119)
1. Each Member State shall ensure
that the principle of equal pay for
male and female workers for equal
work or work of equal value is
applied.
2. For the purpose of this Article,
‘pay’ means the ordinary basic or
minimum wage or salary and any
other consideration, whether in
cash or in kind, which the worker
receives directly or indirectly, in
respect of his employment, from
his employer.
Equal pay without discrimination
based on sex means:
(a) that pay for the same work at
piece rates shall be calculated on
the basis of the same unit of mea-
surement;
(b) that pay for work at time rates
shall be the same for the same job.
3. The Council, acting in accordance
with the procedure referred to in
Article 251, and after consulting
the Economic and Social
Committee, shall adopt measures
to ensure the application of the
principle of equal opportunities
and equal treatment of men and
women in matters of employment
and occupation, including the
principle of equal pay for equal
work or work of equal value.
4. With a view to ensuring full equal-
ity in practice between men and
women in working life, the princi-
ple of equal treatment shall not
prevent any Member State from
maintaining or adopting measures
providing for specific advantages
in order to make it easier for the
underrepresented sex to pursue a
vocational activity or to prevent or
compensate for disadvantages in
professional careers.
Article 142 (ex Article 119a)
Member States shall endeavour to
maintain the existing equivalence
between paid holiday schemes.
Article 143 (ex Article 120)
The Commission shall draw up a
report each year on progress in
achieving the objectives of Article
136, including the demographic
situation in the Community. It shall
forward the report to the European
Parliament, the Council and the
Economic and Social Committee.
The European Parliament may invite
the Commission to draw up reports
on particular problems concerning
the social situation.
Article 144 (ex Article 121)
The Council may, acting unani-
mously and after consulting the
Economic and Social Committee,
assign to the Commission tasks in
connection with the implementa-
tion of common measures, particu-
larly as regards social security for the
migrant workers referred to in
Articles 39 to 42.
Article 145 (ex Article 122)
The Commission shall include a sep-
arate chapter on social developments
within the Community in its annual
report to the European Parliament.
The European Parliament may invite
the Commission to draw up reports
on any particular problems concern-
ing social conditions.
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1 Much of the information set out in this
document comes from a report by the
Institute for Labour Sciences at the
Catholic University of Louvain; this
survey was conducted under the aus-
pices of the Commission. The data set
out in the report on the absolute num-
ber of members have to be treated with
caution. Some of the organisations
have not counted their membership
properly, while some of the national
organisations are affiliated to more
than one European organisation. In
some cases, information supplied by
the employers includes firms without
any payroll employees. As far as the
workers' organisations are concerned,
it has to be borne in mind that some of
their figures still include pensioners,
the unemployed and the self-
employed. In other words, there may
be discrepancies depending on the
method of calculation used. In some
cases, data have been supplemented by
information taken from the 1997–98
International Labour Organisation
(ILO) report entitled Work in the
world.
2 Organisations with European affilia-
tion.
3 In some countries (e.g. Germany,
France, Ireland and Austria), a signifi-
cant proportion of undertakings or
federations are directly or indirectly
members of both UNICE and the
UEAPME. These data should therefore
be looked at relatively, taking into
account the mandates for each organi-
sation.
4 Communication from the Commis-
sion entitled 'Adapting and promoting
the social dialogue at Community
level', (COM(1998) 322 final,
20.5.1998).
5 The phase 'joint texts' covers agree-
ments, recommendations, declara-
tions, opinions and of conduct adop-
ted by the social partners.
6 The debates and conclusions of this
conference are summarised in Social
dialogue for success: the role of social
partners in EU enlargement, Warsaw
Conference, 18 and 19 March 1999,
European Commission, Directorate-
General for Employment and Social
Affairs, Brussels, 1999, 43 pp.
7 Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17
February 1975 on 'The approximation
of the laws of the Member States rela-
ting to collective redundancies', as
amended by Council Directive
92/56/EEC of 24 June 1992, consolida-
ted by Council Directive 98/59/EC of
20 July 1998.
8 Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14
February 1977 on 'The approximation
of the laws of the Member States rela-
ting to the safeguarding of employees’
rights in the event of transfers of
undertakings, businesses or parts of
businesses', as amended by Council
Directive 98/50/EC of 29 June 1998.
9 Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22
September 1994 on 'The establishment
of a European works council or a pro-
cedure in Community-scale underta-
kings and Community-scale groups of
undertakings for the purposes of infor-
ming and consulting employees'.
10 European systems of worker involve-
ment, report by the group of experts
chaired by E. Davignon, May 1997.
11 Proposal for a Council directive establi-
shing a 'General framework for
employee information and consulta-
tion in the European Community',
adopted by the European Commission
on 11 November 1998.
12 Data produced by the Foundation for
the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions on the basis of
EIRO data.
13 Source: European Foundation for the
Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions — European Industrial
Relations Observatory (eironline).
14 See ‘Financial participation’, Working
Paper No 1, February 1998. In this
paper, ETUC calls European employers’
organisations to conclude a framework
agreement on financial participation
and also invites the EC to strengthen
the necessary framework for promo-
ting such schemes.
15 Bleijenbergh, I., de Bruijn, J. and
Dickens, L., 'Strengthening and mains-
treaming equal opportunities through
collective bargaining', European
Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions, 1999.
16 Vaughan-Whitehead, D., 'Enlargement
to the East: Europe economic and
social remodelling', prepared for the
European Commission’s Forward
Studies Unit, September 1999.
17 See Vaughan-Whitehead, D. (ed.),
Paying the price: the wage crisis in cen-
tral and eastern Europe, prepared for
the ILO and European Commission,
Macmillan, 1998.
18 Maddison, A., Phases of capitalist deve-
lopment, Oxford University Press,
1982. 
19 These figures are presented for illustra-
tive purposes only. The author
(Maddison) acknowledges the difficul-
ties of producing comparable statistics.
20 Le temps de travail de ceux qui ne le
comptent pas, Bernard Brunhes
Consultants, Paris, 1999.
21 COM(97) 128 final, 16.4.1997.
22 Council Directive 93/104/EC.
23 Estimates of lifetime working hours are
notoriously difficult to make; the
approach here is to estimate average
age of entry into, and exit from,
employment (for men only), using
data on employment rates by detailed
age group (from the LFS). Comparing
these two ages allows some estimation
of how many years an individual is
likely to work over a lifetime (or, at
least, the trend in this figure, by using
two separate years). Assuming that all
intervening years are worked — i.e.
ignoring possible labour market
absences in any year, see subsection
2.2.2.4.1 — an estimate of lifetime
hours can made by multiplying the
number of years by the annual hours
worked.
These figures should be treated as esti-
mates at best, since they combine data
on entry and exit for separate groups,
rather than observing age at entry and
exit for the same individuals — which
is impossible with existing data.
Estimates of entry and exit ages are
made by identifying a ‘standard’
employment rate, based on the 30 to
54 age group, when there will be little
distortion due to education or retire-
ment; average age at both entry and
exit is the age at which the employ-
ment rate is half the standard rate
24 Annex to Council Directive 96/34/EC
of 3 June 1997 (OJ L 145, 19.6.1996,
p. 4).
25 Council Recommendation 82/857/
EEC on 'The principles of a Commu-
nity policy with regard to retirement
age'.
26 Anxo, D., Working time: research and
development 1995 - 97, EC.
27 Loi Robien.
28 Council Directive 93/104/EC concer-
ning certain aspects of the organisa-
tion of working time (OJ L 307,
13.12.1993, p. 18).
29 OJ L 167, 2.7.1999, p. 33.
30 OJ L 14, 20.1.2000, p. 29.
31 Proposals for Council directives: amen-
ding Directive 93/104/EC of 23
November 1993 concerning certain
aspects of the organisation of working
time to cover sectors and activities
excluded from that directive; and
concerning the organisation of wor-
king time for mobile workers perfor-
ming road transport activities and for
self-employed drivers.
32 OJ L 14, 20.1.1998, p. 9.
33 For further analysis of these issues, see
Part II, Section 3, of the 1999 employ-
ment report.
34 See 'Transformation of labour law in
Europe', final report, Directorate-
General for Employment and Social
Affairs, 1999.
35 This section is based on a study carried
out by the European Social Observa-
tory.
36 'National recovery programme' signed
in 1987.
37 Wassenaar Agreement signed in 1982.
38 No pact; institutional tripartism.
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